An important issue I have been reflecting on lately, as far as recruitment is concerned, is morale, which is also and especially influenced by future prospects.

Ukraine over the last winter was mobilizing in large numbers, but it also had a large flow of volunteers, especially from the under-27 age bracket. The average age of soldiers in the brigades the Offensive Guard for example is quite lowish (compared to the average) afaik, because when they were established there was a massive nationwide enlistment campaign, aimed particularly at the younger folks. The campaign relied heavily on the counteroffensive hype, Western equipment, NATO training, etc. Which proved indeed the best way to attract young people.

Ditto for other formations such as the 47th Mechanized Brigade, before it had to include mobilized within its ranks to replenish losses - probably the brigade’s problems drastically reduced the flow of volunteers (benefitting others). A case in point is the 3rd Assault Brigade. A few weeks ago it was withdrawn from the frontline to rest, to train recruits and to become the largest brigade in the UAF: recently two newly formed rifle battalions were added to its structure, which has grown to seven maneuver battalions, counting the tank one. This is possible because the brigade still has a significant flow of volunteers (at the expense of others), due to the fact that it’s perceived as successful, competent and caring toward its soldiers. And this is good.

There is another issue, however. Beyond the demographic aspect and the individual willingness to fight, today’s voluntary enlistment of young men is damaged by the failure of the maximalist goals of the counteroffensive and the growing perception of it as a positional, static and attritional war. It’s much more “romantic” for a 20-year-old to see himself on top of a Bradley chasing the Russians after breaking through their lines than in the trenches.

But my point is that it’s good for Ukrainians (more so since in the short-medium term they will have to focus on defense) to have a “cultural” shift regarding this aspect, and the UAF needs to be a protagonist in enhancing that. Being part of a mechanized assault against Russian lines is actually much more dangerous at individual level, on average, than defending a trench or a position. Units that break through are supposed to take very heavy casualties in a short time, but that’s not the case for those defending a position, except fuck-ups or being under enemy’s main effort. I know about Ukrainian soldiers who have been defending sectors (where the Russian main effort was not concentrated) for over a year with very little rest, and despite there have obviously been deaths and serious injuries in their unit, most are alive and doing relatively well. Whereas you cannot storm enemy lines for a year and stay alive without being maimed.

There were interviews with young Ukrainians who were thinking of enlisting but were afraid at the idea of storming Russian fortified lines. So a strategy by the UAF to attract young people, and more recruits in general (especially the ones that are scared the most about fighting), beyond expanding mobilization, could be to improve people’s perception about trench warfare, while other units should be fully trained to carry out competent mechanized attacks when an opportunity will arise. And here the UAF has to help with better, deeper, more protected trenches, as well as improving the perception that recruits are not just “meat”.