Ukrainian military observer Mashovets this morning confirmed that the 104th Regiment of the 76th VDV Division has been deployed to the south-east of Novoprokopivka, which by the way seems to be the most critical area in the sector right now. The 234th and 237th, the 76th Division’s other two maneuver regiments, would also be in the rear according to him.

The Russians have reportedly moved quite a few units into the sector during the last week, like two regiments of the 2nd Corps (part of the 8th Army - former LPR Corps), one of which is holding the ridgelines where the “Height 166” is located, probably the purpose of their deployment is to use them as cannon fodder, considering the attrition of the Russian territorial forces' regiments and of the BARS detachments already deployed in the sector… Also, at a least a battalion of the 503rd Motorized Regiment of the 19th MRD (this regiment covers the hitherto fairly quiet area between Kamyanske and Robotyne) would have been transferred from Nesterianka to Kopani, where the Ukrainians have been doing some probes to try to widen the flanks of their advance towards the South. This regiment is still fairly fresh afaik. Elements of the 4th Military Base (58th Army) would also have been moved near Novoprokopivka from the Kamyanske sector. By now we are talking about lateral transfers, as the Russians are imho approaching the “minimum limit” of formations they have to hold along the Dnipro, except for a few units perhaps, at least until the new formations they are creating will be able to be moved there. The one thing they could do at this point, like they are starting to do, is to ask for reinforcements from the 8th Army from the eastern front, since the Russians don’t seem to be eager to touch the brigades (all of them still quite fresh) of the 35th Army in Polohy… Let’s recall that in the Tokmak sector there are still most of the 42nd MRD, the 100th Reconnaissance Brigade as well as the 22nd Brigade and elements of the 45th Brigade (both are Spetsnaz GRU), which usually provide reconnaissance activities, Lancet operators, snipers, but are also used for some local counterattacks. Plus there are at least two battalions of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, one of which was brought in from near Kamyanske. I imagine that the deployment of VDV units in the area could be explained by the fact that this brigade which has often been used to face Ukrainian attacks (the notorious debacle of a Company tactical group from the 118th Mech Brigade in late July was the work of a battalion of the 810th NIB, as far as I read) and also for counterattacks, may begin to be losing combat effectiveness.

Personally, I was a little skeptical about the relocation of 76th VDV Division, but it seems to be confirmed, as I wrote above. Kofman too wrote that he has indications that the 76th has been moved. Probably the bulk of this formation arrived in Berdyansk and is getting ready to be deployed in the Tokmak sector. I was skeptical because the Russians sent two regiments of the 7th VDV Division (56th and 108th - the 247th has been in the Velyka Novosilka sector for almost two months) to the Tokmak sector in the first half of this month… And they are already sending new reinforcements. This is not to imply that units of the 7th Division have had huge losses - they have still been involved quite marginally as far as I know, but it does make it clear that the Russians are seeing an high potential risk there if they are moving so many elite units into that sector in such a short time. It appears that in the coming weeks the bulk of the fighting will be between VDV units against elements of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, which began getting seriously committed during last week, between Robotyne and Verbove. Russia continues to use the elite + “expendable” mobilized/BARS units combo to hold the lines.

For instance, two battalions of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, still fresh and among the best formations they have in the South, are reported to have been deployed in the flanks around Staromlynivka to support formations that are either battered like the 60th MRB or have quite disappointed like the 37th MRB. VDV and the Naval Infantry are also often, according to the Ukrainians, used as “fire fighters”: i.e., a part of these units don’t hold a given frontline, but are in the tactical reserve ready to be employed in the hottest area of a given sector to support other units. It’s for this reason that in Urozhaine the marines of the 155th Brigade covered the retreat of the other units together with their colleagues from the 40th NIB, despite the fact that the 155th NIB is attached to the 29th Army which is deployed in Vuhledar.

If the 7th VDV Division was practically fresh after the long recovery from the Kherson campaign (it always remained on the other side of the Dnipro), let’s remember that the 76th VDV Division cannot be properly considered a Russian strategic reserve (like I’ve read these days), as it was fully active in the Kreminna sector, specifically mainly in the Serebrianka Forest. It had been deployed there since November when the Russians withdrew from Kherson and managed to block Ukrainian efforts along the Zherebets and in the aforementioned forest. It’s considered the best VDV formation both because of its military tradition and because along with the 7th Division it’s the largest and the best equipped - it also fields a tank battalion for example.

As we know the 217th Regiment of the 98th VDV Division was transferred to the Dubovo-Vasylivka salient in the second half of June. If the transfer of the entire 76th VDV Division were confirmed, it would mean that only the 331st Regiment of the 98th Division is remaining in the Kreminna sector, which until Wagner’s withdrawal from Bakhmut represented the largest VDV grouping in Ukraine. Hence now the overwhelming majority of the Russians deployed there are likely from the 41st Army with its three brigades + the 90th Tank Division, which is a much less competent formation than the VDV. This would be good news for the Ukrainians deployed in the area - Kreminna has undoubtedly been among the bloodiest sectors for the Ukrainians in the past 9 months and since June the Ukrainians have sent several additional brigades there; on the other hand this could reflect that the 76th VDV Division that had been leading the Russian efforts in the Kreminna sector is unlikely to be at 100% of its capabilities.

The 51st Regiment of the 106th VDV Division would have been transferred from the northern flank to the southern flank of Bakhmut, near Kurdyumivka, according to the Centre for Defence Strategies. This Division is entirely deployed around Bakhmut. I had read a few weeks ago from a Telegram channel close to it that some elements of the 106th had been transferred near Kreminna for a short period during June to support VDV efforts there, but now it’s definitely entirely back in Bakhmut.

