An update on the new Russian formations after my previous one, now that more news have been published.

Last year, with the “partial mobilization”, Russia replenished the ranks of the regular formations with the mobilized and formed the “Territorial Forces”. The mobilized are a too very diverse and large sample to be simplified. Even the VDV and the Naval Infantry have replenished their losses with the mobilized. But generally with the better ones, perhaps already members of these corps in the past. In addition, I read on a Russian Telegram channel that most of the personnel of the 70th and 71st Motorized Regiments of the 42nd Motorized Division (58th Army) would be made up of mobilized, yet they are having a decent performance in the battlefield.

The mobilized soldiers closest to the “Mobik” stereotype (older, less fit and little motivated) are generally the ones included in the motorized regiments of the Territorial Forces, a new entity formed by Russia last year. For instance, the vast majority of the protest video appeals published and translated by Dmtri from WarTranslated come from personnel of these regiments (or from mobilized men sent to the 1st or 2nd Corps).

These regiments are organized on a regional basis and are often attached to a regular formation. For example, the 1441st Regiment (mobilized men from Altaj Krai) would be attached to the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade; the 1307th Regiment (mobilized men probably from Moscow Oblast) would be among the ones under the command of the 150th Motorized Division, etc. Otherwise, they are included in new motorized divisions formed exclusively by territorial units. The Territorial Forces have several tank and artillery regiments too. I recommend this Substack which keeps a very good track of the new Russian units, that are much more hidden than the Ukrainian ones at least to a non-native speaking audience like most of us.

Now Russia is beginning to create far more complex formations: Combined Arms Armies.

The 25th Combined Arms Army is being established in Irkutsk Oblast and Primorsky Krai (i.e. Vladivostok region) - denying initial reports, it will not be part of the Central Military District. It will have 30 thousand troops. Latest reports write it will made up of two separate motorized divisions + detached brigades. The existing formations of the Eastern Military District will have to transfer about 10 thousand officers and contract personnel who will form the experienced cadre of the 25th Army. A side note: given the losses that a large part of the EMD formations are experiencing (all of them are deployed in the frontlines between Polohy and Vuhledar, except for the 57th Brigade of the 5th Army which is near Bakhmut) and will suffer in the next months, it will be very interesting to understand the feasibility of such a move without major damages to the operational capabilities of the existing formations.

The rest of the personnel will be made up, in their intentions, of volunteers. Lots of announcements of open positions have been published, the salaries + bonuses seem very competitive (a Russian source quoted in the latest Substack report called them “record”: 600 thousand rubles as a one-time bonus and 200 thousand rubles monthly salary); also one can join this formation from any part of Russia and not only from the Far East. In case the volunteers will not be enough (that is, probably), I assume it will be manned by new mobilized men.

It’s already known that the 25th Army will be sent to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts (it’s written in the announcements) and will begin to be deployed to the front since December. It will likely relieve the most damaged formations deployed to the front.

The strange thing, however, is that despite being formed, trained and associated with the Eastern Military District (training is supposed to be in Dalnegorsk), from what I have read the 25th Army will actually be part of the Southern Military District.

This could be due to organizational reasons - the whole front from the mouth of the Dnipro up to the border with the Polohy sector is in the hands of the SMD, but probably also strategic ones: I had read that at the moment the responsibility for the southern front could mainly be in the hands of the EMD, but this could change and the SMD could see an ever increasing importance.

It could also be due to “power clashes” among the various MDs. The Southern Military District is undoubtedly the largest, the most autonomous and also the most capable. With the new additions it could end up larger than all the rest of the Military Districts combined and almost an Army in its own right. This would also reflect the growing importance of Rostov on the Russian supply chain. Let’s recall that there have been instances where coordination between MDs hasn’t been good at all and in fact the Russian Army tries to mix units from different MDs as little as possible. The management pyramid of the Russian Army is much more complicated than the Ukrainian one and there are much more power hubs, between MDs, CAAs, Divisions, etc.

With the exception of the 3rd Corps created last year and aggregated to the Western Military District (although I wonder if this is only on paper - actually it operates in the territories of responsibility of the 8th Army of the Southern MD), only the SMD in fact saw the establishment of new formations (plus the integration of the 1st and 2nd Corps - the former armies of the D/LPR). This might suggest that the Eastern MD may be intended to be a sort of operational appendage of the SMD and confirm that the Western and Central MDs will be intended to operate only north of the Siversky Donets River without trespassing elsewhere, like it has been the case for over a year.

