Afaik Oryx, in order to avoid double counting, doesn’t count the losses of vehicles captured and used by the Ukrainians of which we can be sure they were actually captured from the Russians (e.g. any T-90). Obviously for example with a BMP-2 this doesn’t hold up, as they can’t be sure it was previously captured from the Russians, came from Ukrainian depots or from partners' transfers.

Agree. Not least because they already count vehicles captured from the Russians and lost by the Ukrainians that before the war were in the possession of both sides (T-80BV, BMP-1/2 and many others). For example, the 93rd Mechanized Brigade still operates a considerable number of T-80Us captured from the 4th Tank Division of the 1st GTA in Sumy Oblast between February and March 2022. There are Ukrainians who, probably exaggerating, claim that the UAF operates more T-80Us than the Russians! During the Bakhmut campaign I recall that several T-80Us in Ukrainian use were lost.

As far as I could find, among the artillery shell production plants in Finland there is the Nammo-owned one in Lapua, but I wasn’t able to figure out whether it produces fully loaded 155mm shells or only parts of them (which have to be completed in Norway/Sweden), and if I understand correctly there’s also something owned by the Finnish Defense Forces. I guess the increase in production announced by the MoD refers to these? I wonder, like u/For_All_Humanity, if there is any idea about the production capacity.

On a related note, regarding the large Finnish artillery fleet, a majority of which is made up of 122mm howitzers. I wonder, is there any factory in Finland that produces this caliber? What would be the FDF’s plans in this regard in case of war? I imagine the country has a large strategic stockpile of 122mm shells to allow each howitzer to fire the recommended daily maximum amount for X weeks, although in the medium-long term this could be a problem if there is no production capacity.

As far as I know after the 2021 reform, in January 1, 2022 the Territorial Defense Forces became their own branch of the Armed Forces, outside of the Ground Forces. Just like the National Guard, the Air Assault Forces and also the new Marine Corps. And of course the Navy and the Air Force.

In September the Ukrainian MoD stated there were 1 million Ukrainians under arms, of which 800k in the Armed Forces. The rest, I guess, in police forces and border guards.

Aside from those sources which are what they are, the fact that the Cossack Volunteer Assault Corps exists has been known since this summer and the composition that u/Glideer listed is in line with what Ukrainian observers wrote about the corps. It’s formed by the union of former volunteer units, former PMCs from the Redut galaxy and various BARS detachments. It’s active mainly in Bakhmut and to a lesser extent in Avdiivka, with some smaller units deployed in other sectors. The brigades it contains are under-strength but some of them are forming new rifle and tank battalions.

Thank you! Maybe there’s a possibility a part of the 122mm shells stockpile could be sent to Ukraine. Perhaps, for the future, one option for Finland could be to increase the 155mm howitzers fleet and start domestic shells production with relevant capabilities, as well as potentially replacing the role of 122mm howitzers (which I imagine are largely intended for “ghost” units mobilized in case of war) with 120mm mortars.

I find it really weird that all the ammo talk is about 155mm shells when that is like the third most common caliber in Ukrainian artillery, after 122mm and 152mm.

I think that’s because, afaik, 155mm shells by far make up the plurality of what Ukrainian artillery fires. In second place there are 122mm shells, thanks to production in Eastern EU countries and others like Pakistan as well as transfers from partners such as Finland, as you wrote. The situation for 152mm and 105mm shells, on the other hand, is much worse, despite Ukraine having many howitzers of these calibers.