Suriyak is simply copying Motopatriot’s updates (not for the first time). There are no geolocations yet to prove or disprove this, as far as I know.

But some Ukrainian sources, such as the observer Bohdan Miroshnikov, are writing about ongoing battles in the area of Semenivka - which is being attacked from both the east and the south (thus, in this case, from the western bank of the Durna). He had written yesterday of a Russian advance of about 200 meters to the west of Orlivka, in the western bank of the Durna. https://t.me/myro_shnykov/5252

At the same time, the Russians over the recent days likely completed the conquest of the fields between Berdychi and Orlivka, in the eastern bank of the Durna. That said, the Durna is not exactly a river… Everyone can see from a satellite view that in its course west of Orlivka, before the Zoryansky Stavok, it’s practically a ditch passing through a swampy area.

According to Motopatriot, which has contacts with Russian soldiers, stormtroopers of the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps managed to cross the Durna and establish control over some houses in the southern end of Semenivka, between yesterday and today. Very heavy clashes are going on in the area. https://t.me/motopatriot/21022

Let’s note that this brigade has been continuously replenished to be able to continue the assaults, for months by men from the regiments of the Territorial Forces and in recent weeks even by small subunits of the 90th Tank Division.

There has also been some news in Berdychi. It seems that since mid-March the Russians have deployed the 137th Motorized Brigade in this area, transferring it from the Serebrianka Forest. It’s a brigade raised at the end of 2023 by reforming the “Ural” Volunteer Battalion from Yekaterimburg; it’s part of the 41st CAA and, from what we can gather from videos and from the analysis of WarSpotting, should be equipped (also?) with T-90Ms and BMP-3s. This brigade is attacking the village from the south and in recent days has managed to take the entire Sadova Street, breaking the stalemate of the last month.

In general, the area of Berdychi seems to have recently come under the operational control of the 41st CAA (previously active just in and south of Orlivka), now that the 2nd CAA should be all but exhausted - the 15th and 30th Motorized Brigades have simply had huge losses (over the last month too, in the costly attacks against Berdychi), and the 21st Motorized Brigade is being reformed in the rear to become the 27th Motorized Division.

Elements of the 74th Motorized Brigade (41st CAA), which is back in the battle, with support from the 3rd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade, attacked Berdychi from the east, taking all of Miru Street, thus approaching the western part of the village and the Durna.

There are rumors of Russian advances north / north-east of Berdychi, but there is nothing to confirm this and even Russian sources are skeptical. The area under Russian control up there on Suriyak’s map is somewhat overstated. In the area of Ocheretyne there isn’t any Russian advance reported. The situation to the west and the south-west of Tonenke isn’t easy at all, with the Russians achieving some advance, respectively, in the direction of Umanske and Pervomaiske.

Just a minor stuff, firstly: technically, if I recall correctly, the first unit to cut the Industrialny Prospekt was the 30th Motorized Brigade, with the 114th taking the “Brevno” the following days.

That said, the replacements that arrive are sent directly to storm, as they are people already trained (more or less) and usually the transfer concerns a whole small unit that can operate coherently on its own for these kind of missions (e.g. a platoon, or a company). There are cases of people fighting under a regiment of the Territorial Forces and one day they are formally transferred to a “regular” brigade and start fighting under it. To give an example, also of the disorganization that characterizes this process, I was reading today about a serviceman from the 1308th Regiment of the Territorial Forces who had been missing since Feb. 10; the family learned that he had died on Feb. 20, then on March 6 he was transferred to the 55th Mountain Brigade, although in none of these two units there is any information about him. There are some regiments of the Territorial Forces that fight (while being subordinate to other brigades/regiments), and others that are purely distribution units that get recruits from the training to their final assigned unit.

