If anyone is still interested about the war in Ukraine (just kidding!), I will try to make an update of the sectors along the frontline from a tactical point of view, including the order of battle (that we are aware of, of course we won’t ever be able to know this stuff perfectly). The sources are the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets, Ukrainian think tank Centre for Defence Strategies, DeepState, WarArchive on Telegram… This will be the first of three parts and today I will be covering the north-eastern front (Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna). In the coming days I will talk about the eastern front (Siversk, Bakhmut, Horlivka, Avdiivka, Marinka) and then about the southern front (from Vuhledar to Kherson).

First, what’s going on along the Russian-Ukrainian border to the west of Kupyansk up to Belarus? Nothing much really. It has a very low force density, covered by elements of the TDF and border guard detachments for the Ukrainians; on the Russians' side, by the border guards, by Army’s conscripts (I mean those from military service, not the mobilized) and by some volunteer battalions that are being created by the Russian oblasts located along the border. There are groups of saboteurs on both sides crossing the border, and occasional artillery exchanges and FPV drone attacks are taking place, mainly against trucks or defense installations.

Kupyansk. As a reminder, slightly more than 100k Russians should be deployed from here to the Siversky Donets River. The 25th and 138th Motorized Brigades of the 6th Army of the Western Military District, supported by regiments of the Territorial Forces and Storm Z detachments, are continuing to attack, as they have for months now. By far the biggest push is from Lyman Pershyi towards Synkivka, which remains firmly in Ukrainian hands. On Wednesday they would have recorded some tactical successes. In any case we are talking about very limited advances. The situation is not easy but Kupyansk at the moment has no structural holding problems in my view.

Attacks are also taking place from Vilshana towards Petropavlivka. There are also fierce clashes for the “Height 195” near Orlyanske, which is one among several tactically important hills in the area. Attacks in this sector at the moment are mainly carried out by infantry (including lots of convicts from Storm Z) and aren’t considerably mechanized, unlike elsewhere (partly because the area between Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka is, well, a forest). They are, however, supported by high volumes of artillery fire: there are reportedly five Russian artillery brigades in the Kupyansk sector.

The Ukrainian grouping in Kupyansk includes the 14th Mechanized Brigade, elements of the 95th Air Assault Brigade and the 67th Mech Brigade (with the rest of the elements of these two brigades deployed in the Kreminna sector), the new 41st Mech Brigade. Probably the 32nd Mech Brigade has also been transferred from Svatove very recently; certainly last month the 115th Mech Brigade arrived too, which was one of those that had completely disappeared from any radar during 2023. Elements of the TDF are present as well - Rybar stated there are battalions of the 101st and 105th Brigades. The 113th TDF Brigade is also supposed to be in the area. The political border with Russia west of the Oskil is manned by the Stalevy Kordon Brigade of the Offensive Guard.

The 95th Brigade is used (like the 25th) as “firefighters” in the north-eastern front, i.e., it operates in separate battalions to reinforce the hottest areas of the front in a given time. It’s likely, by the way, that a company of the brigade is in the southern flank of Bakhmut.

Between Kupyansk and Svatove the entire 1st Tank Army (WMD) is deployed, i.e., the largest (excluding the 8th Army of the SMD which embedded the L/DPR forces) and on paper the most competent Russian formation in the Ground Forces (on paper - in Ukraine it has had embarrassing performances).

According to Mashovets during this week the 153rd Tank Regiment (formed in Nizhny Novgorod) of the 47th Tank Division, part of the 1st GTA (this division had been created in late 2021 but had never been fully equipped) has arrived near the Russian-Ukrainian border crossing of Kantemirovka (Voronezh Oblast). The 153rd was created recently and would be fully equipped: 94 tanks, 32 IFVs, 12 D-30 122mm towed howitzers, and 140 trucks and special equipment. It’s supposed to join the attacks towards Petropavlivka, where it will deployed along the 26th Tank Regiment of the same division. In Velykyi Vyselok, the 79th Motorized Regiment of the 18th Motorized Division (11th Corps - i.e. the Western MD’s reserve) was recently deployed.

The 2nd Motorized Division and the 4th Tank Division (1st Tank Army) are, respectively: the former between Pershotravneve and Yahidne and the latter around the town of Svatove. Both have been involved and are involved in combat through local attacks in the areas they cover.

