Second (and long) part of my tactical analysis of the frontline in Ukraine. Here’s the first part, where I also mention the sources. Today we will talk about the eastern front. I suggest having a map under the eyes (like DeepState or Andrew Perpetua’s) before reading.

Firstly, the Siversky Donets River marks the border between the jurisdiction of the Central Military District (specifically the 41st Army) and the Southern MD, specifically the 8th Army, which reaches as far south as Marinka. The 8th Army is by far the largest Russian formation. It includes the 150th and 20th Motorized Divisions, but also the 1st and 2nd Corps, i.e. the former armies of the DPR and LPR, respectively. These corps are quite large and each includes several motorized brigades (i.e., the old reformed separatist units), some motorized and reserve rifle regiments as well as separate battalions. Moreover, the 3rd Corps, formed during the summer of 2022, although formally part of the Western MD, should in fact be under the command of the 8th Army. We are talking about a small corps, in any case. From the Siversky Donets to the beginning of the Vuhledar sector, around 150k Russians should be deployed, 1/3 of them around Bakhmut.

So, let’s start with the Siversk sector. Or rather, the salient, after the fall of Soledar. Despite the somewhat uncomfortable position, the Russians never attempted any major offensive in this area, and the Ukrainians managed to resist Russian attacks here without major headaches. The Russian advances in the first half of the year in the Serebrianka Forest were halted and therefore the Russians failed in their objective of gaining the entire northern bank of the Siversky Donets and therefore holding Siversk at mortar range. As a result, Siversk is considered a secondary front for them.

Bilohorivka (the one in the Luhansk Oblast, not Donetsk), a salient within a salient, is garrisoned by the Ukrainian 81st Airmobile Brigade. On the other side there are elements of the 2nd Corps such as the 127th Motorized Brigade and several Akhmat detachments from the 78th “Sever-Akhmat” Regiment operate in this area. They are not to be confused with the Kadyrovites of the 141st Regiment from Rosgvardia and the Chechen OMON/SOBR units - these Akhmat detachments are embedded in the Ground Forces and are actually fighting on the frontlines, unlike the others who are in the rear garrisoning occupied towns and so on. The Akhmat name is because they are units created (and financed) by Kadyrov after the war began and are trained at the large “special forces” training center in Gudermes, near Grozny. They are usually units led by Chechen officers, but the Chechen presence among the troops is limited - it includes volunteers from all over Russia within its ranks, though mainly it’s men from the oblasts of the North Caucasus area, often Muslims.

By April the Russians had managed to take the high ground north-east and east of Bilohorivka but the situation has been pretty stable since then - still, bloody clashes have happened in the meantime, with the Russians managing to seize the chalk-processing plant (while the quarry is in Ukrainian hands). In any case, Bilohorivka is not a strategic town and there is high ground west of the settlement.

Around Spirne in recent months there has been a progressive Russian progress - albeit a very slow one - starting with the capture of the gas compressor station in late April. The Russians are pushing also a little further south, near Berestove, and a week ago DeepState clarified that several hundred meters which were thought to be grey area were actually controlled by the Russians. But we are talking about very minor stuff, with no operational consequence. In late July, the Russians had launched a failed attack near Spirne, using a MT-LB in VBIED function and losing 5 T-80BVs and 7 BMP-1/2s. The Ukrainians likely have somewhat weakened the grouping in the salient with the transfer of Bureviy Brigade (Offensive Guard) as a reinforcement to the Svatove sector. In the area there are the 54th Mech Brigade and the Rubizh Brigade (Offensive Guard).

In the area near Vesele and Rozdolivka area the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade is deployed, which has been in that area since summer 2022 - many Ukrainian brigades have been in their sectors for 12+ months. They manage this situation with battalion-level rotations (e.g., 2/3 battalions are deployed, 1/2 are in the rear recovering, training new recruits and receiving new equipment), although the rotation situation is far from optimal, and in brigades that have experienced higher levels of attrition it can be a major problem. This area is the southern flank of the Siversk salient and looks towards Soledar. The Russians in the area are the 137th Regiment of the 106th VDV Division (which has a tank unit with T-90Ms - there were rumors of a transfer of this division to the Orikhiv sector but it would have been canceled by the Russians, given the formation it’s very busy around Bakhmut), the 123rd Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps and several BARS detachments. The Ukrainians during the summer attempted a few probing moves towards Soledar but were repulsed, the front is stable and relatively quiet. Personally, I hold the opinion that without Soledar there will be no chance of liberating Bakhmut (which, however, is not a priority for the Ukrainians).

