With the removal of Zaluzhny (an opponent of this plan) and the appointment of Syrsky as Commander in Chief, and the growing need for manpower, the rumors of recent weeks about the mobilization of Ukrainian convicts have become a bill, the first reading of which is expected to be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada next week, according to the Minister of Justice. The proposal is expected to pass, as no parliamentarian has spoken out against it, and in such case there will be a second definitive reading during the spring.

Let’s recall that the recrutable basin is significant, though not huge like Russia’s back in the autumn 2022. Inside the Ukrainian prisons and detention centers there are currently 26 thousand people, 25 thousand of whom are men. Outside them, however, there are over 50 thousand previously detained men who are exempt from mobilization at the moment.

It’s stated that there are thousands of inmates, according to the Ministry of Justice, who are patriots and had expressed a desire to join the Ukrainian Armed Forces but had no way, including people serving a life sentence. This is still not entirely clear, but the measure is supposed to allow not only the possibility of joining as volunteers, but also the enrollment in the lists of Territorial Recruitment Centers and thus the possibility of being mobilized as conscripts (for the ones not detained right now at least).

At the beginning of the invasion about 300 convicts were pardoned and joined the ranks of the UAF, with mixed results.

The Army demanded and obtained that those convicted of military offenses (e.g. desertion), crimes committed while in the military (e.g. theft of military property) or crimes against the nation (e.g. treason) will not be mobilizable. One part of commanders are ready to accept convicts within their unit (some officers have been pushing hard for the enlistment of convicts in recent weeks), another part is heavily against it. It seems, however, that separate penal units will be established to host the convicts. A part of them will become stormtroopers, while another part (I imagine those considered less trustworthy) will become sappers.

I see this as a very useful measure, especially that now that Ukraine is in dire need of the latter category too, and specifically of men willing to dig just a few kilometers if not hundreds of meters behind the zero line (with the risk of being spotted by Russian drones and shelled), whereas the fortification works in the strategic rear are largely carried out by private construction firms. Let’s recall that the Ukrainian brigades already have “assault detachments”, which are a kind of pseudo-penal companies that host military personnel transferred from other brigades for military offenses (mostly refusal of orders or desertion, to sexual offenses) and are usually used both for combat operations in the zero line and as sappers.

Additional details can be found in articles in Ukrainian like this one or this. Rapists and other sex offenders will likely be excluded from the mobilization law, but it doesn’t look like murderers will be.

As far as I had read, those 300, after being pardoned, had been released from jails in order to join the UAF, and a part of them did not show up. This will not be repeated as those who volunteer (if this bill is approved) will be transferred directly from the jails to the recruitment centers. For the rest, I agree with u/Duncan-M. This war is existential for Ukraine as you pointed out, and it’s fair that those convicted, even for serious crimes, can have a second chance in their life, by which they can prove to their nation that they deserve the pardon and have become worthy citizens that defend and possibly die for their homeland, unlike others.

I also think that they should receive a wage while they fight, as well as receive decorations and awards if they show bravery - and although we don’t know the details of the bill yet, it would be a good idea if, for instance, the convicts employed as assault troops who have survived and have always been disciplined, after a certain period (e.g. 6-12 months), could leave the penal unit and join the regular ranks of the UAF, with their seniority of service recognized.

To my knowledge the enlistment of Russian convicts, now greatly reduced, was always on a voluntary basis - at most there was strong pressure on the inmates to join, as well as on the directors of the penal colonies, to get as many inmates as possible to join. In addition actually, many convicts for petty crimes joined because of the fact that by receiving amnesty (well, before the current “Storm-V” framework) they will get a clean record and because of the difficulties people with a criminal record face in finding normal work in Russia (which is the reason why a part of the contract soldiers who join their armed forces today are people with criminal records, as well as people with debts etc). The objections you raise do make sense: it’s certainly not an easy choice indeed - but well, the answer to the last question, of course, is that the other armed forces don’t risk losing a very considerable part of their country (if not the statehood) in case they lose the war.

Agreed. The mobilization bill (which, however, still retains exemptions for numerous categories) is to be voted by the Verkhovna Rada in the coming weeks - it has been delayed due to a very large number of amendments (4195).

It will be the second reading of the bill that was approved in the first reading in early February. There might be some changes due to the submitted amendments; however, it seems that the current exemptions will be maintained (no students, no parents of 3+ children, no disabled people, no relatives of disabled people of the first and second categories, police officers will not be mobilized, etc). It looks like electronic subpoenas are not going to be introduced; those who ignore a summon are going to lose the driving license. However, Zelensky might eventually approve lowering the mobilization age from 27 to 25, and those who have received a disability certification of the second or the third category in the last two years will have to undergo a re-examination. When it will be approved (in theory, between late March and early April), I will try to make a comment where I list the details and the main changes.

Yes I agree, compared to the original rumors it’s underwhelming. I’ve read from Ukrainians that, however, in the framework of the current mobilization, mobilization in the city of Kyiv (which in relation to population provided way less mobilized men compared to other regions) has been ramped up significantly since the beginning of 2024, don’t know if that’s the case or not. Also, those who will have to undergo a re-examination will have to appear before the military medical commission, not a random doctor from their village. And rightly so.

I was reading a while ago this analysis on the estimated number of theoretically mobilizable people in Ukraine. The numbers are likely a bit overestimated because they are based on the 2001 census, but all the categories currently exempted from mobilization are excluded from the count, including workers in the essential sectors. In total, up to 4,89 million men in the 27-59 age bracket are estimated to be mobilizable. Based on these figures, it’s estimated that, excluding the ones who are students, there are up to 273 thousand young men aged 25 or 26 - a part of whom, however, should already be in the armed forces. If mobilization of these age bracket were implemented in a serious way, very important numbers would still be obtained, though.