The 31st VDV Brigade as far as I know had been withdrawn about a month ago from the first line in Bakhmut after considerable losses… This is the first formation that arrived in the first half of May in Bakhmut (along with the 72nd Brigade of the 3rd Corps and the 200th Brigade of the Arctic Fleet) after Wagner’s withdrawal. I remember that Twitter page (@KilledInUkraine) that keeps track of the obituaries of Russian officers fallen in action, had published quite a few fallen officers from this brigade during June or so. The 83rd VDV Brigade is the reason why the Ukrainians have not fully liberated Klishchiivka yet but is still suffering major losses. The 11th VDV Brigade is in the area too and is the most fresh air assault formation they have in Bakhmut. On the southern flank of Bakhmut the 8th Army has sent two regiments of the 150th MRD from Marinka, in addition to several units of the 2nd Corps, which is overwhelmingly concentrated between Bilohorivka and Klishchiivka.

The Bakhmut affair, although Ukrainian progress is not fast, is very useful as it’s creating considerable attriction in Russian units without the Ukrainians having to deploy their strategic reserves in the area. According to the Centre for Defence Strategies, elements of the 18th Motorized Division (11th Corps, WMD) were reportedly transferred to the Dubovo-Vasylivka salient recently. Let’s await further confirmation - until now this division was the Russian operational reserve in the Kupyansk sector. In the latter sector I read that Russian efforts have slowed down and despite some minor positional successes, Synkivka is still firmly in Ukrainian hands, partly due to a quite large influx of reserves. The brigades of the 2nd Army of the Central MD have reportedly resumed attacks towards Novojehorivka (Svatove sector) but at the moment without success, as far as I can see.

They are probably forced. Territorial forces' units and BARS, regular but less competent units, etc., have to be supported by capable units such as the VDV and Naval Infantry, that are also able to counterattack, make good use of drones etc. VDV has performed quite well in defensive roles in the past, now we will see how they are going perform this time. Certainly the attrition that the VDV and the Naval Infantry are experiencing across the front is considerable and the Russians will have to bear the consequences of that. Several new VDV regiments are being formed, but it’s yet to be seen and it’s by no means a foregone conclusion that they will manage to be even at the level of the existing ones.

This is a very big problem for Russia, whose Army seems to have a very narrow “middle class” (to use this term) in terms of warfare capabilities. The Ukrainian Army obviously has its best and worst brigades, but in my opinion there is less variance.

I feel like it also puts into perspective the Russian decision to hold ground at all cost. Many expected Russia to engage in a defense in depth to make the most of their extensive fortifications, but instead, they’ve bitterly contested every inch of ground, and aggressively counterattacked Ukrainian gains.

Fully agree. They just don’t step back unless forced so. Which also could open questions about their assessed efficiency of their fortifications in the rear. There are political reasons too.

I didn’t know that. That would be a particularly interesting perspective.

Now the 92nd Mechanized Brigade has become an Assault Brigade too by the way. These are employed, as the name says, for offensive purposes, so it’s legit to assume that soon the bulk of the 92nd Brigade that is still in the Svatove sector will be withdrawn. If they decide not to continue their offensive efforts in Bakhmut, where a battalion of the 92nd is deployed, it could also be sent to the southern front, who knows.

I really admire the 3rd Assault Brigade, they are brave and do a good job despite fielding mostly T-72M1s, YPR-765s, and M113s. I had once read that they were a bit disappointed that they couldn’t get any modern shiny toys. I also have the suspect that their close connection to the Azov universe might be a factor that leads Western governments to prefer that modern gear (about which there is more attention from the public opinion) gets sent to other units.

They are specialists in “hit-and-run” attacks, where they inflict as many casualties and take as many prisoners as possible to the enemy while taking as few losses as possible and then retreat before the Russians shell the captured positions. They are also helped by the fact that they are a very popular brigade with lots of followers on social medias. This allows them to receive numerous donations, with which they buy drones, GoPros etc. There is a reason why the 3rd Brigade’s attacks can be seen in 4k like a videogame and they publish a ton of them every week, while we have had little material e.g. from the 28th Mech Brigade, even though around July they had successes near Kurdyumivka (just a few kilometers further south than the where the 3rd Brigade is operating).

I was thinking about that a few days ago: popularity is in fact a factor that widens the warfare capabilities gap between the various brigades, precisely because of the greater availability of donations, which are crucial for stuff like drones that are supplied in minimal quantities by the Ministry of Defence afaik.

At the operational level in this war, the basic unit is the brigade/regiment, which organize the deployment of their own battalions either by deploying all of them or by keeping some in reserve (as it’s often the case) to allow intra-brigade (or regiment, for the Russians) rotations. Battalions and companies are the key players at the tactical level.

Battalions are deployed according to the needs of a given area. The limit Russia prefers to have is not to mix units from different Military Districts for command, control, and coordination reasons, although in certain difficult areas such as Bakhmut this is no longer possible. It’s often difficult to find a formation that can be entirely send to a sector, so they fix this by having one unit sent from this formation, another from a different one, etc. A case in point is the 5th Army of the Eastern MD, which covers the western bank of the Mokri Yaly River up to near Marfopil but “lost” its 57th MRB which they had to send to Andriivka near Bakhmut and so this brigade was probably temporarily put under the command of the 8th Army of the SMD. As a result, the 127th MRD of the 5th Army had to be reinforced by the 71st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd MRD, which should have been in the Orikhiv sector instead.

Ukraine is a specialist in this actually, there are brigades that have their battalions dozens and dozens of kilometers apart in completely different areas. Because maybe one sector needed reinforcements, and a given brigade was in a position to send a battalion of theirs. Although it must be said that the Ukrainian structure is completely different compared to the Russian one and very (perhaps too much) simplified.