On the occasion of both the end of 2023 and having reached the figure of 40 thousand Russian military deaths in Ukraine confirmed by Mediazone, and my interest in the spatial distribution of the fallen, I created an Excel chart with Russian deaths by federal subject (oblast, krai…) per 100 thousand residents.

https://i.imgur.com/hmnGaWl.png

I used Mediazone’s datas for the KIAs and Rosstat’s 2021 census datas for population. Colors are for dividing regions by their federal district. Central FD = blue. North-Western FD = purple. Southern FD = red. North Caucasian FD = brown. Volga FD = green. Ural FD = gray. Siberian FD = light blue. Far Eastern FD = yellow. The average for Russia is in black and is 27,6. Out of 40599 KIAs, there are 264 foreign nationals, in addition to 274 Russians whose regional origin is unknown.

Some notes and analysis of the findings.

The datas show just the KIAs confirmed by Mediazona. So obviously the figure excludes MIAs and KIAs whose death wasn’t disclosed, and therefore the figure of 40k is clearly an underestimate. Datas for the most underdeveloped regions may even be more underestimated than the average, due to factors such as the lack of widespread social network access with which to make obituaries known. The underestimation is lower for regions such as Moscow Oblast and Krasnodar Krai because of the work of volunteers who document the dead soldiers in cemeteries in those regions. It means that the gap between places like Moscow and the Far Eastern regions is even larger than it seems.

Mediazona’s datas account for PMCs and convicts deaths but exclude the D/LPR losses (i.e., the occupied areas, as of 23 February 2022, of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts). Until the DPR was included in the Russian Federation after the sham referendum, their government authorities published regular bulletins of the losses of the 1st Corps (DPR Army). In the last bulletin, dated 22 December 2022, the republic had recognized 4163 KIAs and 17329 WIAs. The rate would be 189 per 100k residents, which would put it off the scale. And these are only the confirmed losses in 2022. Per BBC News Russian D/LPR KIAs are at least 23 thousands at the end of November 2023, which would bump the rate to 620. This makes it clear why the units of the 1st and 2nd Corps today are overwhelmingly made up of mobilized and contract soldiers from Russia proper. Per BBC News Russian, Russia proper has at least 80 thousand KIAs.

For the Russian population datas I also included Crimea, as it’s de facto a Russian region. The casualty figures for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are surprisingly low, an indication that they, being recognized as an integral part of the Federation, were spared by the total mobilization of D/LPR and were not disproportionately affected by the Russian partial mobilization. In the occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts, to my knowledge, Russia enlists collaborationists and in any case locals willing to volunteer, while I’m not aware of a total mobilization as in D/LPR (which slowed down when these regions were formally annexed).

Moscow and St. Petersburg (excluding their oblasts), which together make 12,6% of the Russian population, are virtually untouched by the war. This is because of several factors: very low share of soldiers from these cities in the Russian Army prior to the war in Ukraine, “partial mobilization” being much less prevalent relative to population than the country’s average, much higher proportion of officers among those from these cities (thus lower probability of being killed), probably also much lower % of male population in jail and with criminal records than in certain Siberian or Far Eastern regions. Much of the soldiers from these cities are, for example, mobilized reserve officers or volunteers driven by ideological commitment. Let’s also consider that the salaries and bonuses offered for contract soldiers are not attractive enough to residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In contrast, residents of Buryatia (for example) are over-represented in everything: in contract soldiers, volunteers, mobilized and convicts. The figure should be understood as representative of residents, not ethnicities: as far as I am able to see, a significant proportion of the fallen from Buryatia are ethnic Russians, and there are ethnic minorities (Buryats, Yakuts, etc.) in the fallen from neighboring oblasts that are overwhelmingly ethnic Russian.

In the first place there is Tuva, Shoigu’s birth region. It’s a very poor region, so military careers are very relevant there. For example, at the beginning of the conflict there were Tuvans as contract soldiers in units from every Russian military district. They are largely concentrated, though, in the 55th Mountain Brigade of the 41st Army of the Central Military District, and the rate of losses has increased substantially since the beginning of the Avdiivka offensive in October.

The figures for the North Caucasian Federal District regions are surprisingly low, in spite of what I anecdotally read about the high presence of men from this area (primarily Dagestan) on the new contract soldiers. Note the very low figure for Chechnya, due to the fact that many Chechens deployed in Ukraine are Kadyrovites from the 141st Motorized Regiment of the Rosgvardia or from the Chechen OMON/SOBR units, who saw only a limited presence on the front lines (e.g. in Mariupol) but were later used only for rear and order-keeping roles. Unlike the “Akhmat” units, formed by Kadyrov during the war, which are actually involved in the frontline but are made up of contract soldiers from all over Russia and in fact to my knowledge, basically, just the officers are Chechens. The third lowest figure, however, is from Ingushetia. My personal theory, and I would like to hear what you guys think, is that Muslims are considerably less convinced about the war than the Orthodoxes (remember how involved the Russian Orthodox Church is in supporting the “SMO” and how widespread Orthodox religious iconography is among the patches or flags of Russian soldiers at the front), or even the agnostics or other religious minorities (e.g. Buddhists). Ingushetia is 96% Muslim. In contrast, the only North Caucasian region in the top ranks for deaths is North Ossetia, which is also the only North Caucasian region with a Christian majority, beside the above-average, Orthodox-plurality Stavropol Krai. Additional factors could be important, such as the high rurality of these regions and a smaller state capacity to enforce control over territory (e.g., enforcing mobilization notices) and less sense of loyalty to the authorities. Even places like Tatarstan or Bashkortostan, though large providers of volunteer units and contract soldiers (after all, they have large populations), are respectively surprisingly below average in losses and not much above, which could be due to the fact that they are Muslim-majority regions. The apparent not great support by Russian Muslims towards the war is admirable, considering that many of them come from poor or very poor regions.

