Quantification of the Russian grouping deployed in Ukraine by Ukrainian military intelligence (the estimates were released by the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets this morning, I added the estimates from the same source from 1 and 6 months ago for a comparison):

This grouping is divided among 58 separate brigades (of all types - motorized, artillery, anti-aircraft missile etc.), 133 regiments (again: motorized, tank, territorial, VDV, etc.), 106 separate battalions and 46 detachments (BARS, Akhmat, Storm Z). The numbers exclude Rosgvardia’s elements in the rear and Russian Army’s forces deployed in the oblasts within the federal territory along the Russian-Ukrainian border (largely conscripts from the military service afaik), but include Army’s elements deployed in Crimea.

Despite the very considerable attrition Russia is experiencing, the trend seems to be towards growth in both men and gear (and at least compared to 6 months ago, the same is true for Ukraine, which in the meantime brought the vast majority of the new brigades to the front).

The growth over 6 months ago is probably due to the return to the front of the Western and Central Military Districts' formations that were reorganizing in Belarus until early spring and the attachment of new units (additional battalions, volunteer detachments, Storm Z units, reinforcements in general) to the Southern and Eastern MDs' formations. The growth over the last month is probably due to the deployment to the front of elements of the newly formed 18th and 25th Armies.

Despite widespread belief (and certainly the losses incurred), both the Russian and Ukrainian Armies have likely never been as large as they’ve been in the last period, since the beginning of the war. This is actually pretty normal in wars of attrition (I recommend taking a look at the Iranian and especially Iraqi Army’s numbers at the beginning, during and at the end of the long and costly war of the 1980s). Problems arise when one side cannot keep up with the military and military production growth of the opponent. This is not to say that the two armies aren’t going to have problems in the future, nor does it tell us anything about the quality of new recruits or equipment. For example, Russian formations are being given an increasing number of BMP-1s, as well as T-80Bs, T-72Bs or T-62Ms, all of which are inferior to widespread models such as the T-72B3 or T-80BV - not to mention T-90M or T-80BVM, production of which continues, but there are still great doubts about the numbers Russia can churn out. There is also evidence that the Russians are having major problems with artillery barrels, having to remove barrels from a lot of pieces that are stored in reserve and questions arise about their shells production too.

Another question will be whether Russia can avoid a new major mobilization wave during the fall. At the moment Shoigu said he’s satisfied with the numbers of new contract soldiers, which makes a new mobilization unnecessary in his opinion. In September Russian sources talk about 50k newly signed contracts - although the number should include the renewal of expired fixed-term contracts (that tend to last 6 months). To my knowledge mobilization today is very limited compared to the numbers from the last fall/winter and mainly concerns reserve officers, to replenish losses and in order to lead the new units being formed. Wages and bonuses for contract soldiers are being raised - it seems the standard now has become 200k rubles per month, 6/700k rubles as a one-off bonus upon signing the contract, and family support measures. These numbers could be enough for convincing a significant number of Russians to go to the front, nearly all of them from the poorer regions - not surprisingly, in the new units a very large number of soldiers reportedly come from North Caucasus, as well as from the Far East and poorer places in Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region.

At the moment the Ukrainian Army (too) is probably at (or, at worst, very near) its peak since the beginning of the war, in terms of both personnel and gear. This is not to say that in several brigades there aren’t serious operational capability problems after having suffered heavy losses, particularly in those employed in the counteroffensive in the South. But it was the same, for example, in May 2022: one has to distinguish a brigade in poor condition from the structural difficulties in mobilizing new recruits.

Speaking of mobilization in general, there are relevant problems, although the issue is very sensitive and magnified by Russian propaganda. Ukraine no longer has the huge amount of volunteers who joined the armed forces in the first weeks of the war, and the mobilization process, which continues, also faces greater problems than in the past. I seem to recall that during the winter months, in conjunction with the formation of the new brigades, Ukraine was able to mobilize 30k men a month. Now it’s very difficult to maintain that pace. Certainly the issue of “diminishing marginal returns” during a mobilization exists and is a real problem, which can be improved with better training compared to what we’ve seen so far. At the same time, I wouldn’t be frightened off by certain articles and remember that the datas have to be compared to how realistic the expectations were - if a certain recruiting center recruited only a (rather small) % of what it wanted, it can be because either it actually recruited very little or because it had placed an exaggerated theoretical number. It also depends on standards - I had read that the highest % of missed recruitment goals were in the air assault brigades, which have very high standards compared to the average regarding age and fitness status. There is also the issue of corruption (with fake disability certificates issued, for example), and the replacement of the heads of recruitment centers is mainly due to this. It’s definitely an issue that needs to be resolved.

