I collected the datas on the numerical extent, in terms of personnel and equipment, of the “Groups of Forces” on which the operational and strategic management of the Russian grouping deployed in Ukraine is organized.

These are estimates released at different times over the past month and a half by the Ukrainian military observers Mashovets and Kovalenko, thanks to their contacts with Ukrainian military intelligence. These figures aren’t to be taken literally, but as estimates. They are not fully up-to-date, but they are still a very good way to understand how these GoFs are ranked in terms of strength. I also made a chart, from DeepState’s map, to show the territory of jurisdiction of each GoF (the GoFs “Bryansk” and “Kursk” aren’t shown).

These figures exclude the strategic-operational reserves (about 60 thousad men, with their equipment), the Rosgvardia grouping in the rear of the front (about 35 thousand men, with their equipment, including artillery and even tanks, in the case of the new 116th Special Purpose Brigade), and the small GoF “Crimea” (about 13 thousand men, with a few tanks and around 80 armored vehicles).

The GoFs generally match the military districts, although this is not always the case. Excluding the GoFs located along the state border (“Bryansk”, “Kursk”, “Belgorod”), we have, firstly, the GoF “West”. It corresponds to virtually all of the former Western Military District (now divided between Moscow and Leningrad MDs) - except for a few minor elements of these districts that are located along the state border. In fact, it consists of the: 1st GTA (MMD), 6th CAA (LMD), 20th CAA (MMD), the 11th Corps of the Baltic Fleet as well as the 25th CAA and the elements of the 201st Military Base that are deployed to the front, actually both being part of the Central MD. It appears that since early March, with the transfer of the remaining elements of the 41st CAA and of the 90th Tank Division (both CMD) to Avdiivka, the jurisdiction over the Kreminna sector, including over the Serebrianka Forest, was highly likely transferred to the GoF “West”, which has thus incorporated the 25th CAA. The very high number of tanks is related to the presence of many tank units/formations within this group: the 4th Tank Division and the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA (the latter has two motorized regiments and two tank ones, with the arrival, last October, of the new, fully equipped 153rd Tank Regiment), as well as the 11th Tank Brigade of the 25th CAA, to which we must add the tank regiments of the motorized divisions and the tank battalions of the motorized brigades and regiments.

The Siversky Donets River represents the beginning of the jurisdiction of the GoF “South”, which includes a very considerable part of the Southern Military District.

This GoF encompasses the central/northern part of the Siversk salient too, once under the jurisdiction of the GoF “Centre”, which was moved to the Avdiivka and Horlivka sectors, that have passed to the jurisdiction of the latter GoF during January, when the command of the offensive operations in Avdiivka passed from Rostov-on-Don (Kuzovlev) to Yekaterimburg (Mordvichev).

Let’s note that the GoF “South” still retains jurisdiction over the Marinka sector, from Krasnohorivka (the one north of Marinka) to Solodke. Indeed, in the bulletins of the Russian MoD, the spokesman of this GoF often mentions Bilohorivka (the one near the Siversky Donets) and Novomykhailivka in the same bulletin.

The “GoF” South contains most of the 8th CAA - including its two motorized divisions, all of its 2nd Corps and part of the 1st Corps. This GoF also includes the 3rd Corps, whose formal affiliation is unclear: it was stated to be part of the 20th CAA, but Russian rumors said that since last summer it has been part of the Southern MD), as well as the 68th Corps of the Eastern MD and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, which are fighting in the Marinka sector. It also includes the 98th and 106th VDV Divisions, as well as the 11th and 83rd VDV Brigades and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment, along with part of the 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet; in addition to the bulk of the Cossack Volunteer Assault Corps. Most of this GoF is concentrated around Bakhmut.

