There are some positive news today: in the Bakhmut sector the Ukrainians have reportedly captured the last heights right to the west of Klishchiivka and are making significant progress towards Andriivka, a couple of kilometers further south (note that the Ukrainians fear a Russian counterattack in this area); in the Svatove sector the “bridgehead” (I would really not use this term for anything regarding the Zherebets River - in the course near Svatove the river is half a meter deep and 10 meters wide) has stabilized, the advance should be about 4 kilometers. Russian rumors of yesterday’s evening about a second breakthrough from the villages of Raihorodka/Dzherelne a little further north have not been confirmed.

I would like to share news I read today from Ukrainian sources (Konstantin Mashovets and the Centre for Defense Strategies) on the southern front. The Velyka Novosilka sector is considered the most promising one and the one where the Russians had to commit the highest number of reserves. Between Staromaiorske and Pryyutne, the Russians are reportedly beginning to employ elements of the “second reserve batch” (336th Naval Infantry Brigade and 136th Motorized Brigade), after having sent the 34th Mountain Brigade and the 247th VDV Regiment a couple of weeks ago to assist the units that had been present in that sector since June. Russian counterattacks in that area have been unsuccessful, major fighting has been under way. It’s said that the 37th Motorized Brigade is having serious difficulties in Novodonetske, a little further east. The Center for Defense Strategies seems to be sure that by the end of July the Russians will have to withdraw to the Remivka - Volodyne - Staromlynivka - Kermenchyk line. This is an important statement, we will see if it will be confirmed or not, personally it seems optimistic to me. However, this alternative is considered more likely than the introduction of Russian reserves around Novodonetske.

In the Kamyanske sector elements of the UAF 128th Mountain Brigade managed to advance in Kamyanske on the road to Vasylivka, forcing the Russians to swiftly send two BARS detachments into the area and deploy elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade nearby. The advances in this sector are reported to be slow and “well-thought.” In the Orikhiv sector the Ukrainians reportedly captured several heights just northeast of Robotyne from which there is a good view of the surrounding territory. Net of Ukrainian attacks, Russian counterattacks, and new Ukrainian advances occurring with regularity in the area, the Ukrainians seem to have really come close to the village, although we all know at what cost; this is by far the most complicated sector. Around Novopokrovka, the Ukrainians are reported to be carrying out attacks at what should be the boundary between the areas under the responsibility of the Southern Military District and the Eastern one, hoping to achieve results from a potential lack of coordination. Although they may not necessarily succeed - Velyka Novosilka is already a mixture of units from these two MDs after all.

Russian operational reserves across the southern front are increasingly under stress every week and those that can be deployed very quickly are reported to be very few; Mashovets suggests that there is a possibility that the Ukrainians could open up a fourth direction of attack, without making direct hints. This could be an Ukrainian strategy to take advantage of their numerical superiority in the South and pressure Russian reserves even more, which could be forced to send the last remaining formations along the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast. What might this new direction be? In my opinion: a direct attack on Polohy, which, however, the Russians seem to expect, having sent most of the elements of the 35th Army around the town in June; Marfopil, where I recall an Ukrainian attack happened back in June (the Russians have reported Ukrainian reconnaissance actions in this area in the last weeks, which along with Polohy is the quietest in the South); an attack from Vuhledar, which should have the least developed defenses in the South and with a smallish number of Russians defending it, although it’s also the area closest to Russia proper and therefore with fewer potential logistical difficulties for them. We shall see…

I don’t know honestly, it’s something that could have a very high potential risk. In order to gain enough territory to secure a bridgehead on the eastern shore they’re going to have to get quite a few troops across which will need mechanized support. I find that an unfeasible scenario at the moment, with several Russian brigades still in the area. Unless the Russians withdraw, but that would make little sense for them.