Further to the south-west of this area there’s the northern flank of Bakhmut, i.e. the Dubovo-Vasylivka salient. In early June the Ukrainians had some success reaching the gates of the settlement of Berkhivka and clearing some woods east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka. The arrival of Russian reinforcements halted all Ukrainian progress in the area. Lately the Russians gained some ground towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka. The area, since Wagner’s withdrawal, is garrisoned by the 200th Motorized Brigade of the Arctic Fleet (which has had heavy casualties), recently this brigade incorporated a new unit named “Sever-Z”, formed by convicts -it’s an experimental unit, where it looks like convicts will be given better training than usual. In the area there is the vast majority of the 98th VDV Division: the 217th Regiment, elements of the 331st Regiment and the division’s artillery regiment. There’s also the 9th Motorized Regiment of the 18th Motorized Division (11th Corps, WMD), transferred as a reinforcement during the summer and some regiments of the Territorial Forces.

The Ukrainians in the area: the 30th Mech Brigade, the 56th and 57th Motorized Brigades (the latter reportedly had heavy losses in the fighting for Berkhivka), the 77th Airmobile Brigade (which has yet to recover from the urban clashes in Bakhmut during the spring), the 241st TDF Brigade (ditto) and other elements such as a battalion of the Presidential Brigade and probably of the 60th Mech Brigade.

In the area next to the city of Bakhmut itself there is very little action. It would make little sense to attempt to attack the urban settlement with the flanks still in Russian hands, besides. The vast majority of the high rises are still standing and are being used by elements of the VDV (mainly 98th Division) as observation, sniping and ATGM positions.

The really interesting flank of Bakhmut is the southern one, where the Ukrainians have by far the initiative and in the last period are attacking in three directions: they are clearing the fields before the railway north-east of Klishchiivka; near Andriivka they have passed the Bakhmut-Horvlika railway and gained positions east of it, gradually beginning to move towards Odradivka; they are attacking Kurdyumivka from the west and pressing on the nearby Zelenopillya from the north.

On the southern flank there’s a slew of Russian units. There’s the 72nd Motorized Brigade of the 3rd Corps, the one Prigozhin accused of running away at the beginning of the Ukrainian counterattacks in early May. Between Klishchiivka and, lately, Andriivka it has suffered really heavy losses (and POWs), and recently the Ukrainian assault troops of the 3rd Brigade captured a Major, commander of the “Alga” Battalion from Tatarstan, part of this brigade. A few elements of this brigade are still active but the brigade could have been replaced by the 4th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps which holds the lines along the Bakhmut-Horlivka railway.

There’s also the 85th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps which also had very high losses and would have been largely replaced by elements of the 88th Motorized Brigade of the same corps. There is also the 1307th Regiment of the Territorial Forces, deployed in the Klishchiivka area. I follow a large Russian Telegram channel that posts the KIAs/MIAs reported by families or made public, and the amount of casualties of the 1307th Regiment is striking. A couple of weeks ago soldiers from this regiment in a protest video reported that their unit had 1200 casualties.

The Russians are still sending regiments from the Territorial Forces into the fray to slow down the Ukrainians as much as possible, despite at significant cost to these units. Recently the 1428th Regiment was sent to Bakhmut’s southern flank, among others. Second out of three parts below.