Between Mayorsk and Shumy the jurisdiction of the GoF “Centre” begins, which corresponds to the Central Military District (except the 25th CAA): the 2nd CAA, the 41st CAA and the 90th Tank Division. This GoF also includes the bulk of the 1st Corps of the 8th CAA. The jurisdiction of this GoF extends as far as Nevelske. This group has the worst equipment to personnel ratio, due to the very high gear losses during the Avdiivka offensive, the fact that many units of the 1st Corps and of the Territorial Forces are rifle ones, and the fact that the 90th Tank Division is not fully equipped (otherwise it should have 300+ tanks).

Remembering that the Marinka sector is in the hands of the GoF “South”, in Volodymyrivka the jurisdiction of the GoF “East” begins, which reaches as far as the Konka River between Orikhiv and Polohy. This GoF corresponds to almost the entire Eastern Military District and was joined by the 35th CAA in February, with the dissolution of the GoF “Zaporizhzhia”, that was incorporated into the GoF “East” (the Polohy sector) and the GoF “Dnepr” (the Kamianske and Orikhiv sectors). The GoF “East” includes the 35th CAA, 5th CAA, 36th CAA and 29th CAA, as well as the 40th and 336th Naval Infantry Brigades and the 34th Mountain Brigade of the 49th CAA (SMD). This GoF is also marked by a high number of tanks compared to the personnel, which is due to the presence of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA), which alone has a hundred MBTs.

The jurisdiction of the GoF “Dnepr”, which became the largest after the merger of the bulk of the GoF “Zaporizhzhia” with the old GoF “Dnepr”, begins in Novopokrovka. It covers the entire rest of the front until the mouth of the Dnipro River. It should be split between 55% of its forces in Kherson Oblast and 45% in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, more or less. It corresponds practically to the rest of the Southern Military District: the 58th CAA and the 18th CAA, which are both very large. It also includes elements of the 49th CAA, which, however, is split: the 34th Mountain Brigade in Velyka Novosilka, the 7th Military Base (or at least most of it) in Bakhmut, with some rumors of elements of this army along the state border in Belgorod. The 205th Motorized Brigade should still be in the R&R in Crimea and be part of the strategic reserve. This GoF also includes the other part of the 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet; the 7th, 76th and 104th VDV Divisions, the 810th and 61st Naval Infantry Brigades, as well as some elements of the Cossack Volunteer Assault Corps.

I will conclude with a brief update on the order of battle along the front. As for the Ukrainians, it appears that the 68th Jager Brigade, or at least elements of it, have been transferred over the past week to the Tonenke/Umanske area (Avdiivka) from the Svatove sector, and it’s also confirmed that the 78th Air Assault Regiment has been transferred to the same area (from the Orikhiv sector), in support of the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 53rd Mech Brigade. The Russian MoD already had begun mentioning the 68th Jager Brigade as being in this sector since March 31. The 3rd Assault Brigade, around Semenivka, is supported by the 61st Mech Brigade and by elements of the 109th and 120th TDF Brigades; the 47th Mech Brigade, around Berdychi, by elements of the 31st Mech Brigade and of the 143rd and 144th Infantry Brigades.

The 67th Mechanized Brigade has been transferred to the Bakhmut sector (just before Chasiv Yar). It’s a good brigade (although it lost, in January, a couple of companies of the “Da Vinci’s Wolves”, that refounded the battalion inside the 59th Motorized Brigade), which has been given a very difficult task: stemming the advances of the 98th VDV Division between Bohdanivka and Ivanivske in the direction of Chasiv Yar, with the Russians that have recently come very close to its “Kanal” district (on the eastern bank of the Donets-Donbas Canal). The 67th Brigade was transferred from the Kupyansk (Tabaivka) and Kreminna (Serebrianka Forest) sectors. In the first sector it had halted the Russian breakthrough in Tabaivka, along with elements of the 1st Special Purpose Brigade “Ivan Bohun” and the 103rd TDF Brigade. Today it seems to have been replaced by the 17th Battalion of the 57th Motorized Brigade and by elements of the 3rd Tank Brigade, both of which were already in the Kupyansk sector; while the 108th Battalion of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade arrived in Synkivka from the area around Ivanivka, in both cases inside the Kupyansk sector. In the Kreminna sector it should have been replaced by the “Khartiia” Brigade of the National Guard. Moreover, it appears that the 77th Airmobile Brigade has been transferred from the northern flank of Bakhmut to the Svatove sector, possibly replacing the 25th Airborne Brigade. In the northern flank of Bakhmut, battalions of the 142nd Infantry Brigade have been deployed in Bohdanivka and in Rozdolivka. The bulk of the 141st Infantry Brigade is committed in the Orikhiv sector, where it was joined by elements of the new 5th Tank Brigade.