Let’s also look at the case of those two rifle companies of the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division that became part of the 114th Motorized Brigade, which I had brought up last week. There seems to be no integration/rest period in between, or at least there are many cases where there is not. In the last week I even opened a VK account to better follow the MIA notices. From a group there, I read about a woman asking if there was any information about her husband, who was detached from the 19th Tank Regiment (67th Motorized Division, 25th CAA - Kreminna sector) to the military unit 42038 (i.e. the 114th Brigade)! I mean, it could be a mistake, or something else, but if it were true it would mean that the replacements are coming even from other sectors. Rather, I find it incredible that units (albeit small ones) belonging to formations of the Central Military District are being put under the organic command of a former DPR unit, and this despite the command of the operations in Avdiivka being in the hands of the CMD. I would have thought that it would be seen as a “humiliation”, let’s say. Somehow the 114th Brigade, and thus its staff, seems to be the favorite of the Russian command for the operations in that section of the front, being continuously replenished and continuing to attack. I don’t really know the reasons for that.

So I don’t think any particular emphasis is placed on unit cohesion. In general, even within the same brigade/regiment, there can be big quality gaps between the troops. You have the “meat”, destined for the first waves of attacks, which experiences very high casualties and has thus a constant need for replacements; then you have the more skilled, muchh better equipped ones, the ones who come in at the end, when an enemy position has been spotted and hit - they are the ones who consolidate the gains, hoist the flag and record the video etc. It’s definitely towards the latters that more emphasis on the need for unit cohesion is placed.

The Ukrainians are building and fortifying new lines, but several kilometers behind the current ones. The first real line, and where progress is being made, is along the Vovcha River, about ten kilometers behind the current front line. You can’t perform miracles for those just behind the front.

But focusing too much on the lines could be a bit misleading in certain instances - the Ukrainians are defending from anywhere they can acceptably defend from, whether it be houses in a village, forest belts, minor existing trenches. No tactical retreats are planned.

West of Berdychi/Semenivka, you have heights from which the Ukrainians can defend and potentially stop the Russian attacks in the direction of Novoselivka Persha, but south of the Durna (in the directions of Umanske and Pervomaiske) there is not the same topographical advantage, so things could likely be more complicated if concrete stabilization measures are not implemented.

Yes, from just south of Berdychi to the north-west of Tonenke the front line is, more or less, the Durna. It’s true that it’s fed by precipitations, however, I am not sure how much this watercourse can actually swell to the point where offensive operations in its western bank are not possible.

As for the 90th Tank Division, during winter 2022/23 and the following spring it was partially rebuilt, receiving batches of T-90Ms, T-80BVMs and T-80BVs. On paper it’s the Russian formation (at the divisional level, therefore excluding the 1st GTA and the 8th CAA) with the largest number of MBTs, with 300+ tanks, being the only tank division in the RuAF fielding three tank regiments. At the beginning of the war however it had many T-72A(V)s from the early ’80s (of which it lost a great many): it had never received a complete overhaul in that sense in the years before the war.

That said, according to Ukrainian estimates it’s far from being fully equipped according to the nominal requirements, with the tank regiments being more like reinforced tank battalions + rifle/motorized units. When the 239th Tank Regiment (i.e. the first unit of the division to reach Avdiivka, followed by the 400th Artillery Regiment) arrived in early November, by Ukrainian estimates it had only 1600 men, 32 tanks, 20 IFVs and 13 howitzers. However, the bulk of the 90th Tank Division arrived in Avdiivka in 2024: the 6th and 80th Tank Regiments in January and the 228th Motorized Regiment with the 348th Regiment of the Territorial Forces in February (the latters had been fighting in the Serebrianka Forest for months, however). So it also represents the relatively freshest Russian formation in the sector, even though it has been and is currently employed in the hostilities and besides the fact that some of its subunits, as I wrote above, have been transferred to other units outside the division to act as replacements.

I think in the case of companies from “regular” units at the end of a given period they should go back to the original unit, whereas in the case of replacements from the Territorial Forces I believe it’s often platoons; they are integrated into existing companies, and anyway there are very often internal transfers from company to company or from battalion to battalion, especially given the constant need for replacements that Storm companies have.