The 8th Army also had to send there half of the 150th Motorized Division (from Marinka): the 102nd Motorized Regiment, 68th Tank Regiment and 381st Artillery Regiment. These units are used mainly for counterattacks. There’s a very large VDV grouping: there are the 31st, 83rd and 11th VDV Brigades between Klishchiivka and Andriivka (the first two suffered important losses and a large part of these two brigades could have been sent to the rear); the 51st Regiment of the 106th VDV Division in Kurdyumivka, where the 57th Motorized Brigade (5th Army, EMD) is also present. I never had a chance to confirm the rumors about the presence of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade in the area, but seeing from Russian obituaries, I found that during the summer there were elements of the 7th Military Base in the southern flank. There would also be a Spetsnaz and an Akhmat detachment, as well as some volunteer or legalized PMC units.

The presence of so many units causes serious coordination problems between neighboring units, partly because of the lack of consistency when it comes to fighting capabilities. A few weeks ago I was reading on “Voin_dv” Telegram channel an account from a discussion with mobilized Buryat paratroopers from the 11th VDV Brigade. They complained about lack of coordination between units, lack of coordination with artillery, lack of reserves at the tactical level, abandonment of the active defense tactic in favor of larger and meaningless counterattacks that cause heavy casualties.

The Ukrainians active in the area are part of a large and, on average, competent grouping: 3rd and 5th Assault Brigades, Lyut Brigade (Offensive Guard), 80th Air Assault Brigade, the new 22nd Mech Brigade, with armored support from the 17th Tank Brigade. Elements (probably a single battalion) of the 92nd Assault Brigade and of the 93rd Mech Brigade are also present in the southern flank, with the bulk of these brigades recovering and training new recruits in the rear. The 28th Mech Brigade is active in Kurdyumivka.

The Ukrainians have losses - for instance, last month there had been a failed mechanized attack (maybe by the 22nd Brigade) with losses of 5 BMP-2s and 3 Rosomaks. But the Russians have a lot of losses in this flank, really a lot. Including equipment: several times they attempted mechanized assaults to retake Klishchiivka that all ended badly for them, with T-90Ms among losses. The tactics of the 3rd Assault Brigade are very interesting: they don’t focus on attacking, capturing and holding a given position, but their favored action is a kind of “hit and run” attacks in which they arrive quickly (usually using M113s - this brigade has very good perfomance despite outdated gear), assault Russian positions, usually held by elements much less competent than the 3rd Brigade, inflict as many casualties and take as many prisoners as possible, then withdraw before Russian artillery, as is the typical standard, shells their own (lost) position. The result is that advances in terms of meters are limited, but enemy attrition is high in relation to their own losses. The 3rd Brigade is made up of highly motivated volunteers and has a large following on social medias, which implies a lot of donations, which in turn means a very high presence of drones, thermal visors, and GoPros (there’s a reason why we can see their actions in 4K).

The 24th Mech Brigade is deployed in the Horlivka sector (Druzhba, Shumy, etc.). It’s a good and large brigade that has recovered the losses experienced during its deployment in Bakhmut between December and January. I wouldn’t rule out that in the future it will be sent to a hot sector - the current one is in the podium of the quietest ones along the frontline (excluding the Russian-Ukrainian border in Chernihiv/Sumy etc.). Artillery exchanges, sniper duels, FPV drone attacks and sometimes some positional clashes it’s what takes place in this area. But the lines are generally extremely stable. The Russians have never tried anything serious here or near Niu-York (a bit further south), as they are very well fortified and quite densely built places. Niu-York is garrisoned by the 109th TDF Brigade. For Niu-York the situation is similar to the Horlivka area. When we see the cozy Ukrainian positions with TV etc. they often come from here. Just to the south of Niu-York there are most of the battalions of the Ukrainian Presidential Brigade (a very large formation). In Horlivka, for the Russians, the sector covered by the 1st Corps begins. Near Niu-York there is the 132nd Motorized Brigade of this corps and several regiments of the Territorial Forces.

