A few updates on the issue of mobilization in Ukraine.

The second reading of the mobilization law has been delayed due to a very high number of amendments submitted (4195!), which are going to be debated in the Defense Committee of the Verkhovna Rada. The law will come to a final vote no earlier than the second half of March.

As had been reported, the disabled Ukrainian men belonging to the third group (the lowest category) will not be mobilized, contrary to some initial rumors, but anyone who has received a disability certification of the second and the third groups since 2022 will have to undergo a re-examination, to unearth the large number of those who seem to have obtained it abusively, often with the help of crooked doctors.

The issue of mobilization of convicts (on a voluntary basis) is being increasingly debated. The Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) has visited several penal colonies around the country and testified that many convicts ask to be allowed to fight. However, there is a lack of legislation for amnesty or similar measures for those who fight: this, too, will be the responsibility of parliament. As far as I have read, there are currently 26 thousand inmates inside Ukrainian jails (15 years ago there were about 150 thousand!), including 25 thousand men. For some unknown reason, however, even the former convicts who are today free are exempt from mobilization, and we are talking about dozens of thousands of men. Numerous officers are in favor, while the voice most opposed to that was Zaluzhny. In any case, despite Ukraine being in an existential war, it seems that many decisions are slowed by bureaucracy and adherence to standard procedures, unlike in Russia.

While the decisions of the parliament are awaited, one of Syrsky’s first measures as Commander-in-Chief is to get infantrymen from the roles in the rear, within the existing manpower. It has been determined that: vehicle drivers must be people with disabilities and limited physical fitness; 50% of RMZ and MPZ personnel will be placed in combat roles; and 30% of anti-aircraft defense personnel will be cut.

https://t.me/khimikdavid4308/3146

Let’s give an explanation to these acts: as for drivers, it means that those who drive vehicles (don’t know if that includes armored vehicles, but definitely for logistic ones) will have to be men unfit for service as infantrymen. In regards to the personnel of RMZ and MPZ, it means the moral and psychological support personnel of the UAF, made up of military men, whose equivalents in the Russian Army are those responsible for political and military work. These roles will not disappear: according to a reform proposed a few weeks ago, the system will be changed and those responsible for maintaining morale within the units will be the sergeants, while there will be involvement of civilians (I guess female psychologists) regarding psychological support. Anti-air defense personnel doesn’t mean Patriot crews, but those in mobile anti-aircraft defense units, that is, those operating the heavy machine guns mounted on e.g. pickup trucks that are employed to shoot down Shaheds or other Russian drones. It’s said that these positions will not be left unstaffed: either some of these units were identified as being overstaffed or the tasks will be assigned by people not suited for frontline roles. Let’s recall that in January several anti-aircraft machine gun battalions were created under the Ground Forces, manned by personnel with disabilities or wounded veterans. So I believe that from now on, no able-bodied man will be mobilized in mobile anti-aircraft defense units, as was the case until now. For example, in January I had read the case of a 27-year-old illiterate shepherd from Transcarpathia who was mobilized and sent to a mobile anti-aircraft defense unit of the National Guard in the rear.

According to preliminary sources, more than 10 thousand men from these categories have been identified so far and are going to become infantrymen. Within the issues regarding manpower, a separate chapter should be opened for infantry. It’s the category of which there is an actual shortage of. When we read about artillerymen or ATGM operators being forced to become infantrymen by brigade commanders, it’s of course a consequence of the infantrymen shortage. While these cases are relatively rare and limited to brigades that have taken a serious hit, for specialized infantry roles such as snipers and scouts it’s almost becoming the norm in many units to have to become “regular” infantrymen and defend positions, as far as I know. In Ukraine, to attract people into the army, they often invite people to look at open positions within the brigades and go volunteer without waiting to be called to the local Territorial Recruiting Center, with no choice of either unit or specialty. This in itself is a very smart thing to do, but the downside is that it accentuates the “skills-mismatch” between physical fitness and the chosen specialty.

Example of open positions: https://t.me/lobbyxArmy/1739

From the interviews with officers of various Ukrainian brigades that I have read, they invite people to join their unit saying that they have open positions in numerous fields, but they emphasize that the category they really need are stormtroopers (which in Ukrainian/Russian jargon is sometimes used to define infantry in a broader sense). Today many young people volunteer to become UAV operators or artillerymen, if not for semi-civilian roles such as IT developer or for the press service, while, for example, older people volunteer to become drivers, mechanics, to work in logistics etc; whereas the positions for which there is the greatest demand and need are: rifleman, machine gunner, grenade launcher, etc. The result is that the “niche” positions get entirely filled and when the mobilized people show up at the TRC, almost of all them automatically become stormtroopers, even if, as is often the case, they are over 40 year-old and with some health issues. Which in turn worsens people’s perception of TRCs and the fear towards mobilization. At the moment a buffer solution to find young infantrymen for the best brigades with the highest recruiting standards (except instances such as the 3rd Assault Brigade which still manage to get enough volunteers) seems to be transfers from the Territorial Defense Forces: it was reportedly ordered that their servicemen under 35 year-old will have to join the Air Assault Forces (and possibly the Ground Forces or the Marine Corps).

Personally I think that during this year the priority to curb these issues and find new infantrymen is to have courage to approve what has already been proposed: mobilization of a part of the policemen and of the personnel of the State Emergency Service (at least the younger ones), decreasing the minimum age for mobilization (at least to 25 as was already approved last year, which Zelensky never signed - certain officers are calling for it to be lowered to 22 as they are the best soldiers) and enlistment of the convicts, firstly the former ones. At the same time, and rightly so, the phenomenon of fake disabilities should be addressed (as there are plans to do) and mobilization shoud be made fairer on a territorial basis, intensifying efforts on the territories that have contributed the least. For example, I was reading a few weeks ago on the Ukrainian Twitter that there are serious problems with mobilization in the Carpathian valleys, particularly in Transcarpathia, but not only. In some communities in Kosiv Raion, only 1% of the population has been mobilized, which is half the average of the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (of which such raion is part), and much less than elsewhere - the best perfoming communities of the Zhytomyr Oblast reach 5%. Moreover, I have also read the issue (I don’t know if that’s actually the case or not), that in some of the former communities, men from other parts of Ukraine (e.g. who have relocated because of the war) are disproportionately summoned, in order to meet the mobilization target.

Thanks for the interesting historical insight!