According to Ukrainian estimates on this matter, 40/50 KABs per day are being used against Avdiivka over the last week, including 20 per day on the Coke Plant. On the other hand, arrivals of KABs in the Kherson sector are judged as having fallen sharply compared to the fall. Russian production capacity is estimated at 50 KABs per day. This is a recent write up on this by the military osservator Kovalenko:
On the KABs…
During the day from February 13 to 14, an absolute record of the use of KABs.
131 KABs of FAB-250/500M62/1500M54 modifications, as well as there were drops of rare RBC-500 and volume-detonating ethylene ODAB-500…
131 KABs were used in 24 hours mainly in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Earlier, the absolute record was set on November 25, 2023 - 120. Over the past 24 hours - 131.
Russian occupiers are forcing events. While they are forcing things, our partners, especially our overseas partners… You can think of the appropriate word yourself.
https://t.me/zloyodessit/21038
A report from the 3rd Assault Brigade was published today, and I take the opportunity to make a quick update about the situation in Avdiivka.
Update from Avdiivka: occupants' losses and intelligence data.
At least 15 thousand enemy troops are fighting against the forces of the Third Separate Assault Brigade in our section of the front in Avdiivka.
Our brigade inflicted critical damage on the 74th and 114th separate motorized rifle brigades of the Russian army. Both enemy units have been virtually wiped out.
The actual number of casualties is estimated at 4,200 enemy “200s” and “300s”.
The 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces is also suffering significant losses. Fighting is ongoing against the 35th and 55th brigades of the 41st Army, and against the 21st and 15th brigades of the 2nd Army.
According to the available data of the Third Assault Brigade, the enemy’s forces in our section of the front are as follows: 35th; 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades from the 41st Combined Arms Army. Also: 15th, 21st and 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army. In particular, the 114th separate motorized rifle brigade, the former 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the so-called “DPR”, is fighting against Ukrainian forces.
Some tasks are performed by GRU personnel, who carry out night assaults using night vision equipment, conduct sabotage, and adjust air and artillery strikes.
Despite the fact that the occupiers suffer disproportionate losses, the situation in Avdiivka remains extremely difficult.
Beyond the declarations about Russian losses that might be exaggerated (this is normal), the statement about the units they are fighting against confirms what was already known about the Russian order of battle in Avdiivka; rather, the brigades they mentioned may give an insight about the current deployment area of the 3rd Assault Brigade.
Ukrainian military observer Miroshnikov wrote earlier that Ukrainian units have left the vast majority of Avdiivka and now remain in two spots: the Coke Plant and the 9th District. I believe both strongholds are defended by the 3rd Assault Brigade. He also reported that the situation near the Coke Plant is getting worse. The latter, the forest belts in the direction of Lastochkyne and the area of the Avdiivka railway station are being attacked by the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps and the 30th and 21st Motorized Brigades of the 2nd Army of the Central MD. In particular, the 114th Brigade has recently occupied the area of the former “Brevno” restaurant and the intersection of O0542 Road with the Industrialny Prospekt. As I understand it, the 3rd Assault Brigade was deployed over the last week with a defensive purpose: holding these positions and allowing the Ukrainian garrison to withdraw from the urban area. They would also have carried out several counterattacks in order to drive the Russians away from the west side of the railway, but only managed to slow them down, without having been able to achieve stable successes.
Probably the entire 110th Mechanized Brigade (which was severely attrited) has been or is being withdrawn along with other minor units that were inside Avdiivka. The 3rd Assault Brigade covers the area of the two strongholds mentioned above, while the 53rd Mech Brigade continues to cover the southern flank. It’s not quiet either: today the Ukrainian military observer Kovalenko reported that for the first time the 35th Motorized Brigade of the 41st Army of the Central MD was brought into the battle (elements had already been involved before, mainly in November) in the direction of Sjeverne in order to put pressure, from the south, on the Ukrainian withdrawal.
The fact that the 3rd Assault Brigade mentioned that it had greatly damaged the 74th Motorized Brigade (41st Army) may confirm that the 9th District is garrisoned by the 3rd Brigade and is being heavily attacked, from the south, by the 74th Brigade.
The 1st Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps recently captured the “Zenith” as well as the other fortified area down there, “Cheburashka” (the intersection of the T-05-05 Road with the unfinished Donetsk ring road). Today they should be clearing up the area known as “Vinohradsky-2”, i.e. the area of the dachas along the T-05-05 Road, north of Cheburashka. With the loss of these strongholds, it’s possible that the Russians will be able to quickly approach the southern limit of the 9th District, towards which the 55th Mountain Brigade of the 41st Army is also involved.
The 87th Motorized Regiment of the 1st Corps, the 10th Tank Regiment of the 6th Motorized Division of the 3rd Corps, the 1487th Regiment of the Territorial Forces and the “Veterans” Assault and Recon Brigade are advancing from Soborna Street and the industrial area (Promka) towards the private sector. The Russians likely have “finally” captured the holiday cottages in Skotovata and have taken up positions on Lisna Street. The “Pyatnashka” Battalion of the 1st Corps yesterday occupied the Donetsk Filtration Station, another Ukrainian stronghold.
The Russians report that the “Hispaniola” Assault and Recon Brigade is active in the “beach of Avdiivka” (the western shore of the Sand Quarry) in the direction of the Avdiivka’s main cemetery, and there would also be in the area the 115th Special Brigade of the Rosgvardia, which includes former Wagnerites. I’m not aware of the current status of the terrikon south-east of the Sand Quarry; it’s possible that it was recently abandoned by the Ukrainians.
