I did a very quick search and the findings confirmed what I was expecting: in the 2024 draft budgetary plan voted by Germany’s cabinet in July 2023, the same amount approved for 2025 now (4 billion euros) had been allocated for Ukraine. Only in November the parliament’s budget committee approved to double the value of the aid for the current year (to 8 billion euros).

The numbers contained in the draft budgetary plan are the forecast figures for the purpose of budget approval, which doesn’t mean they are going to be the figures actually disbursed (to be recorded in the final budget law). I’m surprised that, as far as I can see, no journalist from the media that reported this has bothered to delve a bit into the matter.

Small clarification on the initial order of battle. The sector affected by the main axis of the Ukrainian counteroffensive was defended by the 291st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Division of the 58th CAA (which was in Robotyne) and by the 70th Motorized Regiment of the same division (in Novopokrovka). There was likely also a battalion of the 71st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd Division (in addition to the 417th Separate Recon Battalion of the 42nd Division), but the bulk of this regiment was operating in the western bank of the Mokri Yaly in the Velyka Novosilka sector; only in late August did it join the rest of the division around Robotyne (when the 76th VDV Division arrived too).

The 7th VDV Division was not on the second line, but in Kherson; in late June its 247th Air Assault Regiment was transferred to the western bank of the Mokri Yaly where it remained until late August (when it was moved to Verbove). In contrast, the 56th and 108th Air Assault Regiments arrived in the Verbove area in the very last days of July (along with the 100th Recon Brigade of the 58th CAA), following the Ukrainians bringing the 116/117/118th Mech Brigades into battle.

The 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade and the 45th Spetsnaz VDV Brigade were deployed around Robotyne and made an important contribution since the first day of the counteroffensive, particularly in terms of fire support (ATGMs, Lancets etc.). Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were employed in the Kamyanske sector; it was not until early July afaik that a battalion of this brigade arrived in Robotyne (followed, during the following weeks, by the rest of the brigade). At least one battalion of the 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (along with its Storm-Z detachment) arrived in early July in Robotyne, while the rest of the regiment was covering Polohy together with the 35th CAA.

Numerous regiments of the Territorial Forces were committed in the Tokmak sector, along with several BARS detachments - some were already there before the beginning of the counteroffensive, lots of others arriving later. As early as of June the 1430th Regiment was attached to the 291st Motorized Regiment for instance, and the 1429th to the 70th Motorized Regiment (afterwards, the 1441st Regiment to the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, and so on). The 1429th and 1430th were involved in a very sustained and bloody manner, so much that they received “Guards” status (which is very rare for regiments of the Territorial Forces - can’t recall others having this status).

On the Ukrainian side, a platoon tactical group from the 46th Airmobile Brigade was also involved on the first day, but the brigade did not return into action until over two months later (i.e. when other brigades of the Air Assault Forces were committed too); a company tactical group of the National Guard (probably from the 3rd “Spartan” Brigade) was involved on the first day as well. The elements of the 33rd Mech Brigade involved (two company tactical groups), attacking in the direction of Novopokrovka, made quite a mess, even taking the wrong path, as far as I know; that direction was never seriously developed later, while the 47th Mech Brigade and the other units managed to achieve some successes towards Robotyne, that were then sought to be further developed over the following weeks.

The 33rd and 65th Mech Brigades are not part of the 9th Corps, but after all as written, the corps did not (and does not) have the traditional structure of a corps in terms of command and control, cohesion among maneuver units, and the presence of organic support units.

The three National Guards brigades were not examined for actual troop strengths but it’s notable that the 3rd Brigade was previously the Azov battalion, which was renamed a regiment then 3rd Assault and now the 12th brigade. Is it likely that Azov could instantly expand their ranks 3 times after they were surrounded in Mariupol?

The 3rd Brigade of the National Guard is the “Spartan” Brigade, which had been reformed a few months before (previously it was the 3rd Brigade of Operational Purpose), as part of the “Offensive Guard” framework, after being engaged during the battle of Bakhmut back in the previous winter. They were involved in the counteroffensive around Robotyne from the beginning until the end basically, particularly supporting the 47th and 65th Mech Brigades.

The 3rd Assault Brigade is part of the Ground Forces and was never committed in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The successor to the Azov Regiment is the 12th “Azov” Brigade of the NG, which was deployed in the Tokmak sector initially and participated in some minor actions near Novopokrovka, only to be transferred to the Serebrianka Forest in August. At that time this brigade was still being revived after Mariupol; let’s recall that Prokopenko and other senior officers of the former Azov Regiment returned to Ukraine in July 2023, and regained command of the brigade, which today numbers around 7 thousand men.

The 15th “Kara-Dag” Brigade of the NG replaced the 33rd Mech Brigade to the west and the south-west of Novopokrovka in early July, while the 14th “Chervona Kalyna” Brigade of the NG was brought into action in August to reinforce the offensive actions between Novoprokopivka and Verbove.