Ruslan Mykula (one of the founders of DeepState) last week warned to watch carefully Kozacha Lapan (Kharkiv Oblast, but to the west of the Kharkiv River), and Bilopillia (Sumy Oblast, north-west of the regional capital); while for the observer Mashovets two potential directions could be Sudzha –> Sumy or Grayvoron –> Velyka Pysarivka (Sumy Oblast). In any case, I can confirm Andrew Perpetua’s assessments reported by OP. Near Sudzha, during the end of the last week, elements of the 103rd TDF Brigade destroyed two Russian tanks with FPV drones, several kilometers inside the Russian border. Let’s say there is more movement and activity by the Russians (more shelling, more actions by DRG groups), but I think the main purpose at the moment may be to force the Ukrainians to keep the state border manned, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent in the directions of the current offensive. Interesting to point out that Mykula stated that the “Lyut” Brigade of the National Police (or at least some of its assault regiments/battalions, since the “Luhansk-1” Regiment and the brigade’s artillery group are currently active near Chasiv Yar), which acted mostly as a reserve, is being transferred to Kharkiv, and its servicemen learnt about the ongoing transfer from a TASS (!) article, only to later find out it was true. Moreover, the 2nd Battalion of the 36th Marine Brigade, which is where the famous UAV operator Kriegsforscher serves, recently arrived in Vovchansk.

That said, I can confirm the numbers you wrote, that’s the extent of the manpower of the Russians covering the border in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts (Mashovets this morning wrote that in the Kursk Oblast there are about 10k Russian soldiers), and I don’t see the strength needed by the Russians in order to commit to anything serious there - we knew that the bulk of the 11th Corps was deployed in Belgorod Oblast and that the first elements of the 44th Corps were deployed there as soon as they arrived in early May, but there are no similar formations in the other two oblasts that we know of right now (to answer to your other question: if you take away the formations being created as part of the strategic-operational reserve, Russia has no divisions/brigades that are entirely resting in Russia, nor in Belarus).

That could change in the future if the rest of the 44th Corps is sent to the border with the Sumy Oblast as soon as it’s ready. Such as its 128th Motorized Brigade, which should be entirely deployed by the end of this month according to Russian sources - and Mashovets this morning wrote that elements of this brigade may have just arrived around Grayvoron. Or such as the rest of the 72nd Motorized Division: we know that its 41st Motorized Regiment is being heavily engaged near Vovchansk, but its 30th Motorized Regiment is still a reserve in the rear, and I guess the third motorized regiment should arrive in the future too. But sending these new units to Sudzha, Grayvoron etc. also means taking away potential reinforcements from the directions of Lyptsi and Vovchansk, at least if Russia doesn’t transfer units or formations from other areas… Mashovets also stressed this several times: Russia currently has the capabilities to either aim to expand the front in the North (attacking in other directions) OR to reinforce the current two directions near Kharkiv in order to move on to the next phases of the offensive, but not for both (without “stealing” units from the rest of the GoFs, at least).

For the time being, we know that companies of the 25th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA (along with some regiments of the Territorial Forces attached to the 6th CAA) are arriving in Vovchansk to support the 138th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA, which has brought an additional battalion into action (it had one committed, previously), and that elements of the 2nd Motorized Division of the 1st GTA (perhaps belonging both to its 1st Tank Regiment and to its 1st Motorized Regiment) have arrived near Vovchansk, where the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA is deployed too. But receiving additional reinforcements from the 1st GTA also means less pressure capabilities in the Kupyansk and Svatove sectors. Moreover, in the last week POWs from units of the 20th CAA, of the 90th Tank Division, of the 7th Military Base and from units of the 8th CAA have been captured in Vovchansk. I tend to categorically rule out that units of these formations were redeployed there, probably they are from battalions of brigades/regiments of these formations that were in R&R covering the state border and found themselves taking part in the actions, or perhaps transfers of stormtroopers took place in order to reinforce the units of the GoF “North,” or again they were not actually captured in Kharkiv Oblast but elsewhere…

On May 18, Ukraine’s new mobilization law officially went into effect. Among the changes, all men between 18 and 59 will have to update their own informations (before July 18) either physically at the Territorial Recruitment Center (or in an administrative service center), or online, via the new “Reserv+” app. As of today, 415 thousand Ukrainians have registered their information through this app, and long lines are reported in front of TRCs. Obviously, updating one’s information doesn’t mean being immediately mobilized, but it does mean giving one’s readiness for an examination at the military medical commission and being mobilized in case one receives a subpoena in the future.

In addition, fines for those who ignore summons have been increased and TRCs have gained the ability to give fines in absentia, but overall there are no draconian measures in this regard, other than the possibility of having one’s driver’s license revoked. As I understand it, not showing up at the military medical examination will not be a crime, unlike what was announced.

There will be better cooperation between TRCs and police. In the first four months of 2024, in the oblasts that released data, the TRCs asked the Police to bring 94,500 men who had ignored subpoenas ahead of them, and the Police have accompanied more than 20,000 so far.

Several categories have lost their exemption from mobilization: fathers of three or more children who have been in arrears in child support payments for more than three months; men who are raising a child under the age of 18 on their own and the child’s mother hasn’t lost parental authority, is not deceased, etc; students who are receiving an education inconsistent with their current level (such as a MSc graduate studying for a bachelor); part-time teachers; men whose wives have a disability of the third group (the less serious one). For some reason, according to a decree of the Ministry of Economy, employees of Glovo, VISA and Favbet Tech (a betting agency) had earned deferment from mobilization for 6 months, but after public backlash this was withdrawn.

