I’ve been doing some digging on Russian Telegram channels (thanks, Google Translate) about a matter I’m very curious about and it seems that the conditions for contract soldiers are gradually improving.
In summer 2022 the average salary was about 150k rubles per month + 200k as a one-off bonus. This summer, 200k rubles as a monthly salary had become the standard in all recruiting ads and financial bonuses were raised to 600k rubles.
An ad that has been running lately mentions a salary starting from 204k rubles with an one-off bonus of 1095k rubles, paid in three installments within a month of signing the contract. Such large bonus is obtained as the sum of several bonuses: the one of the Ministry of Defense, the one of the Oblast organizing the recruitment, and the potential one of the private firm(s) sponsoring the recruitment. The most generous contracts are organized by the Moscow Oblast, which has abundant resources at its disposal and generally pays on time (while other oblasts can afford smaller amounts and often with delayed payments). Due to this, many people from all over Russia sign a contract with the Moscow Oblast. In this specific case, the contract has to be signed physically in St. Petersburg, as part of the bonus is provided by an association of building contractors from the city. The term is 1 year (2 years for those under 27); the renewal in theory should be automatic according to the legal provisions of the partial mobilization of September 2022. Over the course of a year the signer should be entitled to 40 days of leave. Equipment will be provided to those who sign up but those who already have military equipment are encouraged to bring it with them: many recruits use a part of the initial bonus to buy advanced kits, which is the reason why Russian soldiers in the same unit are quite heterogeneously dressed and equipped.
For most of us in this sub, coming from Western Europe or North America, these are ridiculous figures compared to the risk (a contractor in Iraq in the 2000s was getting much more for a far smaller risk, and if I am not mistaken today in dollar terms a US Army recruit gets higher salaries and bonuses), but evidently for a certain segment of the Russian population this is not the case. Let’s just remember that the mentioned salary IIRC is up to 8 times what an elementary school teacher gets in the poorest oblasts and the bonus is a godsend (e.g., to renovate one’s home) for those living in almost absolute poverty. Recall this article for example. To all of this we should add a certain level of ideological commitment to the cause. This other article is very interesting concerning the demographics of contract signers.
Those who sign on as contract soldiers are an extremely diverse group. There are the 19-year-olds doing their military service and being persuaded to sign a contract (it’s becoming quite relatively common to read obituaries of Russian soldiers born in 2003 or even 2004). There are the young people in their early 20s looking for easy money and adventure, who may not fully understand the risk that awaits them. There are 30-year-olds with debts or criminal records who go to the front to escape their lives. There are 50-year-old nationalists who volunteer “to defend Russia from NATO” or the like. And so on. The ad is looking for men with Russian passports and military papers between the ages of 18 and 59. They must not suffer from chronic or transmissible diseases - otherwise they will take anyone, by the administrator’s admission. I remember it had been proven that the procedures for issuing Russian passports are being simplified, for instance, for immigrants from Central Asia who want to sign a contract.
Benefits and support measures for the signer’s family, legal aid, war veteran status at the end of the contract, life insurance are promised. In case of injury the benefit ranges from 350k to 3 million rubles; in case of death the family will get 12 million rubles. By legal aid, I don’t know if they mean, for example, criminal record clearance (e.g., I know that in Russia getting a regular job for those with criminal records is very difficult, which prompts many to sign up for the front) and debt deferments. According to Conflict Intelligence Team, debts of the fallen soldiers cannot be transferred to family members and for active soldiers there is an extension of repayment terms. Given that consumer credit is widespread in Russia and many Russians have debts, these are things that are further pushing people into signing a contract. In addition, one’s job will be maintained (meaning, if I understand correctly, the company that employs the volunteer will have to treat him as a furloughed worker and will not be able to fire him). Furthermore, despite the fact that the pool from which to recruit is getting smaller and smaller, recruitment for Storm Z units is also continuing: there are reports that 1500 men in jail for petty crimes in Moscow Oblast reportedly signed up to join Storm Z. Even if the period in prison to be served is short, a part of the convicts choose to leave for the front to clean up their criminal record and be able to find a job once home (if they survive…) while in other cases the harshness of Russian penal colonies is enough to make it tempting to go to war.
There is also another interesting psychological issue in my opinion: a man who has served as a contract soldier in the past years and is not employed in a defense industry or the like, in the event of a new wave of mobilization is likely aware that he’s among the first ones on the list to be called up. So maybe the reasoning some people make is to sign a contract and get the big financial bonus, and possibly choose the military unit to serve in, rather than getting the mobilization letter without these benefits. From what I understand it’s possible to choose the unit in which to serve, if one has contacts there who provide a letter of recommendation. This is also the case in Ukraine for those who sign a contract as a volunteer. For example, I was reading that those who want to join the famous 3rd Assault Brigade, if they are under 25 years old can go to the brigade’s HQ and sign a contract there, while those who are older and are subject to the mobilization law, can get in touch with the brigade, receive a letter of recommendation and show up to the local mobilization office which will assign the recruit to the 3rd Brigade.
As for the Russian ad, they are looking for all roles (stormtrooper, machine gunner, sniper, scout, artilleryman, UAV operator, mechanic, etc.). If one has past experience in one of these specialties he will be assigned to that; if one is without any experience he will be trained in Voronezh where he will be trained in a specialty for which he’s the most talented (I have a feeling it will be the stormtrooper one…). People signing up this specific contract should be assigned to units of the Western Military District. Apparently a significant portion of those signing up this contract are former members of PMC Wagner (although the latter’s leadership criticizes the choice to sign contracts with the MoD and is working to reconstitute units linked to the Wagner Group within Rosgvardia). There are reports that 250 former Wagnerites have been assigned as coordinators of Storm Z units of the Western MD.
