It is worth noting, for those who don’t follow these matters directly, that the area of operations of the 3rd Assault Brigade is the middle Zherebets valley, which falls within the administrative boundaries of Luhansk Oblast. For some reason, ever since the 3rd Assault Brigade was deployed there in mid April, they themselves always refer to their AO as “Kharkiv” or “Kharkiv Oblast”; likely as their staging area is Borova (Kharkiv Oblast, in fact), which is also the direction of the offensive actions of the 3rd Motorized Division (20th CAA) - the formation the 3rd Assault Brigade is facing - and, further north, of the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA), but so be it.
Both the 3rd Assault Brigade and the 12th “Azov” Brigade of the National Guard are good for this stuff and in fact the vast majority of those who volunteer to be stormtroopers go there. The Air Assault Forces have their own Training Center and the training there is of good quality, as far as I know. In regards to the mechanized brigades, and in the Ground Forces in general, the whole thing is much more hit and miss; there are good brigades, decent ones and third-rate ones. For those who have time, I recommend reading the posts from early July onward by Roman Donik, an instructor at the 151st Training Center of the Ground Forces, who denounces the many problems there are with training in the UAF.
Among them: a part of the instructors in some centers are incompetent - which he says is due to the fact that the certifications to be an instructor are all issued in Desna (where the 169th Training Center is located), under strict control of the Chief Sergeant of Training in the Ground Forces (although fortunately the head of the 169th Center was replaced recently); this leads to the fact that some of the recruits finish training with not-good skills, which is something that needs to be solved by the brigades to which they are assigned. Donik also stated, from his point of view as a serviceman of a Training Center, that combat brigades don’t have the means and the specialists to provide comprehensive training and should have a more constructive attitude with Training Centers. He also strongly criticizes the system of Chief Sergeants in the UAF, which are a kind of “caste”, far worse than Generals, in his view.
But there is also the fact that certain brigade and OTG commanders pressure the instructors from the Training Centers in order to receive recruits who are not ready yet (which risks making them avoidable casualties in the front line), forcing the instructors to forge exit checks, where the recruit is examined and from there can go on to perform combat duties in a military unit only if the required skills are assessed as satisfactory. Then there is the phenomenon that brigades, particularly TDF ones, are very reluctant to send their men to training centers - whether it’s for a course to make them sergeants, officers or experts in certain specialties. The reason is that it may happen, and it happens a lot with TDF brigades, that those who take these courses are then sent to other brigades (e.g. of the Ground Forces) - but the fact that they are not let go is indeed a net loss for the UAF, overall.
I think, by the way, that this is likely a derivation of Soviet military jargon for operational warfare. E.g. what the Russians call the Borova direction, for the Ukrainians is the Svatove direction; what the Russians call the Orikhiv direction, for the Ukrainians is the Tokmak direction, and so on. Although Ukrainians more generally tend to refer to all of this part of the front as the “Kupyansk-Lyman direction".