This morning the bill on the enlistment of convicts was passed on the second (and final) reading by the Verkhovna Rada - with 279 Yes, 11 abstentions and 40 not voting. This is the best article, in Ukrainian, I could find on the subject.
A brief resume. Convicts will undergo prior medical examinations inside the prison in order to attest to their physical fitness and mental sanity. Both the consent of the convict (who must therefore be a volunteer) and of the UAF are needed. As I understand it, the convicts will serve in separate penal units created within, I guess, brigades whose commanders agree to form them and agree to take in the convicts.
If the convict passes the medical examination, he shall be taken to the Territorial Recruitment Center by the National Guard, where he will sign a contract. It’s not possible to go volunteer as a convict if there is less than 3 years left until the end of the prison sentence. The length of the contract is not specified, but this last point makes me think it’s going to be a standard 3-year contract, which is what any non-convict Ukrainian man can sign. The pay is also not specified, but it might be the standard pay of a contract soldier - probably this point has not been clarified yet.
Those who have committed crimes against the nation (including corruption), crimes as an institutional representative, murder of two or more persons, murder in general when committed under the influence of drugs (including if committed while driving under the influence), murder of law enforcement officers, sexual assault (including rape, pedophilia etc.), and terrorism will not be allowed to volunteer under any circumstances. Apparently, those convicted of crimes related to drug production and trafficking will not be able to join the ranks of the UAF (this last thing, personally, seems very strange).
Out of 26 thousand people currently held in Ukrainian detention centers and jails, between 15 and 20 thousand meet the requirements. Those who sign a contract will be released on parole during the term of the contract. At the end of the contract I imagine there will be an amnesty, although this is not yet specified. Those who break their terms of service will receive an additional sentence of 5 to 10 years in prison, which is in addition to the sentence from which they were released on parole. Volunteer convicts shall not be entitled to any leave, except in the case of injuries, which has to be carried out at the specified place anyway (e.g. a rehabilitation center).
Arakhamia, the leader of the parliamentary faction of “Servants of the People”, stated this law will bring in several thousand volunteers from the jails at the very least.
Another thing, which the vast majority of newspapers aren’t mentioning - although it’s very important - it’s the fact that (as announced a few months ago), some 50 thousand formerly detained and now free men, who are currently exempt from mobilization, are going to be mobilizable - meaning they can be summoned by the local TRC (without following the procedures required for convicts, of course). A certainly significant figure. In addition, since February 2022, 11 thousand criminal cases were suspended after the person under investigation chose to voluntarily join the ranks of the UAF (I did not know such a possibility existed). Very interestingly, the number of people volunteering under this framework has been stable since summer 2022, averaging around 400 cases per month. Theft (including car theft) and robbery alone account for about 1/4 of the crimes for which volunteers were being investigated and whose prosecutions were suspended.
Now, on an unrelated note, an update from the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets on an issue in which the Russians have been improving lately: the reconnaissance and strike complex. Translated via DeepL.
The Russian command is actively introducing new systems of organizing and delivering fire in the course of combat operations based on the experience it gained during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
In particular, the enemy has recently developed and is actively implementing a hierarchical (ranked) three-level system for the use and application of its RUKs (reconnaissance and strike complexes). The so-called “system of combating the enemy’s armored vehicles and artillery”
We have already seen the consequences of this “systematization” (defeat of Patriot SAMs, Hymars MLRS, etc.)
The content consists in simultaneous “linking” into a single system, operating in the “online” mode, reconnaissance and situation monitoring means with appropriate means of defeat, as well as a clear distribution by zones and distances of defeat (providing for the distribution and appropriate management of specially equipped or adapted KPIs)…
In particular…
The close (tactical) zone is the responsibility of the division (brigade) commander, up to 10-12 km.