The creation of the 18th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District was also made official as well, confirming the rumors of the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets of a couple of weeks ago. It will consist of two Corps: the 22nd Corps (already existing) and the 40th Corps (to be created - the news of the latter’s establishment had been known for months). The commander of the Army will be Lieutenant General Arkady Marzoev, former commander of the 22nd Corps. This Corps is based in Crimea and is made up of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade and the 127th Reconnaissance Brigade. Both are active and deployed near Kherson on the opposite bank of the Dnipro.

The 40th Corps (based in Stavropol) is expected to include the new 47th Motorized Division (manned apparently in large part by mobilized men from Crimea) and the new 144th Motorized Brigade. In total, the 18th Army will have 25 thousand men. This Army is supposed to be sent to the Kherson Oblast (part of it, moreover, is already deployed there) to enable the units currently there to be moved to the southern front (the one affected by the counteroffensive), which is always in need of reinforcements. The deployment of the 18th Army could be a prelude to the departure of the elements of the 49th Army still in Kherson Oblast and of the 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet.

Mashovets said in early August that the 70th Motorized Division of the 18th Army would have already been sent to Kherson Oblast to replace the 7th VDV Division which is now fully deployed between the Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka sectors. I could not find any news about this division. It could be an additional formation to be added to the two Corps that hasn’t been made official yet or it could be the 47th Division that has changed its name so as not to be confused with the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA of the WMD. According to Mashovets this 70th Division should consist of the 26th and 28th Motorized Regiments, the 24th Rifle Regiment, the 17th Tank Regiment and the 81st Artillery Regiment.

In addition, one new regiment will be added to both the 98th and 106th VDV Divisions (respectively, the 299th and 119th Regiments). Right now these divisions consist of just two airborne regiments. They will probably be reformed along the lines of the 76th and 7th VDV Divisions, that is, they will change from “airborne” to “air assault” classification. The main distinction is that the latter are more heavily equipped, e.g. often with BMPs instead of BMDs, and have a tank unit. The 106th Division (deployed entirely around Soledar) for example may have already received a tank company/battalion - Telegram channels associated with the division have been posting videos of T-90Ms in action in the sector for weeks. Nonetheless, the two new regiments of the 98th and 106th Divisions according to Russian sources will not be mechanized, i.e., they will not have heavy equipment, but instead will be a kind of rifle regiments, I assume specialized for combat in forested or urban settings.

The VDV will also create the new 104th Division by expanding the 31st Brigade (so they are going to add two more new regiments, since a brigade is very similar to a regiment in the Russian order of battle, particularly in the VDV). There is talk of the potential future creation of up to five new VDV brigades. The 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade is also going be created (until now the VDV had only the organic artillery units of its divisions/brigades). I believe it will be part of the 7th VDV Division.

Also I wonder if former Wagner members who sign contracts with the MoD will be redirected to the new VDV units (a large chunk of Wagner’s professional core is made up of former paratroopers after all). This should also be put in context of the rumours over what will become of PMC Wagner after the deaths of Prigozhin and Utkin, and whether the armed wing of the Russian foreign policy will be taken over by smaller, less ambitious PMCs such as Redut or Patriot, with the Russian MoD having removed PMCs from deployment in Ukraine. At the same time, the creation of new regular formations could be a way to curb the proliferation of volunteer battalions, BARS detachments, PMCs, etc., that often have poor communication with each other (something not rarely reported by Russian soldiers), taking a cue from what Ukraine did back in 2015.

The important issues are the usual: will they be able to find enough men for these new formations and to replenish the existing ones without making the ongoing mobilization effort more and more stringent? Even more importantly, will they be able to find enough decent gear to equip the new formations? On paper, the new formations will need a really large number of tanks and IFVs.

Sure, in theory there should still be plenty of BMPs in storage, especially BMP-1s, which are being delivered to an increasing number of units in fact. We will see if the Russian reports about Kurganmashzavod allegedly ramping up production of BMP-3s (and refurbishment of BMP-2Ms) are true or not. Ditto for Uralvagonzavod for the new T-90Ms and the upgraded T-72B3Ms and T-80BVMs. In recent months, Russian formations likely received a very large number of T-80BVs, probably because it was the tank in storage in the best condition that could be sent without or with very little refurbishment. At the same time, the Russians stated they were refurbishing hundreds of T-62M(V)s. At the moment they are a rare sight at the front. Only a few formations have received them, such as the 5th Tank Brigade and the 138th Motorized Brigade. As tank losses increase and the tank units of the new formations have to be equipped, they may become a more frequent sight.

Anyway, the Russians cannot use, as they have too few, the Ukrainian “trick” of equipping part of the new mechanized battalions with relatively safe and modern MRAPs instead of IFVs. The increasing number of rifle regiments being formed could signal that they are unable to properly mechanize the entirety of the new units (this is also true for Ukraine, with its new rifle battalions).