We’ve “reached” Avdiivka, about which there’s much to write about. Just to the north of this sector there is Novobakhmutivka, which the Russians took in April 2022. The following August they managed to capture Novoselivka Druha and cross the H20 Highway. In February of this year the Russians began a new offensive in the area, succeeding, during the following month, in taking Krasnohorivka and Vesele, which are the staging area for the ongoing offensive operations towards the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway - a very important Ukrainian defensive line. To the south, the Russians have pushed many times from Vodyane, Opytne and Spartak since the start of the war, suffering immense losses (it’s by far one of the bloodiest sectors for the Russians since the beginning of the war). On Wednesday they launched a new offensive, which came as a surprise for the Ukrainians according to Ukrainian sources (although fortunately the units in Avdiivka became aware of the assault when Russian armored vehicles were still several kilometers away, thanks to drone reconnaissance). The attack, setting out to break through Ukrainian positions and tighten the pincer around the town in a major way was, overall, a failure. The Russians used many FABs and fired many artillery shells, but Avdiivka has many bunkers, the Avdiivka Coke Plant has shelters made to withstand a nuclear war, and from down there a network of tunnels starts, which has been expanded since 2015 and covers a vast part of the city afaik.

From Krasnohorivka the Russians allegedly reached the railway line but were pushed back with heavy losses. Realistically they gained several hundred meters west of Krasnahorivka including a tree line, and that’s it. There were secondary attacks towards Novokalynove, with no success beyond a minor gain near the Ocheretyne - Niu-York railway. They would have reached the tailings heap called Terrikon (on the other side of the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railroad, compared to the town of Avdiivka) but as far as I understood they would never have conquered it, contrary to what the Russians claimed. Secondary attacks from Kamyanka would have had no success. From Spartak successes would have been almost non-existent, except for reaching the Avdiivka-Jasynuvata railway in a position just further to the west than where the Russians were before. The well-known former Air Defence Forces' base (which hosts large and solid bunkers), beyond the unfinished ring road to the north-west of Spartak, remains firmly in Ukrainian hands. There would be progress on the order of 300-400 meters towards Sjeverne from Vodyane but my understanding is that the Russians haven’t been able to capture the following tree line (compared with their starting positions) in the “latitudinal direction” but only advanced along those in the “longitudinal direction”. There would have been marginal progress towards Pervomaiske (just above Stavok Kirsha Lake). Until the Russians take Sjeverne and Berdychi, the situation for Avdiivka is quite sustainable in my opinion.

[EDIT: there was an update from DeepState this evening, which has showed an advance up to almost 1 km north-west of Vodyane (and south of Tonenke) that occurred likely over the last week. If confirmed (there were no geolocalizations priorly), it would mean that in that specific area the Russians were actually able to seize a stretch of a “latitudinal” tree line. In any case, the area is not that close to Sjeverne and at the moment I don’t see serious consequences from this.]

What forces the Russians employed? The 114th Motorized Brigade (formerly the 11th DPR Regiment) is the formation that attacked from Krasnohorivka, with support from other units such as the “Yugra” Battalion (mobilized from Khanty-Mansiysk), which attacked in the tailings heap area. Rybar wrote of Russian paratroopers in the area. A Telegram channel associated with the 106th VDV Division shared the actions of a tank of the 114th Brigade writing that it covered the assault of “their” infantry. I don’t know if by “their” they meant Russian in general or from their division. I’m not aware of any VDV unit in Avdiivka. If that was the case, in my opinion we are talking about at most one company, hardly anything more, with the 106th already very busy in Bakhmut. The 106th is the formation preferred by the Russians to move small units in a short time where they are needed the most: for example, during the Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022, a company from this division was helicoptered to Kupyansk to cover the retreat of Russian units in the area and slow down the Ukrainians; in June of this year elements of the division were sent from Bakhmut to the Serebrianka Forest to reinforce the VDV grouping deployed in the area during a Russian attack. In the vicinity of Novoselivka Druha the 21st Motorized Brigade (2nd Army, Central Military District) reportedly just arrived from Svatove. At the moment it has not been involved in any action apparently, but is supposed to be a reserve for future operations with the goal of breaking through the railway line to Stepove and Berdychi. The railroad is a key defense line for the Ukrainians and any breakthrough (although in the short term I don’t see the risk) could be very problematic. Last part below.