Means of reconnaissance and monitoring, as well as radio-electronic warfare (REW) - optoelectronic devices (1TPN-1, Ironia-1, Ironia-M), copter-type UAVs, Aleron-3 UAVs, Fara-VR and Sobolyatnik radar stations, Sextan K144 reconnaissance and signaling equipment, and Field-21 modular radio jamming system.
Means of destruction (firepower) - anti-tank missile systems (ATK) “Konkurs”, “Ataka”, “Kornet”, “Shturm-S”, “Chrysanthema-S”, “Kornet-D”, anti-tank gun MT-12 “Rapira” “, Gvozdika and Akatsiya SAU, tanks, Terminator BMPT, BMP-2/3, TOS-1/TOS-2, fire support helicopters (Mi-24, Mi-35, Mi-28N, Ka-50, Ka-52), Su-25 attack aircraft.
Medium zone, responsibility of the army commander (army corps) from 12 to 100 km
Reconnaissance and monitoring means - UAVs “Aileron-3”, “Orlan-10”, “Forpost” and a number of similar in their specifications, radar stations (radars) such as “Aistenok” and “Sobolyatnik”, as well as radars for counter-battery warfare such as “Zoo”, etc.
Means of defeat (fire) - barrage munitions such as “Kub” and “Lancet”, MLRS “Tornado-G”, “Uragan”, “Tornado-S”, SAU “Msta-S”, “Hyacinth-S”, SG “Malka” “, mine barriers such as UMZ, aircraft Su-24M and Su-34.
Far zone, the responsibility of the commander of the UW (grouping of troops) from 100 km and more.
Means of reconnaissance and monitoring - spacecraft (SC) of the Yantar optoelectronic reconnaissance system, agent reconnaissance and UAVs of the Forpost type and similar ones, whose technical specifications allow for optoelectronic and radio-technical reconnaissance at distances up to 100 and more.
Means of destruction (firing) - Iskander-M missile system, Tu-22M3, Mig-31K\I, Su-24, Su-34 aircraft, attack UAVs of the Geranium type \Shahed-131/136 and STRGR (on S-300/400 SAMs).
Some of these means of defeat are used both in the interests of the commanders of individual military units and to defeat targets of a strategic nature.
That is, for several months now, the Russians have been trying to apply all this not separately, “by order” of individual commanders, commanders (chiefs), as they say “if necessary”… but to systematize and link it into a single clear system. Especially, regarding the process of “data transfer”, from the moment of detection to the moment of defeat (their problems with this are non-critical, localized and can be eliminated).
In order for it to work as a clear mechanism as a whole, rather than in its individual elements, they need to acquire two key capabilities - the ability to operate “online” in these intelligence and strike loops, and at all three of these levels, and to minimize the number of “linking” links of command and control between intelligence and defeat.
In other words, for this they need appropriate means of AUTOMATIZATION (well, and accordingly, properly equipped PUs)… and most importantly, a kind of “internet” between intelligence and fire. It is obvious that this system will not work effectively “because of TAP-ic” or “voice over radio”….
Not everything is working out for them in this area right now, but they are trying very hard… And, unfortunately, we can already observe the first results of this systematization of the enemy defeat system in practice.
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1841
Murderers can be recruited. As long as they do not fall within the above specified cases.
Very fair. Although (on both sides) the use of (meth)amphetamines by stormtroopers in order to overcome fear is relatively widespread (not judging), and in some military units there are widespread cannabinoid and cocaine dealing rings. Unfortunately, these are things that can happen easily when hundreds of thousands of men from all walks of life are put in the same context.
Another issue, at least in the Ukrainian ranks (not that I think the Russians are any better), is online gambling. At the end of the last month Zelensky signed a decree banning soldiers from gambling, and a few days ago the National Bank of Ukraine banned gambling and lending agencies from accepting drones, night-vision goggles, etc. in pledge for money. Unfortunately, stress, sometimes boredom, and huge disposable income for the average Ukrainian man (especially those from rural areas) are a combination that can play bad tricks. I hope there are also interventions on the psychological support side to curb this problem.