Ukraine will still have access to the small river ports at the mouth of the Danube such as Reni and Izmail, and since the ships reach the Black Sea through a channel entirely in Romanian territory, Russia will not be able to do anything. The problem is that these ports have very low capacity compared to Black Sea ports like Odesa or Chornomorsk. In the first months after the grain agreement came into force (let’s remember, wheat, but also corn, barley, sunflower oil…), flows returned to normal levels, but in the months when the sea ports were blocked, they were quite low (more limited quantities were exported via other countries such as Romania). Rail transport is not very convenient as there are bottlenecks at the Polish or Romanian borders due to the different track gauge, and the routes are already clogged due to the export of other Ukrainian products that could not go by sea not even before today (such as metallurgical products) and the import of petroleum products, vehicles, ammunition, etc., which arrive entirely by rail or road.

That said, wheat prices are at relatively reasonable levels and below February 2022. The EU is going to have a good harvest this year which will boost net exports, Argentina as well will have a very good harvest which will be able to offset the drop in Australian production, hopefully India will remove the export ban in place since last year.

Ukraine through a UN initiative had even gifted a few shiploads of grain to countries like Somalia and Yemen, but I think Russia will be willing to sell grain at a very discounted price to African countries as a PR initiative to hide what they are doing in Ukraine and keep the support of African countries.

Bakhmut has become a clusterfuck in terms of Russian units deployed there. Wagner’s withdrawal has really complicated the situation in the area. Russia is doing what it usually tends to avoid (and unlike what Ukraine often does), i.e. sending units of a single formation to different sectors and mix those of several military districts in one sector.

According to the Center for Defense Strategies, a new BARS detachment has been recently transferred from Kreminna to Bakhmut. The sector hosts the vast majority of the 2nd Corps (former LPR Army, now SMD), units made up largely of Russian mobilized and of the 3rd Corps (WMD), the latter having been transferred from Avdiivka (where Russia appears to have eased its grip, although the 10th Tank Regiment is still down there) to cover the flanks after Wagner’s withdrawal. Elements of the 150th Division of the SMD are being transferred from Marinka (currently one tank and one motorized regiment).

The 217th Regiment of the 98th VDV Division is active in Berkhivka, while the 331st seems to be still in Kreminna belying reports that it was in Bakhmut as well. In the southern flank near Kurdyumivka the 57th Brigade of the EMD is present. In Dubovo-Vasylivka there is the 200th Brigade from the Arctic Fleet while the other two Arctic brigades are in Kherson. Even the presence of the 80th Tank Regiment from CMD, which in theory should have been in Kreminna with the rest of the 90th Division, is reported.

I was seeing earlier on Telegram a video from the 106th VDV Division (deployed between Bakhmut and Soledar) where T-90Ms are featured (we know that the 80th Tank Regiment fields them) and they write about armoured units “attached” to airborne regiments. It’s possible that Russia is introducing a kind of hybrid unit where companies of tank regiments are attached to VDV battalions to achieve a combination of capable infantry + armoured support. This would explain the influx of tank regiments into the area. Although Rob Lee once wrote T-90Ms were provided to VDV too.

The 83rd VDV Brigade is garrisoning Klishchiivka, supporting the “infamous” 72nd Brigade of the 3rd Corps (the one that fled its positions after the first Ukrainian counterattacks in the second week of May). Very heavy fighting is going on in Klishchiivka, with the men of the excellent 3rd Assault Brigade on the Ukrainian side. The presence of numerous VDV units on the Bakhmut flanks, however, makes me a bit pessimistic about a continuation of the advances in the short term, partly because the Ukrainians are not sending reinforcements to Bakhmut (beyond the new 22nd Brigade), at the moment the formations in the area are the ones deployed in the sector since winter.

The ISW reported that elements of the 83rd Brigade reportedly complained asking for a rotation, which suggests that attrition is high since it’s a brigade that while had suffered very heavy losses at Kherson, had not seen action ever since afaik. Also in the very same area the 11th VDV Brigade is deployed, which has been engaged to a lesser extent so far.

Personally, seeing the situation in Bakhmut, I am somewhat bearish about the chances of a large-scale Russian armoured attack from Kupyansk to Kreminna. That said, however, many Russian formations are deployed in the area, and according to the Centre for Defense Strategies, such grouping is the most powerful Russian one deployed in Ukraine; recently several formations of the 1st GTA and 20th CAA have reportedly been training in Belarus (I guess they have also partially replenished their equipment after the heavy losses of the last year).

For some reason the Russians have been announcing advances in the Kupyansk area like every week since March. They announced a few weeks ago that they had captured Lyman Pershyi… which has always been theirs. The advances in recent weeks in Kupyansk are measured in terms of an handful of kilometers at best. At the moment the attacks in Kupyansk and Svatove are localized and are the work of mostly Storm Z units; Ukraine in the last month has been pouring a really large number of troops, including new brigades (such as the “Swedish” one, the 21st, with CV-90s) into the area.

Taking the eastern bank of the Oskil River would mean reaching a natural barrier; but in my view it’s somewhat doubtful that in the short term this would favor Russia: it would make no longer feasible for Ukraine any push towards Svatove, but at the same time it would also be a barrier to further Russian ambitions towards Kharkiv from the East as well and could free up Ukrainian brigades (a situation that reminds me somewhat of the opposite, on a small scale, of what happened at Kherson). If there is anything that actually makes sense for the Russians it would be to try to take control over the Serebryanka forest all the way to the banks of the Zherebets. It would secure Kreminna and would bear consequences south of the Seversky Donets, since the Siversk salient would find itself surrounded on 3 sides, which would be worrisome not so much for potential crossings (the Russians must still have nightmares of crossings in that area), but because it would put Ukrainian positions to the south in mortar range for instance.

In the Serebryanka forest, fierce fighting has been going on for months, Russia had deployed there numerous VDV units and also the CMD’s BMPT Terminators showed up; on the Ukrainian side since the beginning of the year there has been in that area the largest grouping of National Guard units of any sector of the front - I was reading this interview btw. In any case these past weeks several National Guard brigades have been sent between Robotyne and Novopokrovka, including Offensive Guard brigades such as Azov (not to be confused with the 3rd Brigade), Spartan and Kara-Dag. Meanwhile, the 247th Regiment of the 7th VDV Division has reportedly been deployed in Staromaiorske, a sign that the Russians are committing their operational reserves, particularly from Kherson Oblast.

The only thing I am aware of north of Kupyansk is an advance from Lyman Pershyi westwards, i.e. towards the Oskil River. Southwards there is still nothing too serious at the moment. In that area the Russian 6th CAA is active, mainly the 138th Brigade.

I had heard rumours that they could be in Bakhmut. But on July 6 the Russians released drone footage that clearly showed a CV90 geolocated in Nevske (then the footage showed it was hit with artillery, although it was allegedly another IFV and they merged the videos lol, Oryx didn’t record the loss). The next day another video came out with a CV90 “meeting” a burnt T-90M, which had been lost in November and located between the Luhansk and Kharkiv Oblasts, i.e. roughly in the area where the 21st Brigade would be deployed now (along the Zherebets between Svatove and Kreminna). So far, however, they have had no recorded actions, so we will see - if the Ukrainians assess that the danger of a Russian offensive there is limited, it could be sent elsewhere!