Two updates today. The first comment will be devoted to frontline news and the second to mobilization news.
Avdiivka sector. Yesterday the Russians occupied the brick factory in the western part of Ocheretyne and are currently seizing the rest of the built-up area of the village. The day before yesterday, they also took all the village of Novobakhmutivka, also with the aim of widening the salient, for obvious reasons. Tonight Ruslan Mykula (one of the founders of DeepState) stated that the Russians entered Soloviove (attacking from Novobakhmutivka) and have started attacks in the direction of Novooleksandrivka, attacking from Ocheretyne.
According to DeepState, further Russian advances along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway from Ocheretyne, in the direction of Prohres, were stopped thanks to counterattacks by the 100th Mechanized Brigade, which arrived in a hurry last week from the Serebrianka Forest (Kreminna sector) to try to fix the problems caused by the 115th Mechanized Brigade. Official sources of the 100th Brigade also confirm the redeployment.
https://t.me/Volyn100obrTrO/1301
It appears that this brigade has taken the responsibility for the section of the front between Ocheretyne (where the 115th Brigade is committed) and the section held by the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which is active (along with the smaller units attached to it) between Soloviove and Berdychi.
Today the spokesman of the Operational-Strategic Group “Khortytsia” (even though the sector falls under the jurisdiction of the OSG “Tavria”) stated that the 55th Mountain Brigade of the 41st CAA of the Central MD was brought into battle between Ocheretyne and Novobakhmutivka, to keep the pace of the advances. According to my analysis of MIA notices, it should have had 1+ month of refitting, quite a lot compared to the the average of the units active in Avdiivka.
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/191
Let’s recall the other Russian units active in the area. The 132nd Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps is trying to advance inside Novokalynove, at the moment without success: they control the eastern part of the village, and further advances are made difficult by the Ukrainian topographical advantage in the western part of the village and in Keramik. It’s opposed by elements of the Ukrainian 23rd and of the 115th Mechanized Brigades. Between Ocheretyne and Novokalynove the 35th Motorized Brigade of the 41st CAA was brought into battle over the last days (again, after a 1+ month refitting). The 30th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd CAA of the Central MD and the 433rd Motorized Regiment (i.e. the former 21st Motorized Brigade) of the new 27th Motorized Division of the 2nd CAA are active in Ocheretyne and Novobakhmutivka, in the directions of Novooleksandrivka, Prohres and Soloviove. Elements of the 15th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd CAA are also active in the latter direction.
Two geolocations were published today, the first showing that the Russians (presumably the 74th Motorized Brigade of the 41st CAA) managed to cross the Durna inside the village of Berdychi and reach the part of the village in the western bank of the small river, and the other showing that the Russians (the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps) reached the northern part of Semenivka. Both of them suggest that the Ukrainians are abandoning the lowlands of the upper Durna valley, retreating along the tree lines in the heights between the Durna and Novoselivka Persha, with the aim of making the Russians' approach to the Vovcha River as costly and as slow as possible.
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14088
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5237
The current status of the part of Orlivka in the western bank of the Durna, still in Ukrainian hands, is unclear. The attacks occurred over the recent days in that direction by the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps, in order to attempt to force the Durna attacking from Tonenke, were repelled by the 68th Jager Brigade (which is also defending Semenivka) and by elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade.
Occupying the part of Umanske south of the Durna and reaching the Yasnobrodivka-Netailove line became the main effort of the 90th Tank Division of the Central MD. During April, the 239th Tank Regiment joined the efforts of the 6th Tank Regiment and the 428th Regiment of the Territorial Forces (attached to this division) in this task, but no new successes were recorded, thanks to the work of Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Brigade, 78th Air Assault Regiment, 71st Jager Brigade and the 53rd Mechanized Brigade.
The so-called Russian peacekeepers recently began their withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh. The contigent previously deployed there is part of the 15th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd CAA (Russia’s only brigade specialized in peacekeeping activities, which has been suffering heavy losses in Avdiivka since October) and numbers 2000 men, fielding 99 BTR-82A(M)s. According to what the Ukrainian observer Mashovets has reported today, it goes without saying that the men (except the conscripts) and the vehicles will immediately go to replenish the units of the Group of Forces “Centre”, active in the Avdiivka sector. 49 BTR-82s are being delivered to the 15th Motorized Brigade; 16 will be delivered to the 30th Motorized Brigade and 34 will go to the units of the 90th Tank Division. All these units and formations are already committed in the Avdiivka sector. Moreover, according to Russian sources, the 228th Motorized Regiment of the 90th Tank Division recently received 30 BMP-3s.