It should also be mentioned that throughout Ukraine, Recruitment Centers run directly by the UAF (without involvement of the TRCs) are opening. After the openings in Transcarpathia earlier this month (in Mukachevo and in Uzhhorod) and an additional center in Kyiv, there are now 21 of them, and by the end of June there will be 27. These centers were created to bypass the TRCs, which scare a lot of people (quite a few stories of people who wanted to volunteer and had a letter of recommendation from the brigade they chose, and the TRC would have sent them somewhere else if representatives of the brigade had not intervened). Ukrainian citizens can visit these centers without formal commitment, talk to the secretaries who will list which vacancies there are, in which brigades, and in which sector. And if the interested person finds something that interests him, he can sign a contract with the unit he chose. In addition, the system works that for example an inhabitant of Zaporizhzhia will have the priority over the vacancies in brigades fighting in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, so that he has a chance to fight close to home and in defense of his region. These centers have a certain turnout, the problem (I have written about this several times in the past), is that according to the Minister of Defense Umerov himself, the jobs most in demand are driver, mechanic and drone pilot… when the most needed role is that of infantryman.

As for inmates, according to reports from the Minister of Justice, 4,500 of them had, as of April, given their willingness to join the UAF as volunteers. Around 4,000 convicts were excluded from the possibility of joining because they are infected with HIV, hepatitis or tuberculosis. Unlike what initially seemed, those convicted of drug offenses will have the opportunity to volunteer. This will also help reduce overcrowding in pre-trial detention centers.

MilitaryLand has discovered that five new brigades have just been created in the Ground Forces: the 155th, 156th, 157th, 158th and 159th Infantry Brigades. Infantry brigades are a fairly new format in the UAF. There are currently the 141st, 142nd, 143rd and 144th Infantry Brigades that were created about a year ago, and the 153rd Infantry Brigade which is in training stage, and was reformed a few months ago from mechanized to infantry due to the equipment shortage. (Lack of) Vehicles are not the only difference with mechanized brigades. Infantry brigades are basically TDF brigades but within the Ground Forces, and not composed very largely of volunteers as in the TDF.

In practice, during 2022, Ukraine created a lot of rifle battalions: either line ones, organically part of existing brigades, or separate ones, which could be attached to a brigade if necessary: these are the separate rifle battalions from 1st to 70th, some of which were later disbanded or used as the basis for the creation of the brigades raised in late 2022 / early 2023. During 2023, Ukraine formed dozens and dozens more separate rifle battalions: those of the 4xx-th series (usually created on a regional basis). Those from 401st to 426th are usually attached to brigades of the Ground Forces and function like those created during 2022. Other separate rifle battalions were then created, in this case subordinate to the four infantry brigades created in mid-2023. Each of these has six rifle battalions: 141st (451st to 456th), 142nd (457th to 462nd), 143rd (463rd to 468th) and 144th (469th to 474th).

Depending on whether the new brigades have 5 or 6 battalions each, we are talking about 25 to 30 new rifle battalions being created. However, it must be said that this type of unit has certain critical issues. First, lack of armored vehicles (except for a few APCs/IMVs), no tanks, and no own artillery group - usually infantry brigades work with the support from artillery brigades or from the artillery group of other brigades, while obviously having mortars in each battalion. In addition, these brigades are usually employed through their battalions getting subordinated to other brigades, instead of holding a section of the front independently, which suggests that they have a scarce HQ staff. The only partial exception is the 141st Infantry Brigade, which should be fully deployed in the Orikhiv sector (particularly near Robotyne), produces videos from there, official brigade’s sources state they are defending the front in that sector etc. The other brigades have battalions in multiple sectors attached to various brigades to strengthen their infantry endowment. Most of the battalions of the 142nd Infantry Brigade are in the Avdiivka sector, attached to the various brigades that are there, others in the Marinka sector; the 143rd and 144th Infantry Brigades have battalions in Avdiivka, others in Bakhmut, others in Kreminna, others in Kupyansk, others along the state border. And they are separate battalions anyway, which means there are more junior officers in support functions than in a line mechanized battalion!

Moreover, as far as I know, rifle battalions are largely made up of the oldest mobilized men, with the vast majority of their servicemen being over 45 years old. In the case of the 143rd Infantry Brigade, I read today in the comments on a Ukrainian Telegram channel that 75% of the personnel are over 45; the brigade had finished training in October 2023, and its battalions were partly used to restore the combat capabilities of the brigades employed in Avdiivka during the battle for the city, leaving the brigade understaffed for several months. I have written several times that there is an active discrimination in Ukraine between older mobilized men being sent to these units (that mostly end up getting attached to other units to act as replacements), while mobilized men which are under 35 are sent primarily to brigades of the Air Assault Forces (which makes sense, mind you). DeepState recently criticized the existence itself of the 4xx-th series rifle battalions, writing that one of them abandoned its positions near Strilecha in Kharkiv (as far as I have investigated, it should be the 415th), causing problems that the soldiers of the 125th TDF Brigade had to try to solve.

Yes, although according to what I was reading, per the MoD spokesperson, putting the subpoena in the mailbox is not enough to consider it delivered, but it must still be signed. In return, condo managers are formally authorized to deliver them.

Yes, currently the armored vehicles are used in a support function by the Russians up there and not in large-scale mechanized attacks.