There are conflicting reports from who I consider to be credible pro-Ukraine analysts, where some say that the Russians have greater capacity to replace its losses and build up new units

This is true and is not anything controversial right now either, although it doesn’t say anything about recruits' training.

In any case, I’m not aware that the 1008th Regiment (Territorial Forces) has been disbanded. It had very considerable losses in Bakhmut during the summer but is being reconstituted with contract soldiers - they are looking for infantrymen and stormtroopers: https://t.me/ordenbat/58

Several territorial regiments were, however, likely cannibalized and disbanded. Lots of them were sent to the front within two weeks from the partial mobilization law, so we can guess what training they had. But there was a huge need for reinforcements after all. As for the summer counteroffensive, numerous regiments of the Territorial Forces had very large losses, a significant number of the subunits of the 42nd Motorized Division of the 58th Army lost combat capability (with many new recruits arriving in them during the clashes to replenish losses), and even elite units such as the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 22nd and 45th Spetsnaz GRU Brigades were badly damaged.

Quality of troops and individual training do remain a weak point. Russian sources as well criticize the training of the soldiers, although it must be said that per Ukrainian sources (e.g. the “Skala” Battalion, active in Avdiivka) the skills demonstrated by the Russians during this period in Avdiivka are better than those of the Wagner’s convicts in Bakhmut, which may indicate better training and more capable leaders (probably former Wagnerite veterans of the urban battle of Bakhmut).

However, there are indeed many cases of contract soldiers who signed up and by the next month were dead or missing. Two-weeks trainings are still very, very common for those who are replacements and are sent to make up for losses in existing units. Although maybe it’s usually people who have had some training in the past (e.g. in the military service) and already knew how to shoot, maintain a weapon, etc. In any case it’s short in any respect. Even more elite units such as the “Veterans” Assault and Reconnaissance Brigade offer just two weeks of basic training for volunteers who join, possibly extendable if the recruit is not deemed ready or a specific role has been chosen (e.g. AGS-17 operator and so on). The same goes for other units such as the “Akhmat” detachments. The situation may be somewhat different for recruits destined for new formations, whose training seems to be longer, more emphasis is placed on collective training, combined arms etc.

And it should be mentioned that sometimes existing units, after being rotated to the rear from the front line, conduct additional training (e.g. to improve assault techniques), also in order to integrate new recruits into the unit. This is true for Ukrainian brigades too.

They are part of the Ground Forces and are formally called motor rifle regiments by Russian official sources. Although, when it comes to their structure (especially in terms of support units), framing, HQ staffing and equipment they are quite different from a standard MRR. The latters are all formally part of a division and operate as such, while those of the Territorial Forces are just attached to a brigade or a division to provide support, when their servicemen are not being used to make up for losses in regular units.

As far as I know the new formations (which, with the exception of the 3rd Corps, have been created just since early 2023) are staffed exclusively by contract soldiers, at most with the exception of officers. There are indications that some of the new units (e.g. the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division near Nizhny Novgorod) have a HQ / barracks in Russia, just like all the units that existed before the conflict, and conscripts from military service (who are not sent to Ukraine) serve in such new units as well.

That said, I would be careful not to counterpose mobilized and contract soldiers in terms of performance and capabilities. In theory it is indeed preferable to have the latters rather than having to draft people, but there are some caveats. A soldier who signs a contract because he has a criminal record and cannot find a normal job is unlikely to be a better soldier than a mobilized man who had been a contract soldier in the Russian Armed Forces until a few years or a decade ago. This is especially true for the VDV, which had access to the former soldiers in this branch during the mobilization period, as well as during the first waves of mobilization in general, when reservists and people with military experience are called up. A Russian source I had read recently stated that many contract soldiers really have no idea what awaits them when they sign up; whereas the convicts, however much worse trained and equipped, are already mentally prepared for the hardships that await them in Ukraine.

Interesting question, but I haven’t any indication about this. Those who had refused for ethical reasons or fear of going to war may as well have ignored the mobilization summon and accepted the consequences - it’s not like there was the death penalty for ignoring the summon after all - or might have gone abroad.

Certainly, however, since September 2022 everything has changed. Before, it was somewhat possible to refuse and go home. Today disobeying at the front line is a one-way ticket to a Storm unit.

Didn’t know that, thanks! I wonder if that was actually the case eventually.