The 24th Mechanized Brigade of the UAF, which is currently defending Chasiv Yar, is the first unit to have officially formed an unit manned by convicts, who since May have been able to volunteer (except the ones guilty of particular serious crimes).

Yesterday, in fact, the creation of the “Charakternyk” Battalion, made up of inmates (who are on parole), was announced. The first soldiers of this battalion, whose application to join the ranks of the UAF was approved by courts at the end of May, have completed the training period and just taken the oath. They will soon start performing combat tasks. It will be interesting to see how they will perform - it’s reported that some of them already have military experience (often from ATO/JFO); in general many Ukrainian sources I have read state that motivation among volunteer convicts is very high, even though they’ve been clearly told that they are going to be stormtroopers. According to the latest figures published by Le Monde, more than 5,500 convicts have joined the ranks of the Defense Forces (more than the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice expected). The day before yesterday I wrote some details about this; the competition for the convicts among the brigades is high (accepting them it’s optional and the modality of their employment is at the discretion of the brigade). The convicts shall have the same rights as a regular contract soldier (their term in fact lasts for 3 years - a standard contract), barring being allowed to a leave period (except if they have a formal permission from their commander, if I understand correctly). Desertions or other offenses committed while in service shall mean immediate return to jail, where they will finish serving their original sentence, in addition to be sentenced to 5 to 10 additional years.

Official source and more photos here: https://t.me/official24ombr/195

From what I gathered, Russian recruits mainly come from its eastern oblasts and ethnic Republics like Dagestan, Buryatia, Tuva etc…

It’s worth noting that according to Mediazona’s data, Dagestan has fewer KIAs as a share of its residents compared to the national average; moreover, in Chechnya and Ingushetia (the two federal subjects with both the lowest proportion of ethnic Russians in the population and the highest share of Muslims), the fatalities per 100,000 residents are less than half the national average, which would place them in the last places of the ranking (in which the city of Moscow is, unrivaled, last). The Muslim-majority federal subjects of North Caucasus all have figures below the national average. In contrast, the populous republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan (that have a small Muslim majority) in 2024 increased their losses much more than the country on average did, due to the fact that they are large pools of volunteers (particularly for the units of the Central Military District and of the 1st Corps, which were committed in the Avdiivka campaign). Tatarstan, which had fewer fatalities than the national average at the end of 2023 (again, relative to its population), exceeds the national figure now, and Bashkortostan went from just above average to considerably above average now, becoming the federal subject with the most identified KIAs in absolute values.

Tuva and Buryatia (the latter has an ethnic Russian majority) do indeed remain the places most affected by the war in terms of losses. My personal theory is that the motivations/propaganda behind the war may be less felt by Muslim Russians (despite being, on average, poor), compared to Asian minorities as well as poor ethnic Russians.

While to my knowledge the mobilization of autumn 2022 hit those regions harder in proportion to their population (compared to the average), the mobilization was actually an equalizer in terms of the breakdown of regions of origin of Russian soldiers, as it brought to the front a significant number of men from European Russia, including from the Moscow and Saint Petersburg metropolitan areas. Since early 2023 they have been recruiting either contract soldiers or convicts, which has caused the gap between regions in terms of fatalities to widen again, as certain regions are considerably more likely to provide volunteers than others - yes, above all for financial reasons.

This is a very interesting question and I cannot have a precise answer of course. The situation in terms of manpower for Russia, while not bad, has worsened compared to 2023: for a similar monthly recruitment pace (actually a bit lower), the losses have increased significantly and the vast majority of the new recruits, if not almost the entirety of them, are needed to replenish the ranks. However, I think Putin wants to wait for a new emergency (if there will be one) before declaring a new mobilization, and as far as it’s possible they will continue with monetary bonuses and so on.

We don’t have exact datas, but it would be interesting to know if e.g. Tuva might be close to the “ceiling” of men willing to volunteer without being forced by a mobilization (there are still many new KIAs from this small republic, which is the most affected federal subject in terms of fatalities in relation to population). For example, from what I see, the 55th Mountain Brigade of the 41st Army, originally made up, in its vast majority, of Tuvans (this was the case until the end of 2023) seems to have been replenished by many ethnic Russians, after the huge losses in the Avdiivka campaign and in the subsequent actions in that area.

Yup! Although, as far as I had read, the 3rd Assault Brigade will be very selective with convicts, since they will be joining their regular squads - they will have to go through several interviews and psychological tests, the brigade’s officers will study each inmate’s past and why he’s in jail, whether he has past military experience, etc.

In convicts-only units (which are going to be the norm), one can be less picky on this matter.