Just now I saw this video and the Scooby-Doo vans made me think back to an interview from April I had read some time ago and that was never discussed. Disclaimer: it’s in Italian language; it’s a heavily pro-Russian interview with numerous instances of straight up propaganda, but I think it’s interesting because there are a few lines of honesty about the situation and the issues and what I like about these interviews is that they allow us to understand how the other side thinks.

The interviewed are members of the Pyatnashka Brigade, a (I guess) battalion-sized unit founded by a volunteer from Abkhazia and manned by Russian volunteers (with a few foreign ones), operating (at least during the date of the interview) around Spartak/Opytne in the Avdiivka sector. It’s a private unit part of former 100th Brigade of the DPR (in turn former DPR Republican Guard), now the 110th Brigade of the 1st Corps of the Southern Military District. Those who want to can read it all with a translator - I will select, summarizing them and adding my personal opinions, the highlights of the interview that I find interesting.

First of all… The interviewer, with soldiers from the unit, reached a bunker near the frontline using an UAZ-452, aka Scooby-Doo’s van. Why? I mean, even a BRDM-2 would be safer. The reason is admitted by the interviewed soldier: that van makes it possible to go from the staging areas to the line of contact more safely than doing that with an IFV/APC, as the Ukrainians avoid hitting these vans (at least unless they are unequivocally close to the frontline) for fear of hitting civilians moving in the outskirts of Donetsk. Unlike other cities, in fact Donetsk is still a heavily populated city with very tough battles (Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Marinka) going on a handful of kilometers from its residential neighborhoods. Beyond the propaganda in this interview and without denying individual instances in which Ukrainians may have hit civilian targets, Ukrainians really do seem to be fighting with gloves on while near such a populated area. Let’s think back to when it was the Russians fighting on the outskirts of a very large center (Kyiv, Kharkiv) and their terror shellings.

The Pyatnashka Brigade often changes its HQ building - at the time of the interview it was an abandoned factory, probably on the outskirts of Donetsk - for fear of being located and hit with GMLRS.

What motivates a Russian to go to war as a volunteer? One volunteer in the article states he’s convinced that either he was going to fight in Ukraine or in a while he would have to fight NATO on Moscow’s doorstep. This is clearly a delusional take, but at the same time it makes us realize that for part of Russian society this is perceived as an existential war, unlike, for example, Afghanistan. Some time ago I was reading this article. Unfortunately, in addition to the whole segment of the population that hangs on Putin’s lips and walks around with ZOV stickers, there also lots of Russians who even if on the surface are educated, open to the West, not supporters of their government… still don’t want their country to lose the war, either out of national grandeur or fear of potential humiliation. I think this has to be well evaluated. I myself at the beginning of the war expected more major reactions from the Russian society and a greater and earlier war weariness, but it did not happen. There are of course individuals in Russia who protested against the war and did what they could and to whom my solidarity goes, but my 2 cents is that overall Russian society may be more psychologically ready than we’d like to think for a long war and to accept greater sacrifices, both economically and in terms of a larger mobilization, if they perceive their country to be in danger.

The men of the brigade complain that Russian artillery has little effect on Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka. The city is home to a very large coke plant, incidentally owned by the same group (Metinvest) that had Azovstal, which like the latter has an immense network of underground tunnels capable of resisting heavy bombings. The Ukrainians after 2015 expanded these tunnels and connected them to other buildings in the city. In fact, soldiers not deployed on the zero line, their dormitories, provisions, ammunition and spare parts depots… are almost all underground. This, in addition to the fortifications built in the surrounding countryside and Avdiivka’s slightly elevated position is allowing the city to be an impregnable fortress for a year and a half now. They complain, as a result, that their drones see only a small part of Ukrainian activities. Drones they have had to buy with donations (although this on the other hand often happens in Ukrainian units as well).