From Vodyane towards Sjeverne the 9th Marine Brigade attacked. Despite the name this formation has nothing to do with Russian Naval Infantry but it’s the reformed 9th Marine Regiment of the DPR. The name marine comes from the fact that from 2015 to 2022 the regiment was stationed in Novoazovsk and covered the southern DPR-Ukraine border all the way down to the sea. It consequently participated prominently in the siege of Mariupol. Despite its name, it had no amphibious capabilities and before 2022 was also considered among the worst units in the DPR Army in terms of morale and readiness. Like the other brigades of the 1st and 2nd Corps, nowadays it’s composed mainly of Russian mobilized, and by a minority of conscripts from the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (the few they can still find, but the mobilization is still active - a few weeks ago a mobilized kid born in Donetsk in 2005 was killed in action). In these brigades, particularly in the Avdiivka area, there’s a very high presence of Storm Z detachments, composed largely of Russian convicts who volunteered, and in a small part of mobilized men punished for drunkenness, drugs usage or theft.

In the area between Opytne and Spartak attacks were carried out by elements of the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps. In the area there are some units considered “elite”, such as the Sparta and Somalia Battalions that are composed mainly of Russian volunteers, as well as part of the 110th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps, several reserve rifle regiments and from the Territorial Forces, and elements of the 3rd Corps. Despite the losses recorded in Avdiivka have often been older vehicles (T-72Bs, BMP-1s, MT-LBs), I was surprised to see even some T-80BVMs, a sign that some 1st Corps' units had recently received modern gear.

As far as the Ukrainians are concerned, the area to the east of the Pervomaiske’s dachas up to the town of Avdiivka is under the responsibility of the 53rd Mech Brigade. In Pervomaiske and Nevelske there’s the 59th Motorized Brigade. The eastern flank of Avdiivka, the one looking towards the H20 Highway, is covered by the 110th Mech Brigade. In the city there is the 3rd Special Purpose Regiment of the SOF and the Kyiv Regiment from the Police. Along the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway there are the bulk of the 116th and 129th TDF Brigades, and elements of the Presidential Brigade have arrived from just further north to provide support. Rybar spoke of the 31st Mech Brigade being present in the rear of Avdiivka on the day when the offensive began but I’m not aware of that at all. I personally am not aware of any Ukrainian reserves being sent from other sectors at the moment. On the FB page of the 63rd Mech Brigade (active in Kreminna sector) they had posted a video of the work of a FPV drone of theirs writing it was in Avdiivka, but as far as I read in the comments a soldier corrected them saying it was in Kreminna.

In Marinka, the “longest town in the world” (quoting Girkin), the Russians had made some advances during the spring but are now stalled again, despite controlling around 70% of the settlement. The units trying to advance there are the 103rd Motorized Regiment of the 150th Motorized Division and the 5th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps. The latter brigade also tries to push towards Krasnohorivka (the town north of Marinka), without success. Just below Marinka there are two motorized regiments (the 33rd and 255th) of the 20th Motorized Division, which have unsuccessfully attempted attacks towards Pobjeda. The area from Krasnohorivka to the “corner” of the frontline is covered by the Ukrainian 79th Air Assault Brigade along with some TDF battalions.

Just south of the area of responsibility of the 20th Division, the jurisdiction of the Eastern Military District begins. Specifically, the 68th Corps is deployed there. The Avdiivka affair completely captured the media’s attention, but during this month there were several important Russian attacks towards Novomykhailivka, with varying degrees of success, by the 39th Motorized Brigade. In the “corner” that the frontline forms between the Marinka and Vuhledar sectors, a number of motorized battalions from the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, a very unusual type of formation (actually a brigade) embedded in the 68th Corps, have recently arrived. As I said, Novomykhailivka has been experiencing very heavy attacks during these past two weeks, supported by vehicles and artillery. In addition, the Russians have reportedly moved some Storm Z detachments into the area. The 39th Brigade is attacking northwards from Solodke and westwards from Slavne, advancing particularly in the former direction. In some places they would have advanced as far as 1,5 km. At the moment the Russian advance is contained and the 79th Brigade is doing its best, but this brigade is over-stretched (particularly after the departure of the 35th Marine Brigade from Krasnohorivka) and I think the deployment of some reserve may be necessary.