Note the high ranking of Pskov Oblast, where the 76th VDV Division is based, or even Kostroma Oblast, home of the 331st Air Assault Regiment of the 98th VDV Division, both units that had significant losses during the first month of the war and again in subsequent periods. This is not to say that the soldiers in a given unit are for the vast majority from the region where the unit is based, but there is nevertheless some correlation. Often the mobilized are sent to units based in their regions. Although progressively this correlation between where the unit’s HQ is located and the origin of that unit’s soldiers may get smaller, it is still evident: during the summer, the plurality of casualties originated from the regions of the Southern and North Caucasian Federal Districts, while since the beginning of the Avdiivka offensive the plurality of fatalities have come from the Ural Federal District, as well as from the Volga and Siberian Federal Districts, i.e., where the units of the Central MD are based (and let’s add that many soldiers of the 1st Corps, formerly the DPR Army, are now from these federal districts). This correlation is not so great, for example, for residents of the Volga and Ural federal districts, which are areas with very high populations compared to the number of military units having their HQs there.

The distribution doesn’t seem to be much affected by the urban/rural contrast: most of the oblasts with the largest share of rural inhabitants are below average, while (not considering Moscow and St. Petersburg) a good chunk of those with the highest share of urban inhabitants are above average. Urbanized and fairly developed and industrialized regions such as Sverdlovsk (Yekaterimburg region) or Chelyabinsk for example are above average and considering their population, are very important source basins for soldiers (and also convits). The high position of Kaliningrad could be due to the fact that even before the war an high proportion of residents were in the armed forces, as a result of the presence of the 11th Corps of the Baltic Fleet in the region (and other military installations). This also applies to Murmansk. I had read that in a village near the border with Norway (where the 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet is located), in one elementary school 85% of the children’s fathers were in Ukraine. The fact that, for example, Amur Oblast and Khabarovsk Krai are below average, unlike the vast majority of the other Far Eastern regions, could be due to the fact that since the Russian withdrawal from Kherson the 35th Army of the Eastern MD, based there, has never been involved in the hostilities in a major way. Small part below.

By themselves the numbers, despite being underestimated, are not very high in an historical context, and from the point of view of spatial analysis the data are influenced by certain factors (which I tried to list earlier, from socio-economic conditions to religion), while in the case of general/total mobilization other factors also emerge that perhaps matter less today.

For example, the figure for my Italian region during the 3,5 years of WW1, counting the official KIAs/DOWs figure provided by the Ministry of Defense and adding a coefficient to count deaths in captivity and deaths from disease at the front, is over 2000 per 100k residents - among the hardest hit regions in the country, as a result of several factors: no heavy industry (= few workers in war-related industries which were exempted from mobilization), low level of education (= very few university graduates, who were conscripted as officers), low level of draft avoidance (around 90% of men of theoretical mobilization age actually enlisted in the army).

The figure for Russia during WW2 is more than 6000 (counting, of course, just military KIAs), the figure for Ukraine almost 4000 - less than Russia because the vast majority of Ukraine was occupied from the second half of 1941 to the second half of 1943 (for the left bank) or to early/mid 1944 (for the right bank). Taking Vadim Erlikhman’s datas at face value, the figure for Armenia (Soviet republic) during WW2 was more than 11000 (!!!) which is an absolutely insane figure that greatly skews the population pyramid.

It has to be considered that today, however, the median age of the population is much higher than during WW1/2 and therefore there are far fewer young men, even though today health conditions are better and men in their 40s if not 50s are sent to the frontlines. In certain cultural contexts having high casualties for a cause that is considered right by the majority of the population is socially acceptable, whereas in large parts of the world this is no longer the case or at least much less so (probably even in Moscow or St. Petersburg). And despite, again, the fact that the numbers are not huge in a historical context, I am of the opinion that several Russian regions may be close to hitting the “ceiling” in terms of male population being willing to fight, in the absence of new mobilization measures.

Is it confirmed that Russian officers are taking fewer casualties per man than non officers? I believe that would be a reversal for most wars of US (and I think most countries?).

Sorry, I forgot to answer. The share of Russian officers killed in action is lower than the number of Russian officers in Ukraine if we look at how many officers a Russian motor rifle unit, i.e., the base of their army, should have in its ranks. It must also be said that as a result of the massive deployment of convicts, first by Wagner and now by the MoD, the share of officers in the total casualties has been reduced, as the penal units have a much lower number of officers than the equivalent regular unit.

I don’t have exact datas right now, but as far as I remember the probability of an officer getting killed has also been increasing due to events such as the growing mechanization of armies and especially the spread of air/rotorcrafts (e.g., I believe the figure for US officers killed in the Vietnam War is heavily affected by helicopter and aircraft losses). For WW1, officer losses were concentrated in the first year of the war afaik, when it was realized that it made little sense to have officers lead the assaults. In Italy, to my knowledge, in early 1916 it was ordered that officers were to remain in the trenches during assaults on enemy trenches, as the previous months had seen huge losses for them. Manpower has never been a large problem, but there was always a shortage of officers.

Perhaps also less of an attempt to recruit and mobilize from some of the Muslim federal subjects in the North Caucuses because of a concern with possible insurgencies re-developing?

Likely!