In the comments to that Telegram channel’s post, there are numerous inquiries about the contract as well as testimony from people who have recently signed and state they have received the bonuses.
It seems that the new formations created in recent months, both of the Ground Forces and VDV, are being made up of contract soldiers. Regarding the geographic origin of the latters, without any surprise they are coming in large majority from poorer regions. As far as I have read the plurality of the members of the 70th Motorized Division and the 144th Motorized Brigade of the new 18th Army are from Northern Caucasus. Many other contract soldiers come from the Far East and Siberia. A very important contribution in absolute numbers is made by the populous oblasts of the Urals and Volga regions. Places like Bashkortostan and Tatarstan are very important pools of volunteers. The Russian Army is progressively returning to the situation at the beginning of the war, with most of the soldiers coming from the poorer regions - whereas mobilization, while disproportionately affecting (in relation to population) these regions, also brought large numbers of soldiers from the metropolitan areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Last and short part below.
The MoD’s official figures report more than 400k contracts signed in the first 10 months of 2023; personally I am skeptical about these figures, or rather, they should also include renewals of existing contracts and also the regularization of PMC fighters (above all from Wagner) who signed a contract with the MoD, although physically, in this case, the number of soldiers in Ukraine doesn’t change. Broadly speaking, from April to October the number of Russian soldiers in Ukraine (per Ukrainian military intelligence) increased from 396k to 442k men (+ 25k of the Rosgvardia in the rear). A rather small but significant increase considering the very high losses experienced by the Russian Army during this period, which is a suggestion that the gross inflow of new recruits is very large. Personally this summer I was giving for certain a new large wave of mobilization in the autumn - I must say I was surprised by the numbers of new contract soldiers and according to Shoigu a new major wave is not necessary. As far as I know mobilization at the moment in Russia is limited and largely concerns reserve officers. From the obituaries, the vast majority of those mobilized were called up between mid September and late October 2022 and a minority in the winter months of 2023. Let’s recall that last year’s mobilization was necessary because the commitments to recruit volunteers during the summer of 2022 (with the establishment of the 3rd Corps and numerous volunteer battalions raised by the various oblasts) were quite disappointing. We may be witnessing a reversal of this, caused by the markedly improved financial conditions and possibly the effectiveness of pro-government and pro-“SMO” propaganda that depicts the war in Ukraine as an existential conflict for Russia’s fate.
The salary of a Ukrainian soldier at the front, IIRC, is 100k hryvnias. At the current exchange rate, it’s higher than the Russian figures, but it comes without one-off bonuses, afaik. Help from Western countries is absolutely essential to pay similar salaries (which are a multiple of the average wage in Ukraine), as well as to keep paying teachers, pensioners, etc. In 2022, the Ukrainian Central Bank had to print money to finance the war effort as support wasn’t enough. Today this is no longer necessary thanks to the growth of financial support from Western countries, the IMF and the World Bank and also thanks to the partial recovery of exports. Of course, Russia is in a better situation financially because of the hydrocarbon revenues it continues to get (although, thankfully, drastically reduced compared to 2022).
Obviously, however, in the case of Ukraine the defense of the motherland comes into play and fighting is not primarily an economic matter as it’s for a lot of Russians and understandably, at societal level, there’s no need to try to avoid new mobilization waves, as Russia has and is trying to. Although there are Ukrainians who joined as contract soldiers as a result of economic hardship - certainly the salary is very attractive compared to the average. Such high salaries are also a measure of support for the soldiers' families. However, I have read complaints about allowances for soldiers disabled by the war which are very low (by Western standards, at least).
Well If I had to guess I would say that in case of death the family gets the life insurance amount (or the soldier himself, for example, if he got maimed) and the remaining monthly payments for frontline duty aren’t paid.
with widely spread videos of people being drug off to enlist from the street by force (by all accounts that’s quite a common occurrence)
Assuming you mean drag instead of drug, I still wouldn’t say it’s a common occurence when you compare it to the large amount of people getting mobilized - don’t base your judgments on social media videos. Still it’s true that are growing problems with recruitment compared to the past and things such as fake disability/disease certificates should be cracked down on. And there are still quite a lot of ongoing exemptions, e.g., for those under 25, for university students (regardless of age, afaik), etc.
Let’s say that generally, at societal level, there seems to be much less trouble mobilizing a 40-year-old than a 20-year-old. Let’s add that, looking at the demographic pyramid, there are many more people in their 40s than in their 20s. Possibly in the future Ukraine could lower this age limit - in May it had already been lowered from 27 to 25 yo. One thing I have never understood so far is the role of 18-year-olds who are supposed to do military service - in the sense, it’s not clear to me whether these go to the front or, more likely, are used for roles in the rear. Volunteers in their early 20s are a much sought-after category for which there is a lot of competition among Ukrainian brigades.
To be honest I’m a little skeptical of wiretappings, and despite Russia being Russia which makes this kind of fuckery credible, I think these situations arise due to problems and/or malice at the “local” level (oblast or military unit) and are still less widespread than we would like. Otherwise rumors would get spread and people wouldn’t sign up.