I don’t speak Ukrainian so the stuff I get only goes so far, but from what I’m understanding the appointment of these new faces on UAF Command, including several brigade commanders (the current one from the 59th Motorized and the commanders during ATO/JFO years of the 54th Mechanized and 58th Motorized) has been met with favor by Ukrainians on social media and has provided a breath of optimism after the frosty spell of Syrsky’s appointment. It looks like a decent team, no matter what is said about its new supreme chief.

The only jarring note has been the new TDF Commander, Plahuta, who replaced Barhylevych (who had only been there since last October and became Chief of the General Staff). Plahuta was the commander of the Southern Territorial Command of the Internal Troops (which later became the National Guard) in 2013/14 and played a prominent role in the repression of the Euromaidan protests, leading the Internal Troops and the infamous Berkut riot police in Kyiv. Although it must be said that the TDF is gradually losing relevance and size within the Armed/Defense Forces.

MilitaryLand did an excellent summary here.

Barhylevych was basically promoted. It’s not written there, but Horbatiuk and Drapatyi are also the former commanders of the 54th and 58th Brigades, respectively.

On the other hand, I don’t see as a good thing the removal of Zabrodskyi, and it’s unclear what role Palisa, the current commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, will play. Zelensky had mentioned him among those who will assist Syrsky, but he might have declined the role. We shall see…

For what I got, especially with regard to the deputies of Chief of the General Staff, is also the fact that they are generally people with military experience as commander in the field, as opposed to primarily staff officers over their carriers. That doesn’t mean they’re going to be great or even good in their roles, but it’s something that counts in their initial approval by the soldiers and the common population.

I was referring mostly to the deputies of the Chief of General Staff, such as Horbatiuk and Drapatyi. About Shevchenko, on the other hand, I have read nothing and know nothing.

There were some rumblings in the comments of some Ukrainian channel but so far there is no evidence to confirm this and David Axe doesn’t seem to bring any more in this article.

We shall see. The 3rd Assault Brigade has much more autonomy than the other brigades and has some say in which battles to fight and especially how to. I don’t expect them to be deployed anywhere without their command agreeing and having a plan. Not least because that is also what their popularity is based on, which in turn means that there is a list to join as a result of the many requests (and it has much more than 2000 soldiers).

Let us know when the updated version comes out - looking forward to buying a copy! Because of the fluidity of the lines, the few drones and, reflexively, the lack of geolocations, scarce analysis from observers etc, knowing in detail what has happened during the first month is by far the most difficult thing in the history of this war and I am very interested in that.

I have always known that there was a battalion of conscripts of the 4th RRB in Hostomel, while among the very first Russian mechanized units to reach the area there were elements of the 40th NIB, which after all was and still is under the operational subordination of the 36th CAA.

Interesting! I thought the elements of the 1st Operational Brigade of the NG were around the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant even during the very first days.

40th NIB and 29th CAA mostly serve as a rearguard when Eastern Military District + the VDV grouping pull out.

I’ve always known that a BTG from the 155th NIB was heavily involved in Moschun, and this brigade was under the operational subordination of the 29th CAA.

76th VDV division’s column (a regiment of which then got plastered on the 27th trying to thunder run Bucha - Irpin to breach into Kyiv.

God bless the 43rd Artillery Brigade ;)