Today our beloved DeepState published a summary of the progress of the war in the main sectors of the front during the summer. I will post it translated. There isn’t a lot that wasn’t already known, but it’s concise and extremely interesting in order to get a clear-headed and unbiased recap of the main events from the Ukrainian point of view. I hope the translation is good (I don’t know Ukrainian). My personal additions are between [square brackets].
https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17673 (and the following post)
Analysis of the actions (mostly) north of the Siversky Donets River:
Today we will analyze our and the enemy’s summer campaigns. Globally, the picture of the front has not changed since November ‘22, when the enemy left the right-bank Kherson region. At that time, the enemy’s withdrawal across the Dnipro, although unexpected to the last, was the last strategic change on the front. Now you will begin to appeal to the battles for Bakhmut, which drained significant resources from both sides, but this did not lead to any strategic changes.
Let’s start with the enemy’s offensive campaign in the Svatove area, which began actively in May with the loss of Masiutivka [Kupyansk sector - north of Lyman Pershyi]. The enemy launched an offensive in several areas at once: Masiutivka-Vilshana, Novoselivske-Kolomyichyha, Rayhorodka-Novovodyane and Serebryanske forestry.
Masiutivka-Vilshana - the Katsaps managed to occupy Masiutivka and push our forces back 2,5 kilometers. Near Vilshany, our advanced position in the village was actually destroyed, and the front shifted to the outskirts of Synkivka. However, reinforcements from the 67th OMBr [Mechanized Brigade] and 95th ODShBr [Air Assault Brigade], which extinguished fires where the 14 OMBr did not have time, prevented the situation from escalating into something serious.
Novoselivske-Kolomyichyha - the enemy managed to concentrate forces to strike at the “hodgepodge” of our units, occupying Kuzemivka station and 2/3 of Novoselivske. However, the transfer of that area to the control of the 25th OPDBr [Airborne Brigade] led to stabilization and a halt to the enemy offensive.
Rayhorodka-Novovodiane - in July, the Katsaps moved in with a large number of infantry and with the support of equipment, dealt a serious blow to the units in that area. The reason for this was the poor IF [translation from Ukrainian “Іф” - likely an acronym whose meaning I ignore: any Ukrainian could clarify that for us?] preparation of the positions and the banal carelessness of the defenders, who later paid for it heavily. The deployment of the 68th OEBr [Jager Brigade] and the newly created 43rd OMBr saved us from the tragedy that could have happened if the mistakes had not been corrected.
Serebryanske forestry - here the enemy continues to attack throughout 2023. The deployment of the newly created brigade in early summer created a number of problems that the 95th ODShBr and other “fire” [fire-fighters: the air assault brigades in the north-eastern front are used as a highly mobile tactical reserve to be deployed in the most troublesome areas] units had to fix. Now the Azov Brigade of the National Guard has arrived there, and the enemy’s chances of success are minimal. But the katsap has fulfilled its two minimum tasks - a buffer zone for Kreminna and the deterioration of the strategic position of our forces in Bilohorivka [Luhansk Oblast]. The latter is actually squeezed from three (!) sides.
Conclusion. Without additional measures to increase manpower and rapidly replenish equipment, the enemy has virtually no chance of any strategic success. The only chance they have is to hold on to the occupied territories. And that’s what they’re going to do. Muscovites can only attack meat [I think the meaning is: employing cannon fodder to attack], and it must be taken from somewhere. Their occupation of Bakhmut, although it has media value, has no strategic or even political impact. After the battles for the city, no one even thought to sit down at the negotiating table. On the contrary, the Ukrainian military leadership is motivated to continue fighting, including for Bakhmut.
Analysis of the Ukrainian offensive actions in Bakhmut and in the South:
The Defence Forces had two strikes in the summer - near Bakhmut and in the south. By the way, the southern strike had two locations - Tokmak and the cut of the Vremivsky ledge [Velyka Novosilka sector].
Bakhmut direction - according to the spokespersons’ statements, the goal is to surround Bakhmut. Over the past 4 months, south of the city, they have managed to de-occupy Andriivka and Klishchiyivka, which opens up the possibility of a further attack towards the road to Horlivka. The situation is not so good on the northern front, where initially everything started quite successfully, but the strategic mistake of going into Berkhivka, which is located in the lowlands, cost us dearly. Now the initiative has even gone to the enemy. Attempts to break through the enemy defences near Zaliznyanske and Rozdolivka did not bring any significant success. Bakhmut is not surrounded, as the media claimed. For the enemy, it is a stronghold where thousands of fa[*]gots are concentrated. It is worth mentioning the connections of the 3rd and the 5th OShBr [Assault Brigades] and 80th ODShBr, which, under the auspices of the “Adam” Tactical Group, achieved success, which is now being used by all media persons.
South. Vremivsky Ridge - the task of cutting the ridge was successfully implemented, although we did not manage to do anything more. In the first month, the network had enough footage of our columns of newly formed brigades, which were supposed to break through the defence in the style of Guderian-Hoth. The tragedy of the 37th OBrMP [Marine Brigade] near Novodonetske also had a negative impact. Due to the mistakes of 5-7 June, all offensive actions were extremely difficult. Other brigades had to suffer unnecessary losses because the enemy’s tank fist from Kermenchyk spoiled all plans in the area.
