Over the last days Ukrainska Pravda published a couple of very interesting interviews, in Ukrainian. I will make a summary highlighting the most interesting points - who wants to, can read the full original versions. By the way, tomorrow DeepState should publish the account regarding the events of April 11 and the following days on the Ocheretyne breakthrough and the problems occurred with the 115th Mechanized Brigade.

In the first interview, we are with Taras Mykhalchuk, a 56-year-old Major of the 65th Mechanized Brigade. He’s a Russian-born, ethnic Russian who grew up in Ternopil. At the age of 18, he joined the Soviet Army and served in the 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade, first in Afghanistan and later in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. After that he served as an officer in the Ukrainian Army. In 2005 he moved to Spain, where he worked as an engineer and built up a family. At the outbreak of what Ukrainians now commonly call the “Great War”, he quit his job and volunteered for the UAF, out of love for the country he grew up in and served, in the latter part of his previous military career.

As soon as he arrived, he started serving as an officer (in view of his past experience), and was sent to the 65th Mechanized Brigade, which was being created at the time - becoming a deputy battalion commander. This is a very peculiar brigade, in the sense that unlike the very vast majority of the other Ukrainian brigades, it never moved from its initial sector: Zaporizhia Oblast (specifically, the area between Kamyanske and Orikhiv).

Since its creation, its task has been to hold the front line in that area, carrying out some attacks (as we shall see later). In June 2023, it found itself involved in the main axis of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, in which it actively participated, remaining in the Orikhiv sector even in the following months; it still defends the area around Robotyne. As the “Spaniard” (his call sign) specifies, the 65th Brigade is not a unit specialized in assault, but simple motorized infantry, specialized in holding positions conquered by others.

In the summer of 2023, he received the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky from Zelensky; in February of this year, he was wounded by a shrapnel during a combat mission and had his gallbladder removed. Mykhalchuk states that most of Robotyne is a grey area at the moment and has not been captured entirely by the Russians (the interview was made during the second half of May). The village has completely disappeared: there are only ruins. The Ukrainian defenders are in the trenches near the village. He blames the loss of the village on the shells shortage. He heavily criticizes the overly optimistic attitude still prevalent in various Ukrainian media, as a result of which people don’t understand the need to defend their nation, and as a consequence there is a lack of replacements in the front line for those who became a casualty or are simply exhausted, like many soldiers after more than two years of war.

According to him, the shells shortage (he speaks for mortars, which is the thing he has control over, being available at the battalion level) was a constant condition throughout the war, with the Russians having a 10/15/20-fold advantage. Lately this imbalance has been improving as slightly more rounds are being supplied, whereas the Russians seem to have less availability than in the past (this is a rumour I have heard on some Russian channels - it’s said that there has been a substantial slowdown in shipments from North Korea and Iran, we will see if this will be confirmed). Now the 120mm mortar of his battalion can fire 10 to 20 rounds per day (I remember that during the winter 5 rounds per mortar was something really common for the Ukrainians), although the situation is not at all satisfactory in order to cope with the constant Russian assaults, which can still afford to fire up to 100 rounds per day per mortar. It’s also said that the 120mm mortar is accurate and effective, while the 82mm mortar is less accurate and is only effective when used in larger numbers (i.e. a handful of mortars at once) against concentrations of enemy infantry. It’s stated that FPV drones are helping the Ukrainians a lot at the moment, although the Russians in turn make extensive use of them.

There is then an account of the counteroffensive, started mostly by the 47th Mechanized Brigade with the support of the 65th Brigade. Mykhalchuk states that there was simply a huge number of trenches, ditches, dragon’s teeth, pillboxes, and especially mines, and that’s just before the actual Surovikin line. In each Russian trench there were 4-5 ATGMs (which they also used against infantry). The very high density of minefields and trenches created an effect of continuous echeloned defense lines. The tanks could only go forwards or backwards along the cleared path: turning right or left would have meant hitting a mine.

For him, attacking with armored vehicles was destined to be a failure, and to the last he did not believe that the main direction of the offensive would be there, but that it would only be a diversionary action, giving the example of the 65th Brigade’s attack against Nesteryanka (a dozen kms to the west of Robotyne) in mid September 2022: only one of the fifteen M113s wasn’t damaged or destroyed by mines and the unit had major human losses. This negative experience taught Mykhalchuk that, at least in that sector, it was just not possible to use armored vehicles, which the 65th Brigade prefers to keep in the rear. In contrast, the 47th Brigade’s initial attacks were exclusively armored/mechanized, with no foot infantry.

