The Ukrainian military observer Mashovets a few months ago speculated about three possible options as an objective for a Russian offensive during 2024.

1. Avdiivka

2. Kupyansk

3. Lyman

Point 1) is self-explanatory. It’s the Russian main effort at the moment, the offensive is directed by the command of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and specifically by its 8th Army, which has reportedly carte blanche in terms of availability of men and equipment in order to fullfill the task, which, as we see, is done with total disregard of losses. And it’s no coincidence that they received the 2nd and 41st Armies of the Central MD as reinforcements. The objective is political in nature, well before it is strategic.

For point 2), the Russians this summer had launched a little-known offensive, when their main effort was the defense in the Southern front, in the direction of Borova in the Svatove sector. Here the goal was to reach Borova, an important crossing town on the Oskil and cut in two the Ukrainian presence in the eastern bank. The Russians managed to cross the Zherebets (near Serhiivka/Novojehorivka) but were blocked by the Ukrainians after a few kilometers, before they reached the watershed between the Zherebets and the Oskil. After that, they intensified their actions in the Kupyansk sector, attacking in six different directions - Synkivka the most famous one, against which they have been beating their heads for months and there have been very few successes, partly due to the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements. The Russians have the 1st Tank Army in the area, along with other formations from the Western MD. However, their successes have been underwhelming compared to the men and vehicles deployed in this area. One problem that has arisen in recent days is the breakthrough near Krokhmalne/Tabaivka, with the Russians trying to attack Berestove and Pishchane during this week. The elevation helps the Russians right there - it is possible, however, that the Ukrainians will be able to stop them in the watershed between the Pischana and the Oskil. Let’s recall that the city of Kupyansk is in large majority in the western bank of the Oskil, so the Russians at this juncture would not be able to conquer the city without an action in the western bank, given the natural barrier posed by the Oskil. Overall, the situation is under control, at the moment. Potential Russian actions from Belgorod Oblast against the Kharkiv Oblast in the area between the Siversky Donets and Oskil are a very remote possibility at the moment, let alone against the city of Kharkiv itself.

For point 3), the goal is to capture the area around Lyman and Yampil, which would allow the Russians to significantly approach Sloviansk from that direction, though there is a natural barrier before the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk conurbation, posed by the Siversky Donets. Despite the fact that the Russian Group “Center” has been significantly weakened after sending those two armies to Avdiivka, the Russians have regained the momentum to begin developing this plan thanks to the full commitment of the 20th Army (WMD) and the recent deployment of the new 25th Army (possibly CMD) in the sector. We are seeing the first phase of this plan, with the attacks towards Terny over the past month and a half, which have been joined in recent weeks by those against Makiivka. The goal is, firstly, to cut off the Ukrainian capability to supply troops in the eastern bank of the Zherebets and eventually to occupy the entire Makiivka-Yampolivka axis, driving the Ukrainians out of the eastern bank. The second phase will be the seizure of all the Serebrianka Forest and Torske, after which they will aim towards Lyman and the eastern bank of the Oskil from the south. Although there have been successes towards the Zherebets, this plan would be very costly and would need far more troops and gear. The Ukrainian grouping in the Kreminna sector is very large and I see no scenario whereby the Russians would have any way to force the Zherebets in its southern course in the short/medium term.

I add other possible targets:

4. Chasiv Yar

5. Siversk

6. Vuhledar

For point 4), the Russians since late November have launched an offensive in the Bakhmut sector on both flanks. The Russian grouping around Bakhmut is estimated by the Ukrainians to be 80k men-strong, considerably more than that in Avdiivka, and this sector is the second main Russian effort at the moment. Thanks to the arrival of reinforcements, the Ukrainians appear to have slowed Russian advances in a major way after their gains during December. Here the Russians want to take Bohdanivka and Ivanivske, the heights north-west of Klishchiivka and move towards the Donets-Donbas Canal in the direction of Chasiv Yar, a town that is very important strategically as it is the main stronghold for blocking the Russians before Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Point 5) connects to both 3) and 4). The Russians want to dislodge the Ukrainians from the Siversk salient, which threatens both Lysychansk and Soledar. Let’s take into account that Siversk was expected to fall as early as July 2022, so it is telling that the Russians have always had setbacks in the area, which then became a secondary front. In the last month, however, attacks have begun towards both Bilohorivka, Spirne and Vesele. There are some Russian successes but I consider it very, very difficult for these tactical gains to turn into a collapse of the salient in its present state. However, the remote possibility of the fall of Siversk would bring the Russians very close to Sloviansk.

For point 6), the Russians want to develop the main action against the town from the east instead of from the south like in the last year. The attacks towards Novomykhailivka should be read in this context, as well as taking into account the Russian aim to drive the Ukrainians away from the Donetsk-Volnovakha-Melitopol railway. They are moving slowly towards the Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar road in the direction of Vodiane, with the medium-to-long term goal of reaching Vuhledar from the east. There are Russian successes but the Ukrainians seem to be succeeding in stabilizing the situation for now.

As for the Robotyne salient, they have been attacking there since late November with the goal of taking back some of the Ukrainian gains. There have been Russian successes west and south of Robotyne, between Novoprokopivka and Verbove and around Verbove. The Russians have pushed the Ukrainians away from the dirt road between Novoprokopivka and Verbove the latters had approached during late summer (it passes along the heights between these two villages) as well as from the tactically important Hill 166, which means that the Russians control the heights in the area and don’t have to worry about Ukrainian actions directed southwards in the short term, while their regained control of Hill 140 north-west of Verbove secures, in their point of view, that area. However, I doubt they will ever launch an offensive as a main effort in that sector, since they would end up moving away from their current fortifications and it would be a costly operation with no strategic gains.

As for Krynky, the Russians are heavily invested in the area, but it remains a local action and it’s possible that the Ukrainians will withdraw in the coming weeks.

On a general level, first of all they still have to take Avdiivka, so we are talking about hypothetical plans in their maximalist goals. And it will depend on the situation in terms of ammunition - the attacks of the last few months have been possible also because of the huge amount of shells from North Korea, which is thought to be between 1,5 and 2 millions, despite these shells lacking in quality. It will have to be seen how much Russian production will grow in the future, whether NK will continue to send shells and/or whether they will find other partners, apart from Iran and Belarus, which are supplying shells and rockets, albeit to a more limited extent than NK.

They want to shrink as much as they are able to the area under Ukrainian control and move them away from the heights. The Russians, moreover, still have considerable forces in the area (the plurality of the 58th Army, two VDV divisions, other smaller units), so even in terms of local counterattacks the pressure remains strong. The Ukrainians seem to be maintaining control of the system of trenches between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka fortunately.

In my personal opinion attacking between Novodonetske and Novomaiorske would make little sense, like very little - the area is not easy, the Ukrainians have been beating their heads against these two villages during the summer. The front west of Vuhledar is well south compared to the latitudine of the town so they would have to advance far to the north-east to approach the town, while to the east they don’t have this issue. The front line between those two villages passes along the Shaitanka River, so they would have to pass it, only to find themselves having to advance another 5+ kms and also pass the Kashlahach River, if they want to approach Vuhledar from the west, with also little chance of flanking the town from there, given the heights to the north of the Kashlahach River.