However, I personally believe that the bulk of these two formations are still being restored. In addition to the losses in the first month of war (from Pryluky to Okhtyrka), during the Kharkiv counteroffensive of September 2022 (despite the fact that the troops were able to withdraw with somewhat limited human losses) they had simply enormous material losses, to the point that most of the battalions had almost no equipment left for real. Together with elements of the Central Military District they spent the winter in Belarus recovering, but we have no certainty about their current status. It’s likely a relevant part of the T-90M / T-80BVM / BMP-3 that Russia manages to produce are going to re-equip the formations of the 1st GTA, but even on this there’s no full certainty. In any case, to motorize their less capable units, Russia seems to be pulling quite a few BTR-70s from the warehouses recently, as stated by Russian sources. Which may be an indication that even BMP-1s are beginning to be treated more… judiciously. The appearance of MT-LBs (often modified) for offensive purposes is also quite telling. In any case, I believe that this army shouldn’t be overlooked and, in case it’s in good shape and fully re-equipped, it could pose a credible threat and be an enabler of Russian offensive operations during the winter. The only negative note for the Russians is that this army, hosting two of the three Russian tank divisions, has a very high number of tanks within it compared to IFVs, making it unbalanced for potential large-scale offensive operations as a stand-alone formation. Armored columns' advances without dismounts were fatal early in the war, particularly to the formations of the 1st GTA and of the Central Military District.

In the last days the Russians (probably elements of the 11th Corps) have advanced a few hundred meters near Krokhmalne, passing the Svatove-Kupyansk railway and capturing a couple of tree lines immediately to the west. I see no immediate operational consequences to this.

The 27th Motorized Brigade, the last formation of the 1st GTA, has been attacking Novoselivske for months. It has lately been joined by the 7th Motorized Regiment of the 11th Corps. By early August the Russians had been successful in taking the vast majority of the settlement. After that it seems that the bulk of the Ukrainian 25th Airborne Brigade was moved to the area. The lines have been absolutely stable ever since. The 103rd TDF Brigade is also active and there should be elements of the 92nd Assault Brigade (formerly Mechanized) in the area, which is being reformed and probably the bulk of the brigade is in the rear - except one battalion in Bakhmut. Just to the south, near Stelmakhivka, the 21st Mech Brigade should be deployed, as Strv 122s (Leopard 2A5) have been geolocated in the area. This brigade has been moving a lot: in July it was in the Kreminna sector and in August in Kupyansk.

Going further south, the hottest area from July to early last month was the one between Raihorodka and Karmazynivka. In July the Russians attacked employing elements of the 4th Tank Division together with the brigades of the 2nd Army of the Central Military District. In the second half of July they succeeded in breaking through the first Ukrainian line held by the 66th Mech Brigade by advancing 4/5 kms and reaching Novojehorivka; a few days later there was a second minor breakthrough at Serhiivka, just to the north, against the lines held by the new 32nd Mech Brigade. These breakthroughs were very dangerous as the Russians were able to cross the Zherebets (which however, let’s recall, is basically a stream near Svatove) and a success in the direction of Borova could have jeopardized Ukrainian positions east of the Oskil. The Russian advance was halted and part of the lost territory was recaptured, but the Ukrainians had to employ numerous reserves: the 68th Jager Brigade (which was transferred from the Velyka Novosilka sector in the south), the new 43rd Mech Brigade, likely the Bureviy Brigade (Offensive Guard) and a battalion of the 95th Air Assault Brigade. In late August, the 3rd Motorized Division (20th Army, WMD) became active. It’s supposed to have provided, through its 237th Tank Regiment, armored support to the 15th and 21st Motorized Brigades (2nd Army, CMD) during the attacks at the end of August and in the first half of last month in the area. It lost really a lot of tanks in the actions around Novojehorivka, including T-90Ms. We can say that after July any Russian attack in this area turned out to be a failure. Second part of the comment below.

Lately the 3rd Division has been attacking a little further south, namely toward Makiivka. It has had some success, advancing 1,5 km during the past week. A similar advance would have been reported slightly further south towards Nesvke, which in this case should be the work of elements of the new 25th Army, specifically, probably, of the 36th Motorized Regiment of the 67th Motorized Division. In this area the Russians have a topographical advantage as they control the heights (where the watershed between the Zherebets and the Krasna is located) and they attack towards the Zherebets valley. The Russians may had found a new weak point along the line but now it seems that the advance has been contained. In any case it doesn’t worry me much, we are still talking about clashes taking place in the eastern bank of the Zherebets. The famous video of the T-90M being hit by an ATGM and exploding (as far as I have read it was the work of the 130th TDF Battalion) comes from Makiivka. The Russians lost quite a lot of gear there too. The area is manned also by the 66th Mech (moved a bit further south than in July), the 1st Special Purpose Brigade; a video came out yesterday in which the drone unit of the 57th Motorized Brigade was active in Makiivka. I don’t know for what reason it was there; it could be a prelude to a deployment of elements of the brigade or not. The 57th Brigade is fighting in the northern flank of Bakhmut but another part of the brigade is in training, such as the 34th Battalion that received Rosomaks. Rybar reported movements of the new 44th Mech Brigade in the rear of the sector. I cannot confirm this. This brigade is equipped with Leopard 1A5s and Rosomaks and is among the new brigades that haven’t yet been deployed.

