Most of the new brigades have such equipment anyway. New toys like Leopards and Bradleys are nowhere near enough to equip the majority of new units, and Ukraine has decided to concentrate, for instance, the entire first batch of Bradleys in a single brigade (47th) that most likely has got the Leopard 2A6s as well.

The Russians probably found a weak point in the line

Spot on. The Ukrainians also talked about that. The Russians are doing recon in force on the whole line from Kupyansk to Kreminna, mainly with Storm Z units. Between Raihorodka and Karmazynivka (where they have been pushing for weeks) presumably because of the lower density of Ukrainian forces and an ongoing rotation, they found a weaker point, buried it with artillery, brought in regular units (in that area 12/13/423th Regiments from 4th GTD with support from the 15th Brigade) and managed to advance a few kilometers. UAF has apparently succeeded in stabilizing the lines at the moment, although the Ukrainians are complaining that their artillery all along the wider sector is insufficient. According to Ukrainian estimates, in the area targeted by Russian advances, the Russians have up to 190 howitzers/mortars/MLRS and also up to 150 tanks and 430 armored vehicles.

Kherson was a rather disappointing campaign to a certain extent. As u/Duncan-M said, the only notable advances were recorded when the Ukrainians managed to break the forward lines and reach Dudchany in early October, which screwed Russian strongholds such as Davydiv Brid and Mala Oleksandrivka and forced them into a substantial precautionary retreat. But let’s remember that up to that point the Ukrainians failed in the slightest to exploit the bridgehead on the Inhulets that they had retained in Lozove since the clashes in June. The Russians even managed to counterattack and recover some ground along the Dnipro and made Snihurivka a new stronghold on the Inhulets. The craziest thing, however, was the holding of the lines in and around the Blahodatne area along the road to Mykolaiv. Yes, the Ukrainians did not push there the way they did in the northern sector and along the Inhulets, but the Russians managed to hold the same positions they controlled in May even the week before the withdrawal from Kherson.

In the end the campaign was won mainly by screwing the Russian logistics and their depots with GMLRS and their equipment with Excaliburs which convinced them to withdraw, along with their losses they were taking just to postpone the inevitable. I think, paradoxically, it was convenient for Ukraine to have so many Russians stuck in the wrong bank of the Dnipro and with no possibility of advancing, while for Russia holding that area once it was clear that Odesa was going to remain a dream made no sense. Kherson, was, understandably, a political objective before anything else. If, however, the Russians had not the Dnipro behind them, everything would have been much, much more difficult.

Unfortunately, I don’t have enough information on this. I would guess they are treated slightly better than Wagner’s convicts. In the South they are also used for defensive purposes afaik. Although, mainly, their role is still recon in force + human decoys to enable the rest of the Russians to locate Ukrainian positions. Given that the mobilized from Russia proper are used primarily for defensive purposes (with a few exceptions: for example, a portion of those who end up in the 1st or in the 2nd Corps…), the Storm Z convicts primarily fulfill what in 2022 was the role of L/DNR units but without chance to complain.