Great points.

Popasna was a very intense urban battle which lasted for weeks. It was fought house to house, including in small detached houses ravaged by artillery. The 24th Brigade did its best but the momentum at that time was really too favorable to the Russians. After losing the town the Ukrainians managed to establish new lines of defense north of the town and hold them for about a month while the battle raged in Severodonetsk.

In my view, May/June 2022 was arguably the nadir of Ukrainian perfomance. Russia had recovered from the madness of the first weeks and had started a more “coherent” war, including fielding enormous firepower in terms of artillery (about 60k shells/day). In the Siversky Donets sector they deployed the vast majority of the formations of the Western and Central Military Districts, elements of the 76th VDV Division and LPR units - whose press-ganged troops were numerous and still relatively fresh and were considered (and thereby employed) basically halfway between today’s Russian mobilized soldiers and the convicts of Storm Z units. Moreover, PMC Wagner’s action was instrumental in the urban battle at Popasna.

The Ukrainian Army was in a limbo in which Soviet-made armament stocks were beginning to run seriously low, NATO countries were just starting to send in heavy artillery, they did not have GMLRS and Soviet-caliber ammunition factories in the former Warsaw Pact countries had yet to begin to go into full swing. If I am not mistaken, they even used tanks as artillery in several instances, which caused a shortage of 125mm shells. The vast majority of the new brigades created after general mobilization had yet to be fully equipped and the volunteers/conscripts trained. And several of those that had been deployed suffered serious efficiency/discipline issues: e.g. the 115th Mechanized Brigade in Severodonetsk (which the Russians tried to depict as the 115th TD Brigade which wasn’t deployed there - I suggest reading this very interesting article, by the way). According to Ukrainian sources, the daily average of KIAs in those weeks was about 200 (which I am convinced was the worst figure of the entire war) and as a result many units suffered huge problems in terms of operational capabilities. Since July/August it was definitely noticeable that the tide had turned for the better.

In the specific case at Popasna, the UAF did its utmost duty, but it was over-stretched in the wider sector and without actual rotation capabilities. Some units had been deployed along the Siversky Donets to avoid bridgeheads (with great success: Bilohorivka!) After losing Kreminna it would have been better to leave Rubizhne and Severodonetsk, focus on holding the southern sector of the river and entrench around the Oskil river to the north.

The real breakthrough I recall occurred the following month at Zolote/Hirske. According to pro-Ukrainian sources 4 battalions came very close to being surrounded, although fortunately they were able to retreat in good order. The loss of these strongholds caused the fall of Lysychansk the following week. The rest then is well-known history. In any case, the Ukrainian actions were heroic and miraculous. I remember vividly that after the fall of Lysychansk it was thought that Siversk (also Soledar and Bakhmut) would fall in a short time and basically the town’s task was to slow the Russian onslaught towards the Sloviansk/Kramatorsk conurbation, with the Russians taking Sviatohirsk in June in the Oskil sector as well. Instead, Siversk has always remained firmly in Ukrainian hands, and Russia has totally lost momentum ever since and failed to exploit the new operational depth.

Thanks for the insight about tanks used as artillery!

One thing we often forget is that politics often takes precedence over military rationality. In this particular case, public opinion in Western countries really likes hearing about victories and not about frontline issues; at the same time, for the Ukrainian society retreating and losing territory is understandably always a stab in the heart, and I think Zelensky in particular has always pushed for all-out resistance even in desperate cases like Severodonetsk.

Generally, at least to my understanding, urban warfare is not a good way to get a good ratio of inflicted vs suffered losses (if anything it can buy time, which in some contexts may be useful) and often occurs in settings with limited logistical capabilities. On Mariupol I have mixed opinions: while it would have been better to withdraw once it was understood how it would end (i.e. since the very first days of the war), the garrison resisted impressively by doing much better than what could have been reasonably expected. Their resistance distracted several Southern Military District and DPR formations - they realized this in April when they loosened their grip there (by then the fate of the besieged was clear to everyone) and moved units to the Donetsk area. If these had been free in March I see a great risk that they could dangerously approach the M04 Highway, with very serious logistical consequences for the brigades in the JFO. More so because that area was quite unmanned (I believe it had only the 128th among the regular brigades) and the TDF units in the South performed far worse, on average, than those in the North. Moreover, the whole siege affair and the humanitarian consequences provided a great boost of support for the Ukrainian cause from Western countries and for the “rehabilitation” of the Russian propaganda’s favorite target, the then Azov Regiment, with many young Ukrainians inspired by its heroism wanting to join the new Azov units or the UAF in general.

The matter in Bakhmut was even more complicated, I agree with Kuleba when he said that either they fought there or they would face the Wagner onslaught with the tens of thousands of convicts somewhere else. That said, it’s great to fight, bleed the enemy and all, but it’s better to do so when you really have a chance of inflicting the greatest possible losses relative to what you are likely to suffer and under the best possible conditions in terms of logistical capacity. I.e. definitely not in Bakhmut after the first half of February.