It’s said that in the months before the counteroffensive, the men of the 65th Brigade could clearly see lights in the Russian positions at night: they were working to build or improve their positions. But the Ukrainians could not hit them due to the shells shortage (and I might add, FPV drones with thermal cameras were not at all widespread at the time).

Before the counteroffensive Mykhalchuk was summoned by the colonels and generals who were planning the operation, in order to brief them about the situation in the sector. He was honest about everything he knew: about the status of the Russian defences and the shortcomings on the Ukrainian side, but was basically ignored by the senior officers. The order to attack was given by the then commander of the Operational-Strategic Group “Tavria”, Tarnavsky. Mykhalchuk claims to have only understood “Forward, forward!” from him (which is what the Ukrainians call the attitude of Red Army-style officers interested only in advancing regardless of any issues and of the losses).

The “Spaniard” goes on to say that a very important target in the initial phase of the counter-offensive was “X”, a hill along the road to Robotyne. I enquired on this position - it should be Hill 138, more than 1 km to the north of the first houses of Robotyne. The battle for this position was very long: it began in the second half of June; the Ukrainians came very close to it in early July, it continued throughout that month and ended in early August. According to him, the 47th Brigade was unable to conquer this position, which was taken by the infantrymen of the 65th Brigade. He then argues that it was better not to attack it directly but to flank it, and he would have preferred that his battalion had been allowed to do this. Here I take the opportunity to say that I always recommend applying a light veil of scepticism to certain statements and not always taking them as 100% true - I have read many interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and when there is something that has gone wrong, it’s very often the fault of other brigades; when it’s clear that the problems are internal to the brigade, it’s the fault of other battalions, then of other companies… I write this because soldiers of the 47th Brigade never spared criticism on the management of the other brigades involved in the counteroffensive.

During the summer, in one day, the Russians fired 400 shells against the positions captured and held by soldiers of the 65th Brigade. There were no fatalities, but 22 servicemen got wounded, some seriously, including the battalion commander, who was replaced in his role by Mykhalchuk.

The Russian tactics against the mechanized attacks of the 47th Brigade (which happened at night) were as follows: ATGM fire against the first vehicle that was advancing towards the heights, after which the artillery began to work heavily against the vehicles behind. The first Russian soldiers the Ukrainians met at the beginning of the counteroffensive were skilled: there was the 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade… i.e. Mykhalchuk’s old unit (he lost all his former contact in this unit after 2014). From the top of “X”, the Spetsnaz destroyed several M113s and YPR-765s of the 65th Brigade with ATGMs. As also mentioned in the past by other soldiers, they too had been said by the higher-ups that the Russians would run away with the sight of the first Leopards. For the interviewee, the only attacks that can be and have actually been successful are infantry attacks, made by soldiers who know the terrain well, at most aided by a few armored vehicles in a support role. He says that he and his men before the attacks walked kilometers and kilometers on foot, through trenches and forest belts (“like partisans”). Second part below.

In any case, after conquering “X”, the 65th Brigade had lost its offensive capability and was moved to the Kopani area (further west), to cover the front there and avoid Russian counterattacks in that area. Reportedly, during the assaults, the men under Mykhalchuk had few casualties, which, however, increased when they had to defend the newly conquered and unconsolidated positions, which were heavily hit by Russian artillery.

The difficulties during the active phases of the counteroffensive and the psychological setbacks (reportedly related in particular to mines) caused some of the troops to refuse the assault tasks, making up medical conditions, and succeeding in avoiding their duties due to the corruption that Mykhalchuk denounces, saying that the UAF is greatly damaged by it, as well as by senior officers without any common sense and attachment to the reality, and by refuseniks.

There were also serious problems with intelligence. Mykhalchuk mentions the 3:1 ratio as the needed superiority to win an attack. In fact, he and 12 other men once managed to defend a position that was being attacked by 40 Russians. After that, the same 13 Ukrainians were ordered to attack a Russian trench, being told there was no one there. Their drones carried out a reconnaissance in the area and saw that there were in fact 70 Russians there. Problems with intelligence at the local level are still a widespread problem that can potentially lead to serious consequences (and it often does, there have also been recent examples that I will not report).

In the conclusion Mykhalchuk also criticises the fact that awards (which don’t carry any monetary prize) only came after the counteroffensive began, while the 65th Brigade’s previous efforts (including the attack against Nesteryanka in September 2022) were essentially ignored. From late 2022 until the beginning of the counteroffensive, only Bakhmut was mentioned, with the result that some units that arrived in Zaporizhzhia Oblast after fighting in the Bakhmut sector felt as if they were on holiday (I believe he refers to the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade and to the 46th Airmobile Brigade).