According to Mashovets, the Russians have not given up their ambition to dislodge the Ukrainians from that “corner” (called the “Volnovakha direction” by the Ukrainians), primarily because they are too close to the Donetsk-Volnovakha-Melitopol railway (less than 8 km in some places), which the Russians would be restoring and therefore they wish to, at least, take it out of Ukrainian mortar fire.

The 30th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Army of the Central Military District (which Mashovets said he was keeping an eye on, since it had been seen moving from Svatove towards the Donetsk Oblast), could have just arrived in the Volnovakha area. In general it seems that the whole 2nd Army is being moved from Svatove. I had seen on Telegram yesterday a POW from the 15th Motorized Brigade (same army) captured in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast - although it could be a mistake and it’s still too early to confirm a transfer of this brigade. Let’s recall that the 2nd Army was heavily involved in the clashes around Novojehorivka. Part of the 41st Army (CMD) is also reportedly moving to the southern front, with two brigades of this army reportedly arriving in Kherson. Coupled with the gradual restoring of the 1st Tank Army (between Kupyansk and Svatove) and the arrival of the new 25th Army between Svatove and Kreminna, it appears that the two “veteran” Central MD’s armies will be used as reinforcements in other sectors. This represents a major turning point and tells us about the constant Russian need for new reserves - Central MD’s formations since July 2022 had never been deployed south of the Siversky Donets (except for elements of the 80th Tank Regiment that were in the southern flank of Bakhmut during this summer).

My summary of the events in this sector and in Avdiivka is: the Russian attacks have failed, but watch out - they will by no means be the last ones. Perhaps the Russians might want to continue to send to the slaughter their 1st Corps in order to create attrition in the Ukrainian units (and perhaps force them to take reserves from elsewhere) and then move into attack again employing more competent formations. I don’t see any short-term risks either in Avdiivka or in the Volnovakha direction but never let your guard down and be complacent (the Ukrainians know this well - I’m not referring to them). Realistically in the coming weeks there are going to be other heavy attacks in this area of the front. The Russians have not given up on the Vuhledar area either. And as for the directions of a potential Russian winter offensive, Mashovets highlighted three options: Kupyansk, Lyman, Avdiivka. I personally feel like ruling out the second option, although strategically it would make sense. Kupyansk (i.e., Kupyansk-East actually, much of the city is west of the Oskil…), will in any case be difficult to take but could be feasible in theory - Avdiivka will be very, very, very difficult but the Russians could try their luck if they have enough reserves to burn. It remains, in my opinion, that Putin will probably push for a shorter-term victory to sell to the public.

In the coming days we will talk about what’s going on from Vuhledar to Kherson.

Thank you so much!! Trying my best.

Honestly, I have no idea about the first question. Russia definitely uses EW instruments in the hottest areas that hinder the drones, but they aren’t perfect and work just at closer range to the drone afaik.

For the second question, Russian rotations and gear transfers happen at night mostly, but it’s very rare for attacks to take place at night, especially if they are mechanized. I’m not an equipment expert but the Russian vehicles that can efficiently operate at night aren’t that widespread among the units and I think only certain branches like the VDV could have the means, adequate night vision devices at individual level, and the capabilities for similar things. But in any case it’s really rare.

Thank you and u/Veqq for the suggest! I started posting here for the first parts so I will finish on the megathread for this time, but really will consider making a stand-alone post for potential future updates.

Thank you! The Russian grouping is growing - I wrote about that here. This doesn’t mean that the Russians cannot have and aren’t having serious problems at the tactical level in certain areas. Their attrition in the sectors of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is very high, but they manage to make up for that, at the moment, by sending additional reserves. In turn, Ukrainian attrition is also significant. I think we can be pro-Ukraine without believing that a Russian collapse is imminent. Ukrainian strategy is in any case aimed at attrition. Whether it will work, we shall see. It will not be easy, we just can hope for the best. In any case, attacking in other sectors is the Russian standard, both to force Ukrainians to transfer reserves and to try to achieve successes to sell to the public.