Yet another (short, in this case) account on the problems during the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, by an UAV operator from the 47th Mechanized Brigade, reported by the “WarArchive” Telegram Channel.

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/8150

I translated it with DeepL and will entirely put it below. The only thing I will add is that it would be nice to have similar interviews/reports from Russian personnel being honest about the problems of their offensive actions (save for some milbloggers throwing a tantrum once in a while); on the contrary, it seems that Ukrainians, particularly in the 47th Brigade, have no problem telling everyone everything.

We saw the preparations with training, planning and the assaults themselves. I think both our allies and our command are responsible for the failure. It is difficult to conduct strategic operations with 30-50% of the required equipment and no air superiority. On the other hand, knowing your resources, you need to build on them, not disperse the already limited forces.

There was indeed a plan to reach Tokmak in 3 days, but more on that later. Let’s start from the beginning. We went through all possible training grounds, exercises, courses and headed south. We were forbidden to interact with anyone in order not to burn our presence. Spoiler alert, two weeks before the counteroffensive, the enemy already knew where each brigade was, the number of vehicles and personnel.

Did we know about enemy forces, fortifications and minefields? Yes, of course. The National Guard, which had been holding the frontline here for a year, knew every bush, every landing, and any ordinary soldier could show us firing points, enemy positions, and provide us with photos of minefields from copters.

A week before the offensive, we conduct night and day firing on the enemy’s fortified areas, massive artillery strikes that we adjust daily. There is practically no response, for 20 of our shots, 1 enemy shell arrives. We were made to understand that there are a lot of 82 and 120 mm, 155 mm is practically unlimited. But still we were preparing for Forward Forward.

Two days before the active phase, we receive a general plan from the command, which provides for a 10-kilometer advance in the first 12 hours at best. At worst, 5 kilometers. In one day, we had to break through the first line of enemy defense, bypass Robotyno and Novopokropivka, and prepare a bridgehead for the next brigades to take Tokmak. We realized that the command wanted Kharkiv 2.0. Was it possible with our forces? British intelligence thought it was 50/50.

When we asked, “What is the plan if something goes wrong?” We were told “The corps command has a plan B”. We had to interact with at least 5 more brigades that I know about, two brigades of the Offensive Guard and three mechanized brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The corridor was to be opened for another corps.

Spoiler alert - everything went wrong, spoiler alert - there was no plan B. An interesting fact is that, according to the “elephant” [military rumors], the first Leopard destroyed was not by Russians, but by the National Guard. But it was the Leopard and its command that were wrong. I repeat, it was just an elephant.

So, we have up to 10 brigades that should quickly break through the front to a depth of 20-30 kilometers. Most of the brigades are newly created. The equipment is mostly Western. The fighters are motivated and mostly trained. However, this time the God of War turned his back on us, and everything did not go according to plan.

Thank you! Do you know what does “elephant” mean instead?

Okay, thanks! I edited the comment to clarify that. Greetings to your friend and best wishes to him.

Yes, you are right. The initial attack was launched by the 47th Mech Brigade, with support from the 65th Mech Brigade and the “Spartan” Brigade of the Offensive Guard. Less well known is the attack from Mala Tokmachka towards Novopokrovka by the 33rd Mech Brigade, which was equally unsuccessful, with human and material losses. I find likely that the 116/117/118th Mech Brigades, together with the “Kara-Dag” and “Azov” Brigades of the OG, were in the rear ready to exploit a possible breakthrough. But, as you have written, this second echelon began to be employed only from the second half of July. It’s possible that the Ukrainians, frightened by the problems of the first day, took a break (effectively acknowledging a failure of their maximalist goals) to rethink their tactics, as they later did.

On his role I don’t know much. To my knowledge he’s a simple operator. But I could be wrong.

Ukrainian brigades, continuing the Soviet/Russian tradition, are led by Colonels.

I checked and Oleksandr Sak, the previous commander of the 47th Brigade, was actually a Lt Colonel! It’s rare but UA/RU brigades/regiments can be led by Lt Colonels too.