The article concludes on a positive note - Mykhalchuk confirms that new strong points and fortifications have been built and are being built in the Orikhiv sector, and in this sense the defense of the Robotyne salient by the Ukrainians over the recent months has bought time for these works - but also with Mykhalchuk’s criticism of the system, both the current and particularly the pre-war one, which saw UAF officers living in poverty due to low salaries. Mykhalchuk is going back to Spain after the war. Finally, he says that his Afghan experience taught him that a small (in size) but determined people can win against a big army.

The second interview is with Dmytro Balabukha, a 34-year tank officer, veteran of the ATO. When the “Great War” began, he was detained in a penal colony in Chernihiv Oblast for a murder committed a few years earlier. He and another detainee, because of their military experience, were released and joined the UAF. Until now, Balabukha was the commander of a tank company of the 32nd Mechanized Brigade, a brigade created in the beginning of 2023 that fought, and fights, in the Svatove sector and later in Kupyansk. Now Balabukha is being transferred to a new role: commander of a very recently created assault company, which is going to be manned by convicts who are volunteering after the specific law passed last month.

First of all, he says that the 32nd Brigade was given T-64BVs, which Balabukha was already familiar with since 2014, when he went to the front as a volunteer. For him, Soviet tanks don’t have much to envy to Western tanks, except for speed - actually a very important factor. The “Kontakt” dynamic protection largely makes up for the armour disadvantage of the Soviet tanks, providing additional protection, and the Western tanks also have an extra man in the crew. Balabukha says he has lost a few colleagues in the past, and usually the most dangerous role in a tank crew is that of the driver. At the same time, age is not a discriminating factor: he says that some young men are not up to the responsibilities of a tank driver and leave his unit, while some older folks really do their best despite their age (I would add - the average age of Ukrainian tank drivers is usually high, as it’s a role that does not require high physical prowess, and in addition, there are a lot of men who have experience as tank crewmen from their military service in the late Soviet Army). The tank he would prefer to drive is a modernized T-80, which has the same advantages as the T-64 but with more speed - he would also appreciate the Leopard 2A6, although he doesn’t think it is better than a modernized T-80 or a T-84 (just stating his opinions).

For Balabukha, the skills of Russian tankers have increased a lot compared to the beginning of the war, but Ukrainian tankers are also able to use new innovative tactics that surprise the Russians. For him, the main purpose of the tanks is to provide infantry support and destroy enemy positions with direct fire, so that the infantry can occupy them. Balabukha says that he has always seen the Russians fighting with newer or modernized tanks (it must be remembered that, as part of the 32nd Mech Brigade, he almost always fought against units of the 1st GTA, which are better equipped than other formations). But he also says that when used against infantry, even a very old tank can be fearsome and successful. Balabukha says that only those who are not at war laugh at enemy equipment. At the same time, Balabukha feels more comfortable in the army than in his old boring and repetitive job (accountant).

He says it’s not easy for tankers to shake off their fear before going into action, but at the same time he feels more protected in there than anywhere else when 120mm mortar rounds start raining down. FPV drones are a problem, but the issue is being quite successfully addressed by EW systems. He’s against using metal grates as the Russians do and also criticizes the “turtle-tank”, which he describes as useful for APCs but not for tanks, which have to rotate the turret to be effective.

He later clarifies the events of the beginning of the invasion. In fact, apart from the two of them, the other ATO participants were also to be released from jail, but there was no time: the Russians had already reached the penal colony and so the two of them had to escape behind their lines, joining some partisans from the village where the colony is located. During this time they took part in guerrilla actions against the Russians, burning their artillery and Grads. He later joined the “Ticks” unit, before returning to his old job as a tank officer in the then-new 32nd Brigade.

As part of his new fresh role, Balabukha visited a penal colony to talk to the convicts. He says he’s optimistic that greater numbers of volunteers will be reached compared to the estimates of the Ministry of Justice (around 4500 volunteers). According to him the motivation of the convicts is very high, and well above that of a part of the newly mobilized men. He told the convicts that they are going to be stormtroopers, a very risky role, and in response they said they accept the risks and only want to be taught their new job.

Despite the difficulties, Balabukha believes in victory, but says it’s conditional on the arrival of aid from partner countries and on its actual amount. He says he is confident about the capabilities of the incoming F-16s, provided there are enough missiles and bombs.