KilledInUkraine has recorded 3309 fallen Russian officers in Ukraine. We have to add, as you mentioned, that Russia had units like Wagner’s Project K in the past and Storm Z/V detachments today with a very limited share of officers compared to the troops (vs the standard of the regular motorized infantry), and these are the units that have borne a very large share of the casualties over the past year. Also, it’s a bit trivial, but there could probably be other factors such as less social media presence by Russians from the more underdeveloped regions that makes it harder to identify losses (perhaps less so for officers).

WarTears, I think you know it, states it has 24,4k confirmed Ukrainian KIAs and 6,5k MIAs. As well as more than 8k POWs. The latter are not that many anyway - that’s a war in which there are surprisingly few POWs on either side in the grand scheme of things, for a variety of reasons. Let’s also consider that the plurality of Ukrainian POWs were taken in Mariupol.

In any case, I am personally, and I repeat personally, of the impression that the ratio of UA : RU irrecoverable losses could be at least 1 : 1,5. Hardly several decimals more, but I don’t think less. I believe a slightly favorable ratio for the Russians may have occurred only during the Kherson campaign of summer/autumn 2022 while in the Donbas campaign of April/July 2022 it was most likely equal. The latter is the thing that makes me bearish for a better ratio for the Ukrainians. People only consider Bakhmut or this year’s counteroffensive, but the Russian offensive in the Izyum/Lyman/Severodonetsk/Popasna quadrilateral was a carnage for the UAF.

But that’s just my opinion. Then, in relation to population, things are worse for Ukraine, but that’s another matter.

That’s true but only up to some extent. Yes, Russia made and makes far greater use of the mechanized component, but large swaths of the Russian losses over the last year are convicts from Wagner or Storm Z units that don’t have armored vehicles, just as from the many regiments of the Territorial Forces (where the mobilized are concentrated) that are in fact rifle regiments.

1:1.15 Ru:Ua losses

Meaning higher UA losses, or was it a typo by chance?

Probably in this summer’s counteroffensive, if I had to make an estimate, I would say the human losses were somewhat comparable (and so were the material ones). I know you may disagree with me. Considering only Orikhiv - yes, a good part of the new Ukrainian brigades ended up in that sector, but so did numerous Russian regiments from the Territorial Forces and volunteer units (in addition to “regular” formations). Every now and then I discover new ones that were deployed there. On the other hand I forgot Kreminna, at least when it comes to the first half of 2023. Probably up there Ukrainian losses were greater than Russian ones. After all, it has been mostly UA National Guard vs VDV for a while.

Good point about officers. Although as far as I know, Ukraine promotes them with ease and has very accelerated courses for new officers. Which is a point of complaint by Ukrainians, btw.