On the shells for Ukrainian artillery. According to Der Spiegel, the 120k 122mm shells that Germany recently pledged to Ukraine were found in Bulgaria, have already been paid for and will arrive “as quickly as possibile”. This is excellent news for Ukraine as will ensure that howitzers of this caliber will enjoy a decent rate of fire for quite a lot of weeks.

Also, the EU has promised that, as part of the EU-organized transfer of shells to Ukraine, 170k shells will arrive by the end of March (I guess, largely, newly produced 155mm shells?). Asking u/Gecktron just in case: I assume that the shells provided by Germany and paid for by them unilaterally are outside the numbers pledged by the EU?

The news that the 120k 122mm shells promised by Germany have an EU origin also means that they are out of the Czech procurement plan (500k 155mm shells + 300k 122mm shells) that will be sourced from outside the EU. I still have some doubts about the full feasibility of this project - some of the countries rumored to be supplying the shells are South Korea, South Africa and Turkey. South Korea has a large stock and ample production capacity, but it seems that it’s only willing to replenish the stockpiles of countries that provide shells to Ukraine, and not to supply them directly (not sure about this, but it seems to me that the use of South Korean 155mm shells in Ukraine has never been proven). Relatively similar situation with South Africa: Rheinmetall has a plant there, and at least a NATO country purchased South African-made 155mm shells (there had been other smaller orders during 2022, I guess it was the Netherlands?). UAWeapons had identified a presumably South African-made shell in Ukraine, but I’m pretty sure South Africa prohibits direct export of shells to Ukraine. Turkey is another very important country, as it has good production capacity (it also produces DPICMs) and stocks and above all doesn’t seem to have issues in supplying Ukraine directly. Although purchases from Turkey at the EU level are very difficult as they are blocked by some countries, so funding is needed at unilateral level (from Germany, the UK, also the US if new funds are approved, etc.).

All those three countries aforementioned produce 155mm shells, while it’s not clear from whom 122mm shells would come from, in terms of non-EU producers. One of them could be Pakistan, which has already supplied very significant quantities to Ukraine (although it seems there were, at least for some batches, quality and full compatibility problems). This article suggests that in recent months, perhaps in Turkey but more plausibly in Azerbaijan, a 122mm shell production line has been opened with a production capacity of 30k units per month. Possibly the financing of this production could be part of the Czech plan? I don’t know. Another producer of 122m shells from outside the EU is Bosnia-Herzegovina - capacities are presumably limited but the country pushes above its weight in terms of production for Ukraine (particularly for mortar bombs, if I recall correctly). Ditto for Serbia - it seems that through some middlemen Serbian-made shells and rockets quite often end up in Ukraine. Then there are other unlikely suppliers such as India, whose 155mm shell had been identified, but I am pretty sure their official policy is against direct supplies to Ukraine and the supply may have been a middleman’s initiative in violation of agreements. There was also evidence in the past that the Ukrainians used Iranian-made (!) 122mm shells, but it was probably a masterstroke by some Western countries in collaboration perhaps with an African country, and difficult to repeat.

Then there is the matter of the supply from Greek stockpiles that had been announced several months ago and had to be paid for by the US (50k 105mm shells, 20k 155mm shells, 5k 203mm shells) which would be critical especially for 105mm shells, whose situation in terms of availability is very bad. The indirect transfer of 155mm shells, as had been rumored, could be repeated with Japan (as done with South Korea in 2023), but the US (with their deep stockpiles) are needed to allow this.

In any case: the two donations coming soon from Germany and the EU could give a breath to Ukraine’s artillery. If, and I repeat if (and they are big ifs!) the Czech plan succeeds (in terms of funding and full feasibility), the US succeeds in approving a military aid package for Ukraine, and the EU comes at least close to what has promised for 2024, I am not afraid to write that the situation for Ukrainian artillery during 2024 could become more than decent for defensive purposes and there would be a great gap filler in anticipation of Western production increases from 2025 onward.

Thanks! And yes, I think it’s a backlog from the amount that should have been provided during 2023.

If Google Translate is reliable, it’s a literal translation of what is written in the article from Der Spiegel. It’s a Bulgarian stockpile (possibly owned by private businesses?) that would have been “discovered” by the German procurement office for Ukraine, as the article puts it. I think the word “found” is quite apt, as Bulgaria is already among the main suppliers of shells to Ukraine, so in some ways it’s strange that this existing stockpile had not already been sent so far.