A very interesting point is that the myriad of Russian units (the Pyatnashka Brigade is - or was? - technically a private unit, although framed in a DPR brigade) are competing for scarce resources (armored vehicles, shells…). They also denounce the lack of coordination between the units and the lack of competence of the decision-maker officers at the operational level, who would not even know the positions they had ordered to assault. This is very important - Russia has this ball and chain of having so many historical DPR units, BARS, volunteer battalions sponsored by the Russian Oblasts, PMCs (the latters until last month) etc. that inevitably compete, which often results in rivalry; the problem of lack of coordination is very serious too. I think Ukraine should be commended because against odds it has managed to avoid this problem, with a process that began long ago, already after the battles of summer 2014, and maintained it despite the extreme surge in the number of soldiers after the invasion. Institutionalizing the Azov Regiment, framing volunteer units as motorized battalions in the regular brigades, other volunteer detachments were the base for several TDF units… Ditto for units composed of foreign volunteers such as the Georgian Legion in first place. This made it possible to maintain coordination and a clear vertical structure without pseudo-militias competing for resources and led by warlords with personality cults. That said, communication between Ukrainian brigades could still be improved and the absence of an intermediate-level permament structure between the brigades and the Operational Command of a certain front (net of the recently formed 10th Corps), primarily a divisional level, is being felt.

During an offensive in the first half of February the soldiers complain of having lost “countless men” for “a few meters gain.” On February 7 alone, the interviewed soldiers' unit had 31 KIAs (described as among their best guys) due to Ukrainian shelling in an attempt to storm entrenched positions. The Italian interviewer then wrote about seeing a large number of coffins both inside and outside the Luhansk hospital, where he had passed earlier (I would not rule out that, given the date of the interview, Luhansk was a logistical hub for repatriations to Russia of the bodies of those killed in Bakhmut).

Generally speaking I think Avdiivka wider sector may be in the podium of the places with the most human losses for the Russians since the beginning of the conflict. The assaults against the city have seen the DPR units, such as Sparta and Somalia Battalions etc., bleeding dry, along with their best and bravest men, perhaps already volunteers before 2022 and with good knowledge of the terrain. I recall u/Glideer had flagged this in the past. Now the DPR army, integrated as a Russian Army’s Corps, is very short of locals and has been enlisting mobilized men from Russia proper for months, with much less motivation and who from the looks of a few videos also seem to be treated with contempt by officers of former DPR units.

Avdiivka is also one of the worst sectors if not perhaps the worst for the Russians in terms of cost/performance ratio since the beginning of the conflict. Huge losses for very little territory gained. The only noteworthy advance this year was the capture of Krasnohorivka north of the city, but the Ukrainians were able to halt progress and hold them off from the rail line. In all of this the Ukrainians certainly had and have casualties, but thanks to the physical advantages they have I am sure they were well below those of the Russians. An evidence of this is that Ukrainians in Avdiivka have a relatively small number of formations. In the recent period the Russians have slowed down offensive actions against the city, which has allowed the Ukrainians to deploy most of the battalions of the 35th and 36th Marine Brigades to Velyka Novosilka, whereas previously these brigades had been a very important part of the Avdiivka’s UAF garrison for months.

Ukrainian officer and military observer Konstantin Mashovets was talking of 830 tanks, 1500 armored vehicles, over 1000 pieces among artillery and MLRS, overall about 100k men.

https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1024

Considering that in that sector there all the formations of the Western and Central MDs deployed to Ukraine + the 76th VDV Division + mobilized regiments and BARS detachments, it seems a likely estimate (though perhaps a bit exaggerated, especially in equipment). At the moment there is nothing too concerning but the Russian grouping is there and should not be underestimated. The Ukrainians have also sent many troops to the area recently - I would not rule out that there are not fewer Ukrainians between Kupyansk and Kreminna than between Kamyanske and Velyka Novosilka.

Well let’s hope so! Btw I think this is a military intelligence estimate, not a visual one; I find it possible that much of the equipment at the moment is dispersed along the Aidar Valley and thus partially protected from the firing of the Excalibur and GMLRS.