Some news on the industrial side of the war in Ukraine.
This morning the Ukrainian military observers Mashovets and Kovalenko both reported the estimates of Ukrainian military intelligence about the production at the “State Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building Bakhirev” located in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. It’s by far the main factory in Russia for the production of shells.
In 2024 there are reportedly plans to produce, from this plant:
- 60k 203mm artillery shells (almost three times as much as planned in 2023);
- 684k 152mm artillery shells (18% more than planned for 2023);
- 270k 125mm tank ammos (an increase of nearly 14% over the current year);
- 253k 122mm artillery shells (just a 5% increase).
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1459
https://t.me/zloyodessit/20579
In general, the Russian military command expects to receive nearly a third more new shells produced from its military-industrial complex in 2024 compared to 2023, although it’s said that the growth in 2024 could stop at a quarter. Russia’s shells production capacity is judged to be between 1,5 and 1,7 million shells per year (not clear whether this includes tank ammos). The very large increase in 203mm shells production is clearly due to the withdrawal of howitzers of this caliber from depots and the ongoing creation of the new high-power artillery brigades. It’s also reported that the “Precision Electromechanics Plant” near Minsk in Belarus is working to fulfill an order for 10k units of 122mm unguided rockets for BM-21 Grads, for the Russian Armed Forces.
Mashovets also reports that the Black Sea Fleet has recently received (it reportedly just arrived in Novorossiysk) a Karakurt-class “Tucha” missile corvette (capable of accommodating up to 8 Kalibr-NKs), manufactured by Zelenodolsk Shipyard in Tatarstan and arrived via the Volga-Don channel. It would be on trials and will replace the “Askold” corvette that was damaged by a Ukrainian missile attack a month ago.
The Russian “Military Informant” Telegram channel reports that there’s a possibility that mass production of 122mm shells for Ukraine has begun in Azerbaijan. It’s not certain that the pictures are from there, but there are several clues: one is suggested in the post. Another might be the fact that in a photo in this article, reporting the start of 122mm shells production in a partner country of Ukraine, there is a “NetLift” stacker (a Turkish company), which might be indeed another clue, given the high presence of Turkish equipment in the Transcaucasian country. Thanks to the production, primarily from the East EU countries, but also from Pakistan and potentially new partners like this one, 122mm shells are the second most used artillery caliber in the UAF after the 155mm, and in fact the 2S1 Gvozdikas and D-30s equip an important part of the artillery battalions of Ukrainian brigades. Whereas the situation for 152mm (and Western 105mm caliber) ammunition is much worse.
https://t.me/milinfolive/112013
I will answer within the limits of what I know. The average daily ammo expenditure of a tank isn’t that high, as generally, in this war, a tank spends the vast majority of the time hidden in the rear. Russia, according to the latest estimate of Ukrainian military intelligence, had over 2300 tanks deployed within Ukrainian borders.
Ukraine lived through a bad time between late spring and early summer 2022, when due to the depletion of their stockpiles of Soviet-caliber shells and the fact that NATO-caliber ones were just beginning to arrive, they had to use tanks in place of artillery, which resulted in a shortage of 125mm ammo. Which was resolved with a major scaling down of this practice and with Romanian and Bulgarian factories of 125mm ammo at full capacity.
Regarding the second question, my understanding is that Ukraine produces from 20 to 50% of its requirements of certain calibers (e.g. 152mm), and it’s not clear to me whether they actually meant 20% in total, which would look like a very large share, given the importance of the numbers of 155mm shells that Ukraine doesn’t produce. In any case, Ukroboronprom’s efforts to increase domestic production, despite the fact that the results are not huge (it’s also understandable, given the many difficulties) are appreciable.