Today the Ukrainian military observer Alexander Kovalenko published an interesting article on the issue of Russian glide bombs. I will post it translated (via DeepL).
In recent months, Russian aviation has increased the frequency of strikes on Ukrainian army positions using aerial reconnaissance bombs. In October, an absolute record of strikes was set - 1,165 KABs were used, and on November 6, the maximum use of such bombs in a day was set at 103. What is this threat from the Russian occupation forces and how can it be dealt with? Let’s understand each aspect in detail.
The cause was a shortage of missiles
In 2022, the Russian occupiers found themselves in a difficult situation, when they began to experience a shortage of cruise, ballistic and aeroballistic missiles, so they could afford to use them mainly against objects in the rear Ukraine. However, they did not have a powerful and effective means for air strikes in the forward area. To be exact, they had it - aerial bombs, but almost all of them, being free-fall bombs, jeopardized the destruction of the aircraft and its pilot.
It is for this reason in Russia began to accelerate the implementation of the project to create planning bombs. Although there was no need to create it from scratch - such work has long been carried out, and there were a number of interesting design solutions. For example, a guided missile-bomb weapon system of modular type 9-A-7759 “Grom”. The advantage of this development was the inertial-satellite complex with an interference-protected receiver SNS GLONASS and GPS.
Or, for example, K029BE - aka UPAB-1500B. These planning bombs weighing 1.5 tons were used by Russian aviation in Ukraine, but in very small numbers. The planning range of this bomb is up to 50 kilometers, with a drop altitude of 15 kilometers with a fairly high accuracy rate. But the UPAB-1500B are very expensive, and their production is slow and labor-intensive.
These interesting design solutions were expensive, non-serialized and required technological resources, which Russia still lacks to a large extent. In addition, it was impossible to “saw” budget funds on them.
That is why then took the path of least resistance, starting to produce a unified planning and correction module (UMPK) - a tool that allows a free-fall bomb to plan at a distance of up to 30 km, depending on the height of the drop, and relatively accurately hit targets.
UMPC
The module is a “flying wing” concept, which is brought into flight position after the bomb is dropped, which is simultaneously cocked into a combat-ready state. This process is accomplished by a spring-type device that is tensioned and restrained by a latch prior to engagement.
And everything looks at first glance like a carefully coordinated mechanism, if it were not for one nuance. UMPC production can hardly be called a serial, factory-type, automated process with quality control and post-production control. UMPC production in Russia is more like artisanal, “garage” creativity in industrial volumes. UMPCs are produced very much and very quickly.
As a result, UMPCs (and not only the module itself) do not always work. In particular, there have been repeated cases when a bomb failed to open the UMPC, i.e. the latch did not work. A similar case was in the Belgorod area, when a Russian Su-34 dropped planning bombs that had failed to activate the UMPC, and they fell freely on the city.
In addition, there have been cases when UMPCs have collapsed in the air after being uncovered. Thus, on March 12, 2023, one of such bombs collapsed in the Kuibyshev district of Donetsk.
The reason for UMPK destruction in the air is both the quality of assembly and materials, and the fact that the module’s design capabilities operate at the limit of capabilities when the FAB-500M62 is loaded. When aerodynamic loads increase, the module cracks.
Another disadvantage of the UMPC is that the bomb itself is not always guaranteed to be in a combat-ready state when it is dropped. This is where the module can work perfectly, and the bomb simply fails to explode on landing.
However, the main and indisputable advantage of UMPK is that because of the primitive, artisanal production of them can be produced per month in the hundreds, and in the presence of thousands of bombs FAB-250 and FAB-500 of various modifications left by the USSR inherited by Russia, the shortage of ammunition to equip UMPK in the near future is not expected.
That is, even if a quarter of the hundreds of bombs dropped in a day do not work due to one of the above reasons, this will not critically affect the capabilities of the DEW aircraft to strike.
Countermeasures
It is impossible to shoot down corrected aerial bombs. Therefore, we should concentrate not on fighting KABs themselves, but their carriers - the tactical aviation of the Russian Federation. And this is where methods of destroying aviation become effective, both with their pros and cons.
1- First of all, it is air defense.
Destruction of Russian aviation along the battle line before a Russian front-line bomber can reach the location to drop a KAB. That is, Ukraine needs air defense equipment capable of destroying enemy aircraft not just 30 km deep into the temporarily occupied territory, but needs to have a safety buffer of at least 20 km.
This all points to the need to use medium-range air defense means in Ukraine, along the battle line, with a target engagement range of 70 km+. This is a definite plus in the fight against KABs.
But such air defense systems are not enough even for the defense of cities with millions of inhabitants, let alone LBS. And it is unlikely that we will receive such a large number of such systems from our partners in the shortest possible time. And this is a disadvantage.
2- Aviation with long-range air-to-air missiles.
Such missiles are in service with Western fighters - in particular, F-16s use AIM-120 AMRAAM. And, unlike the MiG-29, the F-16s have a much more high-tech weapons complex, and the support of partners from the airspace of other countries or neutral zones by airborne radar aircraft maximizes the capabilities of these missiles.
Possessing even not the newest modifications, but with a target engagement range of 70-100 kilometers, we can create an extreme flight zone for Russian aviation even over the rear temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine.
But the disadvantage is that such actions require the coordination of means used by us and our partners to be as effective as possible. Besides, we still haven’t received F-16s, which means that such a scenario is possible in the long term, but not in the short term.
3- ATACMS.
I guess not everyone expected to see this tool as a counter-aircraft element. But yes.
The ATACMS missiles that we have received from the United States and will continue to receive have two remarkable modifications, the M39 and the M39A1. These are cluster warhead missiles, with 950 M74 submunitions in the former and 300 in the latter. The M39 missile is capable of hitting targets at distances of up to 165 kilometers, and the M39A1 - up to 300 kilometers.
And these missiles are ideal for striking airfields. That is, even before we receive F-16s from our partners and, most importantly, before we can form an effective strategy to counter the Russian Air Force, and even more so before we have an opportunity to cover the entire LBS with air defense systems of the required range (and to be honest, this will never happen), we are already using ATACMS.
By launching regular strikes on airfields in temporarily occupied territories, we can force the ROVs to take their planes back to their own territory. This, in turn, will limit the operational capabilities of their tactical aviation, increase amortization costs, and reduce the surprise factor. ATACMS can be a more effective solution to the KAB problem than F-16s or air defense assets. The main thing is to get them in the right quantity, in a timely manner and in the right modifications.
The bottom line
The UMPC is not a perfect highly technical and highly advanced device, but it works. The module shows mediocre reliability, poor workmanship, and no guarantee that the bomb will even detonate when it reaches its target.
But they are being produced so quickly, and the Russians have so many bombs, that all these shortcomings, which would cause any other, normal army to reject such products at the outset, are fully compensated for.
In the fight against this means of defeat, traditional methods are not so much ineffective - no, they are simply unavailable to the Ukrainian Defense Forces today. Therefore, counteraction is possible by means that are already available and guarantee the effect.