In any case, the situation regarding vehicles in the Group of Forces “Centre” is far from optimal. According to the figures published by Mashovets in the recent days, the number of personnel in it has remained stable since mid-March (from 87 thousand to 86 thousand men), the number of artillery guns + MLRS has increased (from 1044 to 1100), but there has been a significant drop in the number of tanks (from 386 to 280) and also a reduction in armored vehicles (from 774 to 760). This is the least mechanized GoF in terms of “manpower to gear ratio”, due to very high losses of vehicles, and there is a huge need for replacements… The situation in regards to the reserves is also delicate: the command allows little time to the units to recover combat capabilities and brings every combat-ready unit into battle, to try to preserve the momentum as much as possible and not allow the Ukrainians to fortify. There are successes, but they come at a very high cost; for Mashovets it’s possible that in the future the Russians will have to choose whether to focus in the direction of Pokrovsk or Chasiv Yar.
Briefly on the Bakhmut sector. The 4th Assault Battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade carried out a counterattack between Ivanivske and Klishchiivka, recovering about 1 km of territory and stabilizing the situation south of Ivanivske, preventing the Russians, at the moment being, from achieving further advances that could jeopardize the holding of the eastern bank of the Donets-Donbas Canal in the southern flank of Bakhmut. The constant Russian attacks against Klishchiivka and Andriivka by units of the 2nd and 3rd Corps and by the 7th Military Base (49th CAA, Southern MD) are repelled without any success for the Russians.
The 41st Mechanized Brigade and the units attached to it at the moment are successfully defending the Kanal District of Chasiv Yar against the attacks by the 98th VDV Division (being praised by DeepState, despite not being an elite brigade at all), with support by the 5th Assault Brigade, deployed around Chasiv Yar. Russian attacks in the garages of the holiday cottages were repelled and at the moment the Russians don’t control any building of the district, except those east of the intersection of Zelena Street with Horbatoho Street.
The efforts by the 102nd Motorized Regiment of the 150th Motorized Division (8th CAA, Southern MD) to take the small part of Ivanivske still in Ukrainian hands were unsuccessful. In recent days, the intensity of the fighting has decreased and the Russians are expected to be amassing men and gear for new attacks. Mashovets today warned that in the coming days it’s very likely that there will be a large Russian attack to break through the area where the canal passes underground and into the overground pipes (i.e. the nature reserve south of the Kanal District), to reach the western bank in the direction of the Novy District and also to reach the canal along the T0504 Highway in the direction of Stupochky; the attack could be carried out by the 11th VDV Brigade and by elements of the 98th VDV Division, with the potential involvement of the 85th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps.
In all the other sectors there is no news worth mentioning, except that the Russians have conquered the entirety of Novomykhailivka and there are bitter clashes ongoing inside Krasnohorivka, with the Russians storming the area near the large brick factory. Moreover, the 9th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps has advanced into the orchards south of Pervomaiske, which significantly complicates matters for the Ukrainian 59th Motorized Brigade (deployed around Nevelske) and for their positions in the small salient that the front line forms in that area.
Let’s now list some of the details approved this month by the Verkhovna Rada and in general the news on the subject of mobilization.
Zelensky finally spoke out on the decision to lower the mobilization age to 25 (remember that the Verkhovna Rada had approved this at the end of May 2023, and all that was missing was his signature). He mentions how in this war there is a great need for young people who understand new technologies faster and are more versatile. His words are actually nothing new: for months, numerous Ukrainian officers and military personnel have been pushing for the age to be lowered below 25, like Oleksandr Alfiorov of the 3rd Assault Brigade in this YouTube interview. There are those who push for the minimum age being lowered to 18, although 22 is the age on which there is generally more consensus. Some officers have mentioned that the best age range for stormtroopers (the most needed category of soldiers) is 22-25.
A big problem I’ve mentioned in the past is the fact that young people who volunteer can choose the unit and the specialization, which means that the “worst” roles are the ones that are both the most in demand and for which there are the fewest applications, and so the 40+ year olds who are mobilized very often automatically become stormtroopers , which increases people’s fear of TRCs. Age is also a discriminating factor between capability of the brigades. The more popular and more capable brigades have priority in the allocation of young people and/or are able to recruit young volunteers. For example, I think that the “Azov” Brigade of the National Guard is the one with the lowest average age of all the Defense Forces, with a large share of servicemen in the 18-23 bracket, due to the fact that it attracts ideologically motivated youngsters. In general, the average age in the National Guard is lower than in the UAF. In the 3rd Assault Brigade too the average age is low due to the popularity of the unit and the volunteers it receives. The brigades of the Air Assault Forces receive the majority of the mobilized men under the age of 35 and in any case they cannot have soldiers older than 45. In contrast, in the “second/third tier” mechanized brigades, the tank brigades and the TDF brigades (after these have been losing most of their young servicemen to other branches since the second half of 2022), a large proportion of servicemen are in their 50s.
Now some details (that had not already been discussed here) on the mobilization law, which will officially come into force on 18 May. Bonuses have been established for those who sign a contract. For instance, those who go to the local TRC and volunteer will be entitled to a 2 months-long deferment before being called for service and starting training. Let’s remind that in Ukraine, a person can volunteer either by signing a 3/5 year contract (for those over 18 - although until they turn 21, parental consent is required), or by being formally classified as a mobilized person, serving until the end of martial law (it’s only possible for those over 25).
