To my knowledge the seizure of Kherson and the right-bank of the Dnipro as well as Mariupol was the work of the Southern Military District (+ the rest of VDV outside of Kyiv); the sector between Svatove and Kreminna as you mentioned is in the hands of the Central MD, which Lapin in fact led until October, and the Western MD is between Kupyansk and Svatove (I believe that quite a few units of the 1st GTA are still under-equipped after last year’s losses, although the best tanks available are supposed to go to them).

Incidentally, I think the Central MD is a good contender for the prize of the worst District of the conflict, between the atrocious failures in the Chernihiv Oblast and Brovary - the failed crossing at Bilohorivka is also their responsibility, although it must be said they still played an important role in the Severodonetsk sector and also in Lyman/Sviatohirsk in June ‘22, and the push towards the Zherebets of these days is their own work.

I had always assumed that the District with the greatest operational autonomy was the Southern one, also considering that it’s the largest and that it had the command over the D/LPR Corps since the beginning of the war.

Agree. Though Western MD was the one boasting Russia’s most elite formations and disappointed really greatly. Eastern MD almost, almost, looks decent compared to the fuck-ups of the formers, despite Vuhledar. On the other hand we must admit that Southern MD, without considering the former separatists, has been pretty consistent during the war and never suffered embarassing defeats as far as I recall, despite it having its better and worse elements.

Very valid arguments. Of course, the discussion about the effectiveness of the various Districts must be proportionate to the feasibility of the objectives and the enemy forces they encountered. At the same time… I find that the task of the WMD was still more doable than the plan of the push to the capital of the VDV with the support of the EMD. In Sumy they totally ignored that the TDF could actually fight and efficiently so; they suffered heavy losses during movements in the main roads of the Oblast and then took a huge blow in the Okhtyrka area by UAF 93rd Brigade. Around the urban area of Kharkiv it was a disaster as well despite the support from the Arctic brigades. They thought they would enter in with few problems instead the major clashes of the first week happened there. They were stuck around Izyum and south of the Oskil Reservoir for like a month and a half, being unable to approach Slovyansk and the UAF forces in the JFO area from the back, allowing the Ukrainians to buy time. The cherry on the cake was the performance in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. I’m not saying they were inherently bad formations, especially on paper, but the command had glaring failures.

I had read that Hägglunds in Sweden, which manufactures CV90s (as well as Bandvagn vehicles), would go from 1 unit per week to 1 per day, although the point is that production is logically destined to acquisitions by NATO countries, while in Russia it all goes to the front. Hopefully, as many Bradleys and to a lesser extent Marders as possible can be drawn from the stocks, and as Poland and the Czech Republic receive new IFVs they can send BWP-1 and BMP-2 to Ukraine. Thankfully Ukraine can count on MRAPs available in large numbers, quite modern and relatively safe, if we compare them to M113s for example. Although they certainly do not have the offensive and supporting power of an IFV. Autocannons are a bless to have.

Of course the days of Brezhnev are long gone but in any case their production potential should not be underestimated.