The Ukrainian 47th and 116th Mech Brigades, along with other smaller units, continue to be active in the area north of the Coke Plant and in defending Stepove and Berdychi, towards which the 15th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Army is continuing to put pressure. Overall, many elements of SF/SOF units from both sides are also active in Avdiivka.
Moreover, on the Russian side there are elements of the 90th Tank Division of the Central MD, which is both being committed and is likely also a kind of Russian reserve / second echelon in the sector. All three of its tank regiments (239th, 80th, 6th) are around Avdiikva. Kovalenko had reported some days ago that several battalions of the 228th Motorized Regiment of the 90th Division have been withdrawn from the Serebrianka Forest (Kreminna sector), along with the 348th Regiment of the Territorial Forces, attached to it. Apparently for R&R, but I wouldn’t rule out that they arrived in Avdiivka with all the rest of the division. In any case, the numerical disadvantage on the Ukrainian side is huge, especially considering the numerous Russian territorial regiments in the sector.
The last week has been extremely bloody for both sides, in relation to the average level of losses for each of the sides. I wouldn’t be surprised if daily casualties were at the level of the days of urban clashes inside Soledar in early January 2023 or on the Bakhmut’s flanks in February 2023.
Objectively, beyond what the 3rd Assault Brigade has stated, in these 4+ months the 114th Motorized Brigade had huge human losses and lost a large chunk of its armored vehicles too.
https://t.me/poisk_in_ua/45845
https://t.me/poisk_in_ua/46144
https://t.me/poisk_in_ua/46813
The point is that it has been, even very recently, replenished with men from the Territorial Forces, which allows it to continue fighting without the need for R&R. Same goes for elements of the Central MD.
Agreed. The 47th Mech Brigade had serious shortcomings and underperformed relative to expectations and considering the equipment it had access to. But it was in no way worse than much of the other brigades created in early 2023 that took part in the counteroffensive. In Stepove they had the support of quite a lot of other units but in any case their performance was very good, and the use of their Bradleys outstanding. I personally believed, in October, that the battle of Avdiivka would almost entirely be played out on that flank, but there was very little Russian progress.
Regarding the second paragraph, the Russians in the urban setting are favored by the presence of basements, which they fill with their soldiers, who are then protected and remain there until further assault orders. Occupying and holding positions near Stepove under the eye of drones and thus FPV drones and Ukrainian artillery was much more difficult. That is why the Ukrainians fight and defend better, and especially with far more favorable casualty ratios, in open fields.
Yes I agree. Although at that time drones were much less widespread than they are today. The Ukrainian strategy was based on an interpretation of two Soviet strategies in WW2: “hugging the enemy” and to some extent “not a step back”. At that time the Russian artillery was outshooting the Ukrainians even worse than they do today. The Ukrainians therefore planned to take the battle to the cities, where Russian artillery and their armored pushes were less effective. In addition, urban battles are very time-consuming in terms of time per meter of advance, so for the Ukrainians the strategy was to buy time (while waiting for Western aid and the formation of new brigades) while losing as little territory as possible. The problem is that this stragegy was implemented even in totally unfavorable contexts (Rubizhne, even more so Severodonetsk), precisely because the Ukrainians did not want to retreat, to avoid the negative consequences on the national morale and at the political level (but also because of a lack of defense in depth).
Didn’t it also force Russia to commit a lot of precious infantry which they could ill afford with their initial invasion force?
Yes but in the battles in the Donbas during spring/summer 2022 they had managed to party fix this issue with the D/LPR mobiks.
Yes, some Ukrainian brigades such as the 110th and 115th Mechanized Brigades should not have a tank battalion. Considering that the 110th Mech Brigade for its entire existence was in Avdiivka, the need of having tanks in first place was way lower than in other brigades. It seems that APCs were also lately given to other brigades: near Bohdanivka the Russian 200th Motorized Brigade of the Arctic Fleet captured a YPR-765 on which was written “110 OMBr”. Considering that we are sure that the 110th Mech Brigade is not fighting up there, it seems quite clear that the brigade has transferred some of its armored vehicles to other brigades and could be basically a rifle brigade. Which makes sense, since it used to defend fixed positions in an urban context.
Moreover, Tatarigami had written that the CAAs of the Central MD committed in Avdiivka received armored vehicles from the new 25th Army to make up for equipment losses. This was confirmed by visual evidence. Also, an update to what I wrote yesterday: according to evidence recently published by Russian sources, the assault detachments of the 41st Army have been involved in the attacks in the western side of the Sand Quarry since the last days of January; in the last few days elements of the 74th Motorized Brigade have been fighting in the area of the railway station (where there have been extremely bloody clashes with the 3rd Assault Brigade) and elements of the 55th Mountain Brigade have been spotted in the area of the station’s hospital and of the city park. Hence elements of the brigades of the 41st Army along with elements of the 90th Tank Division (I imagine mostly their Storm battalions) have been involved in urban fighting from the north-east, besides from putting pressure on the southern flank. This could also mean that the 2nd Army, active in the same direction (from the north-east), is now considerably damaged.
I agree that the ratio of equipment losses (with Russian losses over 10 times higher than Ukraine’s) do not match at all the human losses. Russia lost so much armored vehicles because it carried out so many armored/mechanized attacks on the flanks and in general they can afford to lose more equipment. At the same time, this does not mean the human losses between the two sides are even. Zelensky today stated a ratio of 1:7. Yeah, this is likely very exaggerated and therefore an upper limit of the potential ratio. But I would still expect Russian human losses in Avdiivka since October 10 to be a multiple (though not close to Zelensky’s level) of Ukrainian casualties, with the ratio worsening during 2024.