After each year of service, the contract soldiers shall be entitled to a one-time bonus of 100 thousand Hryvnias. After 3 months of signing, they will have a 150 thousand Hryvnias voucher for the purchase of a vehicle. They will be entitled to a 50% compensation on the down payment of a mortgage and they and their family members won’t have to pay any interest on current loans, except for real estate mortgage or loans for vehicle purchases.
A bonus of 70 thousand Hryvnias was approved to any serviceman for every 30 days spent on the front line (or the “zero” line, as the Ukrainians call it). Those who perform special actions, such as destroying enemy equipment, are entitled to a monetary bonus. A soldier is entitled to 30 days of leave per year, 15 days of which must be continuous.
Reportedly, it seems that the so-called “reservations”, i.e. the system that allows companies or state bodies deemed critical to the functioning of the state to make their workers (or part of them) exempt from mobilization, will also be updated/reviewed.
A thing that’s very little discussed is the exemption from mobilization for the family members of those killed in action, including those killed in the ATO/JFO since 2014. This is by far among the exemptions that make the most sense, but with the amount of those killed being a strictly increasing function, it means that the pool of the men exempt for this reason is growing month after month.
The new provisions also include the possibility of dischargement for POWs who are exchanged (which I personally don’t support - but it’s up to the representatives of the Ukrainians to make these decisions); that said, it concerns a very small number of people. Those who wish to remain in the ranks of the Defense Forces will be entitled to a 90 days leave, in any case.
Regarding women, there is no update, although debates on this issue are increasing. For now, it has been approved that on a voluntary basis women between the ages of 18 and 24 will be able to get military training. At the moment there is actually a mobilization for women: those with medical/nursing qualifications, for obvious reasons.
Regarding punishments for those who ignore the summons, a law was passed in the first reading (it’s one of the three laws voted by the parliament, the others being the general law on mobilization and the law on the mobilization of convicts); at the moment, the envisaged measures are very mild (e.g. 3 years-long suspended sentences, according to the cases I analyzed) and there doesn’t seem to have been a substantial tightening in this respect – an evader now faces up to 5 years and fines up to 204 thousand Hryvnias.
The handing of subpoenas “on the spot” has been legalized, if I understood correcty. In any case, to request documents, bring people to the TRC and so on, the employees of the latter must act in cooperation with the police, as they are not allowed to do this alone. There will therefore be greater cooperation between the two bodies. In Kyiv, for example, the TRC asked the police to bring in 5387 men who, for whatever reason, ignored the summon. At the moment, 1416 have been identified and taken to the TRC.
The possibility (not automatic, it must be requested to the court) to revoke the driving licence of anyone who fails to appear before the TRC after 10 days of receiving the summon has been approved. Clearly, the indirect aim is to hit those who live outside the cities and deprive them of the opportunity to work. The refusal to undergo a medical examination at the military medical commission has been criminalized - the failure to appear before the TRC being already a crime. The subpoena is considered delivered when it’s delivered to the official address of the summoned man. It will be the men’s responsibility to inform the TRC in case of change of residence. The oblasts are building the electronic registers of mobilizable men; the participation in which is, though, voluntary. However, it was specified by the spokesman of the MoD that this might change in the future (and attendance on this register being made compulsory).
Some additions to what was written: the 23rd Mechanized Brigade has had elements fighting around Pobjeda (Marinka sector) since January, and after the fall of Avdiivka additional elements of the brigade were deployed there, including the 425th Assault Battalion “Skala” (attached to the 23rd Brigade), which was moved to Ocheretyne just last week, as written in this article; other elements of this brigade are currently fighting in Novokalynove. During the early days of April it was suffering losses in Pobjeda. The 1st Tank Brigade had only its 1st Mechanized Battalion and its 1st Rifle Battalion in the northern flank of Avdiivka at the time of the battle of Avdiivka (the 129th TDF Brigade was deployed there too, and it was moved elsewhere in 2024); I can no longer find a geolocation or MIA notices of members of the 1st Tank Brigade for months from the Avdiivka sector - the bulk of the brigade has been in the Velyka Novosilka sector for months. As for the 104th TDF Brigade, only one battalion is deployed in the area (ditto for a battalion of the 112th and of the 120th TDF Brigades, which are further south); the bulk of the 104th TDF Brigade is between Ozarianivka and Mayorsk, in the Horlivka sector. The 115th Mechanized Brigade replaced the 71st Jager Brigade, which was in the same places that became the responsibility of the 115th Brigade (i.e. Ocheretyne and Novokalynove, according to MIA notices), and it remains that it bears very serious responsibility for what happened, along with OSG “Tavria", being the main unit responsible for that section of the front and for the deficiencies that have occurred in the defense of the area.
The 47th Mechanized Brigade also recently denied being deployed inside Ocheretyne, stating that in case of need, their Abrams and Bradleys can be committed to support the infantry of nearby units.