Numerous brigade commanders have been removed over the recent weeks. Some deserved it, others did not.

As for the 80th Air Assault Brigade, its 1st and 2nd Battalions are deployed in Klishchiivka while the 3rd is fighting in Krasnohorivka. In both places, the situation is, to put it mildly, far from easy. That said, considering that the now former commander has been promoted and that there don’t seem to be bad things about the new commander, I have no reason to think badly about this whole matter. If he was promoted, it’s because there was already such intention. The General Staff has few to no PR concerns and if it wants to do something unfair and/or heavily unpopular it has pretty much no issue doing that (recall the appointment of Sodol as commander of the OSG “Khortytsia” back in late winter).

On the command of the 24th Mechanized Brigade (the main unit in the defense of Chasiv Yar, where it was transferred the last month), I have heard, how could I say… very conflicting versions. I’m not a fan of this aprioristic demonization of the General Staff - which, mind you, has indeed a ton of flaws (let’s just remind the ongoing mess with the 59th Motorized Brigade as well as what has been happening recently in the 14th Mechanized Brigade and, overall, regarding the command of the TG “Kupyansk”).

In these cases there should always be the need to hear both sides of the argument, in my opinion. This series of posts I had to screenshot and paste into one image and translate (unfortunately, the quality of Google Translate is quite atrocious), as they are from a private Telegram channel which I therefore have no way to share (“Радикальна” - I suggest joining it and searching for “24 OMBr”, if someone is interested in details and wants to use a better translator), may allow one to learn the version of some soldiers of the 24th Brigade. Who heavily criticize the previous command and were even blocked by the Telegram channel of the Strike UAV Battalion of the 24th Mechanized Brigade, where servicemen of that battalion had published the appeal in favor of the removed brigade commander.

Great additions, I agree and have little to add. During the mobilization of fall 2022, VDV / Naval Infantry / Spetsnaz units received men who had been their servicemen in the past, so they already had received a training in them. The 40th Naval Infantry Brigade performed well during the Ukrainian counteroffensive, in Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.

I don’t know whether I would say that they are not the fighting force they were before the war, though. I personally believe that, overall, both the sides of this war are much stronger and more capable today than they were two and a half years ago - in the way that combat experience, new tactics and technologies, changes in doctrine, and the very large increase in fielded manpower and equipment more than make up for the (loss of) pre-war levels of training, theoretical combat readiness and military cohesion of an unit. For instance, I don’t think that if the 106th VDV Division of January 2022 hypothetically replaced the 106th VDV Division of July 2024, the former would perfom better than the latter, given the same wartime context and also considering that in the meantime they received a third airborne regiment and a separate tank battalion.

Very quick update in regards to bonuses for signing a contract with the Russian MoD. Yesterday I had written that both the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast had reached a 2,1 million Rubles bonus upon signing a contract. Today the bonus offered by the city of Moscow has already reached… 2,245,000 Rubles. Specifically, 1,9 million from the municipality, 195 thousand from the MoD, 50 thousand from the mayor (from his own funds, apparently) and 100 thousand from private sponsors (e.g. construction firms).

Moreover, the city of Moscow offers a supplement of 50 thousand Rubles per month to the 210 thousand Rubles base salary provided by the MoD to servicemen deployed in the “SMO” area. Everything else I had written yesterday applies. Contracts are signable by any Russian citizen, with travel and lodging expenses needed to reach the city where the contract must be signed fully reimbursed. The poorer federal subjects, although they are gradually raising bonuses to adapt, cannot afford certain amounts at all and therefore their residents usually go to the richer regions/cities to sign contracts. For example, the contract signing bonus offered by Khabarovsk Krai is still only 595 thousand Rubles with no monthly addition to the salary, albeit it grants the right to some promotions as well as housing support. On a separate note, that thing has got to be the most cringeworthy recruiting image I have ever seen.

In part, yes, but in fact the competition is among those federal subjects who can in first place afford to offer those figures, as the system is “broken” by the possibility of moving between regions to sign the best offers, which are therefore the ones that matter.

First time I’ve seen that in an official ad, but perhaps they had done it before.

No, they are not retroactive.

has any authorities reported issues with people waiting to sign up because they know the pay will be bigger next week?

It’s possible that this is happening, but I have not found any official statements on this.

have you heard of any troops complaining that the fresh guys get paid 8x what they do?

The matter concerns the one-time bonus, as monthly salaries are the same for everyone, except e.g. for those who sign a contract with the city of Moscow and have therefore the right to a monthly supplement.

Some channels run by servicemen I follow seem quite happy with these new bonuses and, if anything, accuse regions that have not increased them enough of not taking care of the war and of the soldiers, who are increasingly needed at the front. Moreover, the city of Moscow does make some initiatives for its mobilized residents, like benefits for their relatives as well as one-time payments to their families once in a while, although with pretty much insignificant amounts compared to the figures reached by the new bonuses.

Good additions. In short, I think the key is the “bigger picture”. The median individual soldier is likely worse (net e.g. of shrewdness about how to avoid FPV drones, etc) than he was two and a half years ago, but today there are a lot more soldiers, and the command/staff of military units has become (more or less…) accustomed to fighting this kind of war and about which tactics prove, on average, to be the most suited - compared to the shitshows of the beginning of the war.

By the way, on average their training lasts 2 weeks. If they are lucky and are not sent immediately to the front lines once they arrive, there may be a little more training in the rear in Ukraine.