A small expansion of the National Guard continues: the 11th Separate Battalion has been reformed as the 35th Regiment, with the creation of an additional battalion and a reconnaissance company, along with the supply of BTR-4s and Roshel Senator MRAPs. I had heard a mention of this regiment last month, but had found no evidence that it existed, until MilitaryLand confirmed it. It’s covering the state border along Sumy Oblast. The “Azov” Brigade of the National Guard, which has many demands to join it, recently created the 6th Special Purpose Battalion,

The 2nd Mech Battalion of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade arrived around a month ago in the Terny area (Kreminna sector) - despite the fact that the bulk of the brigade is already very busy around Bakhmut - joining the large Ukrainian grouping that is halting the Russian offensive in the direction of Terny and Yampolivka. These villages are being attacked by practically two reinforced Russian divisions: respectively the 144th Motorized Division of the 20th CAA, that was joined, in mid March, by the 252nd Motorized Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division (20th CAA), and the 67th Motorized Division of the 25th CAA, reinforced by several battalions of the divisions of the 1st GTA.

That said, analyzing Russian social media, I come across more and more cases of servicemen of the 67th Motorized Division which are listed as MIA in the Avdiivka sector. There are men belonging to the 31st and 36th Motorized Regiments as well as the 19th Tank Regiment of this division who are reported missing there. This is in addition to what Tatarigami said in February, i.e. that the 2nd CAA and the 41st CAA had received armored vehicles from the 25th CAA to replenish their equipment losses (there was later evidence of this). Now I don’t know whether the assault detachments of these units were sent to Avdiivka, whether other small elements were transferred to this sector, whether some men from these units were transferred to the units of the Central MD deployed in the Avdiivka sector to replenish their losses, if not to other units (one woman wrote that her missing husband and other men were detached from the 19th Tank Regiment to the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps). We shall see how that develops. Also, it seems that many smaller units of the 1st Corps have been cannibalized or are anyway used as marching units to replenish the others. Let’s recall that during the summer the 1st Corps had several regiments deployed along the Southern front as a reinforcement for other formations against the Ukrainian counteroffensive; today it’s conceivable that their presence has been scaled back. In another case, a man from the 95th Rifle Regiment of 1st Corps (which was in Kherson) was reported missing in the Vuhledar sector, where in theory the 116th Rifle Regiment of 1st Corps is present. Other units such as the 96th and 98th Rifle Regiments of the 1st Corps are being used as marching units for the other units active in Avdiivka. The same is true for the regiments of the Territorial Forces, of which there are many in Avdiivka: for instance, I read that the 1231st Regiment from Kazan (Tatarstan) had very large losses and was disbanded, with the men sent to the other units around Avdiivka; the 1232nd Regiment, again made up of mobilized residents of Tatarstan, also had major losses and the men were used as replacements for the brigades of the 2nd CAA.

There are the conscripts of the units of the RuAF located in their original barracks/bases (generally, a brigade/regiment will have like a battalion of conscripts), the operational units of the Rosgvardia, the Border Service etc. There aren’t, to my knowledge, any regular maneuver formation sitting idle outside Ukraine and the border with the latter, barring those in the creation stage.