There are a number of Ukrainians who join as contract soldiers for economic purposes too (the wages offered, thanks to Western financial support, are very generous compared to the average salary and therefore very attractive to, for example, a man with economic problems and/or who has lost his job). There’s still a certain flow of volunteers, particularly from the under-27 age bracket that aren’t subject to mobilization rules, although fewer than in the past (as when the brigades of the Offensive Guard were formed). Volunteers in their 20s are an extremely sought-after category for which there is much competition among Ukrainian brigades.

Regarding support from the West - yes, indeed it’s essential and is a prerequisite for the continuation of the war. No doubt about that. I take it for granted that it will continue, otherwise it would be a very, very serious issue. Numerous NATO’s armies are having problems in terms of sending additional equipment, and the quality of new equipment is not always the highest, for example, the vast majority of the new tanks coming in the next few months are Leopard 1A5s, but let’s remember that the Ukrainian Army had pulled T-64BMs or T-72AMTs out of its warehouses; MRAPs (which are available in large numbers) are a decent solution to equip mechanized units compared to BTR-70s or even BMP-1s (for not-muddy terrains). Even M113s are quite appreciated by Ukrainian soldiers as far as I read! It will be essential to continue sending artillery guns, especially 155mm pieces with which the Ukrainians can use the DPICMs and, from the next year, enjoy the increased production of 155mm shells in the Western countries.

The last units that were officially announced to be created (over the summer) were the 5th Tank Brigade (although I’m still not 100% sure it will be formed) and a significant number of separate rifle battalions, which seem to be the favored option lately because of both the shortage of equipment and the lack of officers for more complex structures like a brigade. I honestly don’t see the need to create additional brigades, though. I think the current number is good after the creation spree during the winter and spring; the priority should be introducing additional battalions in the new ones, which are substantially smaller than most of the veteran ones. There are several new brigades of which nothing was ever heard about after the news that they were in training (primarily infantry brigades, a new type of formation). With the large number of brigades now in existence and rising recruiting issues, I think it’s fair that the priority is to replenish losses in existing brigades. I’d have enjoyed seeing a divisional level being added but it doesn’t seem to be a feasible thing.

The 47th has suffered very significant losses but is still in combat. We all know about the recent events concerning it. To my knowledge, some battalions of the brigade are in the rear recovering, while the rest are on the front lines in Robotyne. Marine brigades also suffered large losses, especially the 35th and 37th. I’m closely following the Velyka Novosilka sector, because it’s possible that the grouping of the whole Ukrainian marine formations there could be no more. Partly because of losses, partly maybe the General Staff wants to deploy them elsewhere. Elements of the 36th would be back in Avdiivka, the 35th has been less active after the failed attack on Novomaiorske last month, the 37th has also been very little active, same goes for the 38th. Rybar said elements of the Ukrainian Marine Corps would have been transferred to Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts, according to him in preparation for a landing across the Dnipro that was later cancelled. Beyond the occasional hallucinatory states sometimes Rybar has to fall in (today he outdid himself with the Avdiivka affair, he wrote the Russians had taken Berdychi when there’s no indication they passed the railway before Stepove in first place!!), it’s indeed true that the marines are much less active than in the summer in the sector (and the 23rd and 31st Mech Brigades that were in the western bank of the Mokri Yaly seem to have been missing for months - Rybar wrote the first of these would have been spotted in the rear of the Orikhiv sector in the recent days). It’s no coincidence that lately the western bank of Mokri Yaly has been taken over by several TD brigades while in the eastern one the fresh 58th Motorized Brigade and some battalions of the Presidential Brigade have very recently arrived. If I have time and new infos maybe I could write the latest tactical developments of certain sectors with more detail.