Simply wow, if that’s the case! That would be even better, as the situation for 152mm shells is very bad - much worse than for 122mm shells. It would allow Ukrainian howitzers of this caliber to return firing at decent paces. I can fully understand the request for anonymity by the suppliers, but I am very curious to know which countries have been hoarding these stocks of 152mm shells so far and are now willing to send them to Ukraine. Outside the EU there are really very few producers not allied with Russia, and Pakistan doesn’t produce 152mm shells as far as I know. Could it be, for instance, a country which is getting ride of 152mm guns and giving away the stockpile of such shells?

That was about the losses as of February 2023, and I think that was still a considerable underestimate. Arestovich said in early June 2022 that about 10 thousand Ukrainian soldiers had fallen in action up to that point; I don’t see how there could have been only another 10k dead between June 2022 and February 2023.

TDF in the very first weeks played a huge and underestimated role, but was still limited in size. Only after the early weeks it went into action as a fully formed and large branch, having integrated a very large number of volunteers. It became very relevant all along the whole front line only from April 2022, however, when the brigades were authorized to perform combat tasks outside their own oblast.

It’s true that the first weeks of the invasion saw units getting overwhelmed and also heavy losses from missile attacks on barracks etc., but from early June 2022 to February 2023 there was the second part of Russia’s Donbas offensive (per Ukrainian sources, Ukraine had 200+ KIAs per day around mid June ‘22), Pisky, the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives, the first part of the battle of Bakhmut and the entire battle of Soledar, along with the early stage of the battle of the Svatove-Kreminna line and countless minor clashes elsewhere.

The Russians never came close to that operation, storm aside. The 7th VDV Division, i.e. the formation that was supposed to thunder run towards Odesa (in case of almost total collapse of Ukrainian defense, I assume) got stuck on the outskirts of Mykolaiv and the rumoured landing plan of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, that was supposed to join the VDV in marching towards Odesa, was quickly cancelled.

In early March the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade got beaten in Voznesensk and driven far away from there as Ukrainian reinforcements arrived, with the Russians totally failing to cross the Southern Bug, and then beginning to lose ground even near Mykolaiv and having to switch to a primarily defensive instance in that sector.

Small corrections to the otherwise very good work: the Group of Forces “Centre” covers a smaller area in the south: roughly the Avdiivka sector, from Niu York to Pervomaiske/Nevelske. The southernmost area, including around Marinka and Novomykhailivka, is under the GoF “South”, which also covers from north of Niu York (thus including the Horlivka sector) up to the Siversky Donets River. The GoF “Vostok” covers from Volodymyrivka to the Konka River (between Orikhiv and Polohy); in the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly the sub-jurisdiction belongs to the 36th CAA while in the Vuhledar sector to the 29th CAA, with the 5th CAA covering only the western bank of the Mokri Yaly up to Marfopil.

The GoF “Centre”, specifically the 25th CAA, also covers the Kreminna sector from the Siversky Donets up to Yampolivka. From Terny up to the Oskil River along the official state border, on the other hand, there is indeed the jurisdiction of the GoF “West”, while the state border in the north is covered by the smaller GoFs “Belgorod”, “Kursk” and “Bryansk”.

I don’t know him, but in any case the best way to know which areas a given GoF covers is reading Russian MoD daily bulletins and checking what Ukrainian settlements and brigades the spokesmen of the various GoFs are talking about. The Kreminna sector (which the Russians call the Krasnolimansky direction) up to Yampolivka is still under the responsibility of the GoF “Centre”, which over the last months deployed the new 25th CAA to the area.

Lately the GoF “South” seems in fact to have gained the northern and central part of the Siversk sector, up to Siversky Donets, which was originally under the GoF “Centre”.

The Horlivka sector (down to just north of Niu-York) is under the responsibility of the GoF “South”, just like the area of Marinka, Krasnohorivka (the one north of Marinka), Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka; with the 68th Corps subordinate to GoF “South”. The GoF “Vostok” begins only from Volodymyrivka.

The GoF “Zaporizhzhia” was disbanded in January also according to Ukrainian sources: the 35th CAA came under the control of the GoF “Vostok” (and thus the Polohy sector), whereas the 58th CAA, along with the 76th and 7th VDV Divisions and other smaller units, came under the GoF “Dnepr”, which became the largest GoF in terms of manpower and in fact has now the responsibility over the Orikhiv sector.

Once you have time, would it be possible to write more on the current R&R that both belligerents are doing in the new thread?

Do you mean the units currently in the rear for recovery or how the latter works, generally speaking?