I have no idea of the current quantification of these groupings, outside the official datas on the number of conscripts and how many people serve in the Border Service etc. Then there is the Russian presence abroad: the 4th (South Ossetia) and 7th (Abkhazia) Military Bases are likely almost entirely in Ukraine, along with at least a relevant part of the 201st Military Base (Tajikistan), which is almost division-sized, unlike the others which are brigade-sized; whereas there has never been any evidence, as far as I know, about involvement of the 102nd Military Base (Armenia) in Ukraine, although a few hundred personnel from it may have been sent to the front in other units of the Southern MD.

I would do this for Ukraine as well, but of course the Ukrainians don’t release this kind of data about themselves and I’m not aware of any Russian observer producing similar work, with this level of detail of estimates.

The deployment of Ukrainian units is known - I was referring to the quantification of the number of personnel and equipment of the Ukrainian groupings along the front.

That said, it’s a very good map and almost perfectly match my knowledge. As far as I understand it’s based on the updates of the Centre for Defence Strategies (which in turn is mostly based on what the observers Mashovets and Kovalenko write) as well as on the available geolocations.

One of my favorite methods, in addition to those, is the analysis of MIA notices, for both sides - it’s surely time consuming, but it lets you know the details of the deployment even at the battalion level (if not at the company level), and allows to confirm rumors about the deployment of a given unit or make it known in first place.

MilitaryLand reports that the 153rd Mechanized Brigade, one of five mechanized brigades created in October 2023, has been reformed as the 153rd Infantry Brigade, and there are rumors that the 152nd Mechanized Brigade will also have the same fate.

Interestingly, this is happening despite the fact that Ukraine reformed the 100th TDF Brigade as the 100th Mechanized Brigade just a few days ago. So the reasons could be both a shortage of vehicles and a willingness to give them to existing units that have proven to deserve them. It should also be said that in a defensive posture, an infantry brigade with no or poor mechanized capabilities can still do much, unlike when in offense.

In general, the situation for vehicles in Ukraine is not extremely bad, meaning there is a shortage, but it’s not one of the priorities compared to shells or manpower. But it’s not rosy either, and the vehicles received from partners and those recovered from depots probably cover the losses, but are unlikely to allow the mechanization of new units.

The 150th Mech Brigade was seen in training with BRDM-2s, the 151st Mech Brigade with BMP-1s (actually the standard in many brigades), the 154th Mech Brigade with BMP-1s and even with a captured T-62M.

Ukrainian stocks of T-64BVs proved to be much deeper than expected, due to the fact that those in storage were really a lot. Incoming Leopard 1A5s will support the situation, although there is also a need to replenish the losses of the existing fleet of MBTs.

Until there are large new transfers from partners, the situation will also remain delicate regarding IFVs, both Western and Soviet ones. There are still many IFVs in service, but I think it’s very difficult to equip new units with them. Also, there is no longer the huge number of vehicles captured from the Russians like back in 2022.

Regarding APCs, the situation seems to be better, but they also include those such as the BTR-60. In March, the 425th Separate Assault Battalion “Skala” received the first M117s delivered from the US - hopefully the rest (250 units were pledged) will arrive as soon as possible. Moreover, M113s are always appreciated and in huge demand by the Ukrainians.

Additional MRAPs, those weighing around or over 10 tons, are also needed. As for IMVs, Ukraine has many, and many more have been pledged - they are great vehicles if the alternative is a civilian car, but some of them aren’t able to withstand a TM-62 mine and are too lightly armored to be supplied to mechanized units; they are given mainly to the National Guard and the Border Guards and/or used for CASEVAC.

As for artillery, many newly made 155mm howitzers are expected to arrive from France and Germany in 2024 and 2025, and the production pace of the domestic 155mm SPG (2S22 Bohdana), has increased to 8 units per month. The former Warsaw Pact countries still have many 2S1 Gvozdikas, which are useful for Ukraine given the decent availability of 122mm shells.

From the production plants as well as the stocks located in Eastern Europe (+ Pakistan) and in the future from the Czech initiative. The situation is considerably worse for 152mm, and for 105mm.