So, we arrived in the Kreminna sector. This sector has been very disrupted lately due to the transfer of the entire 76th VDV Division to the Orikhiv sector. It can be divided into two areas: Torske/Yampolivka/Terny and Dibrova / Serebrianka Forest. In the former, the 144th Motorized Division (20th Army, WMD) is active and has been reinforced by a formation of the new 25th Army: the 164th Motorized Brigade. This new army is probably part of the Central MD and has been downsized compared to the initial plans, which wanted the army to field 30k men and be associated with the Eastern MD. It should have 17k men in total; the other regiments of the 67th Division and a tank brigade are yet to be deployed. They are facing the 63rd Mech Brigade, elements of the 95th Air Assault Brigade and of the TDF. Elements of the new 42nd Mech Brigade should also be deployed in this area. As far as I had read, they hadn’t a good start and in August they lost several positions (presumably around Torske) and had to be bailed out by units of the 95th Brigade. Hopefully, any internal problems of the brigade has been resolved, considering that it seems confirmed that this brigade received Strykers. In any case, nothing too bad came out of that for the Ukrainians.

The 90th Tank Division (41st Army, CMD) supported by some BARS detachments, is active in the Serebrianka Forest. The unit experiencing the greatest actions there is its 228th Motorized Regiment, which is fighting against the Azov Brigade (Offensive Guard), suffering casualties and prisoners. Russian actions in the forest are paying the price of the transfer of the VDV to other sectors. The Ukrainians achieved some positional gains in the forest. The last VDV elements deployed there might be a few companies of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th Division), but I am no longer sure about that anymore - the vast majority of the 98th VDV Division has been transferred to the northern flank of Bakhmut for months. The Ukrainians in the area: most of the 67th Mechanized Brigade, the 100th TDF Brigade and the Azov Brigade that arrived in late August to reinforce the National Guard’s grouping which made up the bulk of Ukrainian units in the Kreminna sector throughout 2023. There are in fact numerous National Guard units deployed in the forest.

Let’s recall that the National Guard (which is continuing to expand), is divided into two classes: on the one hand, the Offensive Guard brigades (i.e., the former operational brigades), which can be compared with those of the regular army; on the other hand, the brigades for the protection of public order, which are pretty much comparable with the TDF brigades. Personally, I think the Kreminna sector for the Ukrainians was the bloodiest after Bakhmut in the first half of 2023; and, also owing to the fact that much of the fighting saw VDV in action against NG units, I think the Ukrainians had worse casualties than the Russians in that specific sector. Now the situation is quieter - Kreminna has actually become the quietest sector for the Ukrainians in the north-eastern front. I don’t see any structural risk in the area.

It seems that the Russians want to use most of formations of the Central Military District to reinforce the hot sectors along the frontline in Ukraine. Mashovets wrote that the 21st Motorized Brigade (2nd Army, CMD), which had been heavily involved in the attacks near Novojehorivka, would have been moved near Avdiivka and would be ready to carry attacks, although so far it has not been involved at all. I will also talk about Avdiivka and which units were involved in the Russian attacks. The 30th Motorized Brigade (2nd Army) would have been moved to the rear (it was in the Svatove sector). Mashovets initially thought it would be destined for reinforcing the Russian grouping in Kupyansk, but it has headed into the interior of Donetsk Oblast instead of Luhansk Oblast. This could be a hint that it may be destined for a sector located further south. When mentioning the locations of Russian formations, Mashovets (who has contacts with Ukrainian military intelligence) is the most reliable person I am aware of and often anticipates geolocations.

Recently some Russian milbloggers reportedly wrote that two of the three brigades of the 41st Army (CMD) would have arrived in Kherson: the 55th Mountain Brigade and the 74th Motorized Brigade. They were employed in the Kreminna sector until last month. The 35th Motorized Brigade, on the other hand, seems to have been inactive through 2023. Budanov’s words about the potential transfer of the 41st Army (or at least a part of it) to southern Ukraine could thus find confirmation.

A Russian brigade is practically equivalent to a Russian regiment without being embedded in a division. That is why they are called, even in Ukraine, “separate brigade”. At most they have a few support units that in regiments are framed at the divisional level. They tend to be way smaller (2/3k men) than a NATO brigade, although some in this war have received additional battalions. Consequently, even a Russian division (7/12k men) is considerably smaller than a NATO division. They had created many brigades in 2008 because they wanted to reform their army on the NATO model but then much of the reform was cancelled and they returned to the divisional level. But the US for example is also going in that direction.

The more interesting issue is the “army”. Don’t expect the huge field armies of the World Wars. A Russian army, with the exception of the 8th Army, is on average equivalent to a NATO division. Some may be equivalent to a corps (1st and 58th Armies), some just to little more than a brigade (29th Army).

Ukrainian brigades when it comes to order of battle are equivalent to Russian brigades/regiments. Or at least the new ones are. Veteran ones, meaning the ones existing before 2022, are generally considerably larger as they include additional motorized battalions (usually volunteer units from the war of 2014/15 which were regularized later). It’s possible for some Ukrainian brigades to be as large as 7k men, although the average in 2023 has decreased as the new brigades have about 3k men on average afaik.

P.S.: remember that a Russian motorized brigade has the same order of battle and equipment (on paper) as a Ukrainian mechanized brigade.

Thank you so much!