South. Robotyne - the operation lasted for three months and attracted attention not only in Ukraine but also around the world. Even a drunkard in the Moscow region understood why Leopards and Bradleys appeared near Mala Tokmachka. But it was in vain to hope for a blitzkrieg. The Katsaps considered this area as a place for our breakthrough, so everything was dug up and mined during the winter and spring. Official communication also played a cruel joke. While in May the Katsaps in Tokmak were saying goodbye to their families, after the first footage of the downed Leopards, we were afraid. The situation with the two top tanks, which instead of providing cover for the infantry, drove into the bushes to simulate getting stuck on the ground, is a case in point.
It was only in mid-August that the Katsap began to retreat and bring in reserves. There was a lot of heroism by our guys: deep breakthroughs that ended in a rollback due to the lack of success on the flanks. We know of at least two such cases. Robotyne came under our control, but so far we have not been able to expand by taking Verbove and Kopani or drive the wedge deeper. The latter is a consequence of the former, as we continue to suffer losses in equipment due to the peculiarities of the contact line. Finally, I would like to mention the 47th OMBr, which has become a hostage to its own media coverage. The brigade really showed the best result of all the newly created brigades, often acted in cold blood and did not retreat. Over time, the problem of excessive media exposure was resolved. In September, it became known that the Brigade’s Commander had been replaced. Whatever happened, he could hardly be blamed for anything. It was him and his team who were the drivers in the area.
Conclusion. It was a difficult summer for the Defense Forces, but the defense campaign for Bakhmut was no easier. Of course, we did not achieve any strategic success, but the Robotyne salient has all the prospects. The only condition is time, and we are running out of it. A new defense line is already being built east of Tokmak. The enemy is also reinforcing the Krasna Polyana-Volnovakha-Donetsk line. You can’t underestimate the Katsap in engineering. On the other hand, 2023 demonstrated the superiority of Ukrainian infantry in equal battles. Where there was a shortage of anti-aircraft guns and artillery, the quality factor of infantry was already leveled off. The summer demonstrated that the war will not end on our terms in 2024. The Ukrainian state needs to prepare for new challenges that it will have to face soon.
Your analysis has got valid points - although I find it too “ruthless” to some extent.
As usual, as we all strive not to be war analysis tourists, we know that particularly in such a war it’s not just the square kilometers gained/lost (or even less, say, the population of the villages) that matter, but also and especially, for instance, the topography of the area and the human and material losses experienced by both sides.
At this point, given that the resources to devote to the action are what they are (i.e. limited), I am quite sure that the Ukrainians have given up, beyond propaganda statements, on surrounding Bakhmut but are engaged in attrition actions in the southern flank with the main objective of keeping busy the (numerous) VDV units deployed in the area and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Corps. The attrition in the area, although the Ukrainians are having major losses, probably favors them in an important way due to the employment of experienced and well-motivated forces with excellent knowledge of the terrain (yes, I am talking about the 3rd Assault Brigade). They have pushed the Russians to the railroad and are in a good position to begin serious actions towards the settlements of Kurdyumivka and Zelenopillya. Already today the vast majority of Russian supplies towards Bakhmut are coming from Popasna due to the impossibility of using other roads.
The northern flank proved really difficult to penetrate, and the affair is worsened by the lower quality of Ukrainian units deployed in the area. In particular, the Ukrainian 57th Motorized Brigade suffered really heavy losses in the battles around Berkhivka. The Soledar sector was heavily reinforced and is garrisoned by the bulk of the 106th VDV Division - Ukrainian actions in the area were limited and aimed at testing the enemy’s strength.
In the Kamianske sector (Vasylivka) Ukrainian actions have been very limited since mid-June, at the moment the fighting is mostly positional and as far as I know not that “expensive” for both sides. It has become a fairly quiet sector compared to what is going on a few tens of kilometers to the east. The Ukrainians are extremely cautious in that area and probably prefer to wait for decisions by the General Staff about which side they’re going to pick in order to expand the salient around Robotyne - whether pushing towards this sector or towards Polohy, where we all know the fresh 35th Army is deployed.
In the last days there seems to be some news in the Tokmak sector, nothing too big (no breakthroughs, despite what was said), but interesting tactical advances, particularly thanks to the recent deployment in the actions of the 71st Jager Brigade around Verbove to assist the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. The situation is not easy - losses are heavy, Russian reinforcements are numerous and in part of high quality, with the deployment of two entire VDV divisions. Determination and cold blood on the part of the Ukrainians will be needed. The Russians are deploying their heavy hitters in the area and thus are willing to sustain the attrition of such formations, as they evidently know that the loss of positions in this sector would be even worse for them. In this context, the first thing to look at is attrition rates of both sides.
In the Velyka Novosilka sector the Ukrainian losses were heavy and the successes have been partial - but the Russians also had to commit numerous reserves to the area. Novodonetske was perhaps the biggest disappointment. I expected it to fall at least two months ago. Last week there was a failed attack towards Novomaiorske by the 137th Battalion of the 35th Marine Brigade with relevant casualties - the Ukrainians call that area “cursed”, mostly due to the fact that the Russians dominate it from above due to their control of the heights around Kermenchyk. Pryyutne has also proved to be a tough nut to crack - infantry battles have been going on for weeks in virtually every tree line in the area with significant losses on both sides.