In addition to the answers you have already received, the main issue is that there seems to be a taboo on the use of conscripts from the military service in active combat operations outside national borders. This is undoubtedly the case: conscripts never went to Ukraine (except for a few episodes at the beginning of the war, probably due to negligence of the command of the military unit); conscripts are used to keep a skeleton of the unit in its original barracks and to assist the Border Service and the National Guard in guarding the Ukrainian border (VDV units manned by conscripts were involved in combat actions during the Ukrainian raids last March) and in support/logistical activities. Even during the military crisis back in September 2022 the Russian government nevertheless chose against sending conscripts to the front, which makes me really believe that this will not change in the future. And let’s also remember that for the Russians the four Ukrainian oblasts are officially annexed (considering legit Ukrainian territories, conscripts are deployed only in Crimea)!

During the mobilization of the fall 2022, it was very rare that people under the age of 23/24 were summoned. The average mobilized man was in his early/mid 30s. However, there is also a veil of hypocrisy behind the issue. There are often pressures, or at least constant invitations towards young conscripts, to sign contracts in order to join the “SMO”. Either pressing the sense of duty, or money, etc. To my knowledge, it’s possible to sign a contract only after one month from the start of military service. A not-so-small fraction of conscripts sign a contract during or at least at the end of their service. In the last couple of weeks, the first MIA notices of boys born in 2006 are beginning to come out. As an example, one came out today about a boy born on 17 February 2006, serviceman of the 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Division, 20th CAA). He went missing on May 1 after being seriously wounded during a combat mission.

I’m not an expert in geolocations, but I think I found the place, if the frame shown at around 24:07 matches the area of the clashes. It’s the eastern end of Netailove - coordinates 48.102694, 37.564645. If that’s the case, they are almost certainly part of the 25th Airborne Brigade.

It seems that this group is quite secretive and I have not found any statement from them about which brigade they belong to. However, I did a little digging on the Instagram profiles of the soldiers from this group and the combination of several clues (participation in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, photos showing them near Borova during the past months…) confirm my theory that they belong to the 25th Airborne Brigade. Minor elements of this brigade were involved in the battle of Bakhmut (there is material from Bakhmut from winter 2022/23 in their profiles); VABs are seen in several instances in videos posted in their accounts - officially they’re in use by the 46th Airmobile Brigade and by the 79th Air Assault Brigade, but yesterday a video came out showing a convoy of Marder 1A3s, BMP-2s and VABs, which might indicate that a batch of them was received by the 25th Airborne Brigade.

If my geolocation is correct, the reportage was filmed in the first half of April, when the 9th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps was attempting to enter the built-up area of Netailove, after having recently captured Pervomaiske (the conquered village mentioned in the video). In fact, since April the 25th Airborne Brigade has been turning its attention to Netailove as the 59th Motorized Brigade has been mostly focusing on Nevelske. Since then the Russians have occupied the positions shown in the video, arriving at the center of the settlement. The guys featuring in this reportage are doing fine luckily!