Update on the order of battle of (mostly) the Tokmak sector. The grouping of Russian troops is increasing more and more. I will try to make a list of Russian (and Ukrainian) units deployed in the sector, counterclockwise. The sources are the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets, the Centre for Defence Strategies, various Telegram channels. Btw I recently discovered a large Russian Telegram channel that publishes the KIAs/MIAs, the latter sent by their families. In the case of the MIAs, there is also usually their unit and the place of last contact, which is a huge clue for those like me who are passionate about keeping track of where Russian units are.

Kopani would be garrisoned by probably 2 battalions of the 503rd Motorized Regiment (19th MRD), supported by a battalion of the 4th Military Base.

The 104th VDV Regiment (76th Division) would have replaced the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and is deployed between Kopani and the fields just to the west of Robotyne. The 810th NIB would have been withdrawn from the sector (and sent either around Kamyanske or to Kherson) due to the attrition experienced in three months of actions, except for one company of the brigade that would have been attached to the 76th VDV Division. Particularly between August 24 and 26 (during the urban battle for the southern part of Robotyne) the brigade seems to have suffered very heavy losses. The rotation between marines and paratroopers would have allowed the Ukrainians to record a considerable advance in Robotyne and surrounding areas.

As I got it, the 104th VDV Regiment has counterattacked several times and on several occasions it managed to occupy some streets in the southern part of Robotyne. Then it has been driven out, although at a cost to the Ukrainians. Just to the south there would be the 234th VDV Regiment while the 237th (the only one at the moment entirely in reserve, apparently) would be to the southeast of Ilchenkove according to some unconfirmed rumors. The tank battalion of the 76th VDV Division with its T-72B3s is also in the area.

The 291st Motorized Regiment (42nd MRD) had massive losses, being the unit that has defended the settlement of Robotyne since early June. It had been brought to the first rear line and would have been restaffed - the regiment being among those to have received a fourth motorized battalion as far as I read. It’s now active just to the south of Robotyne and it’s involved in counterattacks.

The hills between Novoprokopivka and Verbove are reportedly in the hands of two regiments from the 2nd Corps: the 201st and 210th. They were sent last month as low-level manpower to slow down the Ukrainians as much as possible and have reportedly already suffered considerable losses. Between Novoprokopivka and Verbove there are also the 1429th, 1430th, and 1441st Regiments of the Territorial Forces, which in any case have been there for months now and all three of them have suffered massive losses. On paper they are motorized regiments, but in fact they are rifle regiments with fewer personnel than expected and with very little armored component (we’ve all seen the video of the T-55As assigned to the 1430th Regiment, haven’t we?). According to Russian casualties reports, there would also be elements of the 1455th Regiment; the 1152nd Regiment of the Territorial Forces has also been reported there.

Recently the 387th Regiment of the Mobilization Reserve, part of the 44th Airborne Division, has also arrived near Verbove. This is a very interesting classification. The name Airborne is due to the fact that the mobilized of this regiment were trained in the VDV training center in Ryazan and would have received some VDV officers. But it’s not considered an actual part of the VDV by the Russians (unlike the 104th VDV Division which is being formed). In fact, the Telegram channels associated with the VDV never mentioned the 44th Division. I find it difficult to think of it as a particularly competent unit.

Let’s recall that VDV also has many mobilized within its ranks. From that Telegram channel, it seems that, where it’s specified, almost half of the VDV troopers dead/missing in the recent months were mobilized. Another part are contract soldiers who signed during 2022. But as I often say, being mobilized isn’t in itself a guarantee of being a bad soldier, especially if they have past experience in the corps and the officer cadre is decent.

Verbove is defended by the 100th Reconnaissance Brigade. There are four BARS detachments in the area, all of them largely attrited. The 71st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd MRD (or at least the vast majority of its elements) would also have been moved near Verbove and hence joined the rest of the division, after it had been defending Rivnopil and Pryyutne since the beginning of actions in June.

The 56th VDV Regiment would have arrived in the Tokmak sector (from Kherson) during the very last days of July: MIAs from this unit were recorded in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast since July 31. It has likely suffered not negligible losses. Just after its deployment it was joined by the 108th VDV Regiment. The Challenger 2 of the Ukrainian 82nd Brigade was reportedly knocked out by a Kornet ATGM of this regiment. Small trivia: the 108th Regiment had several MIAs with whom they lost contacts in the early morning of June 6, when the Kakhovka Dam exploded. Probably a forward observation point was swept away by water. They were never found.

In the last week even two battalions of the 247th VDV Regiment, which had been assigned to cover the area between Staromaiorske and Pryyutne (Velyka Novosilka sector) since late June, have reportedly arrived. Despite the fact that the Russians in this week have managed to counterattack and recovered some ground in that small salient that emerged north-east of Pryyutne, the sector of 5th Army has been weakened by such redeployments. Now, to my knowledge, the area between the Mokri Yaly River and Marfopil is covered by the 127th MRD and the 60th MRB, the latter being in pretty bad shape. They are supported by the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, with the 136th MRB of the 58th Army in the second lines (it’s the last unit of this army outside of the Tokmak or Kamianske sectors). The other bank of the Mokri Yaly, the one under the responsibility of the 36th Army, has the 34th Mountain Brigade (49th Army) as its tactical reserve: in the absence of available paratroopers or marines (with the the bulk of the 40th NIB busy around Novomaiorske), it’s up to the mountain infantrymen the task to support the other units and to counterattack, also given the low logistical footprint and thus the rapid mobility of this kind of formation. The 247th Regiment was employed in many counterattacks in this sector and according to Russian sources as well it took very significant casualties. With this, practically the entirety of the 7th VDV Division has been deployed in the Tokmak sector, covering the eastern flank of the salient, from Verbove to the north. The 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade is also there.

Finally, Novopokrovka is garrisoned by the 70th Motorized Regiment (42nd MRD), which has been tasked since June with preventing the Ukrainians from widening the flanks there, and so far has succeeded in that. It covers as far as the Konka River, where the “jurisdiction” of the Eastern Military District begins.

Have you noticed anything? Yes: the VDV is covering the flanks of the salient, while the southern line is covered by less capable units. This is no accident: the Russians have realized that expanding the flanks is the most important thing for the Ukrainians, and at the same time by concentrating on the flanks they will be able to attempt local counterattacks in order to annoy the Ukrainians. One thing I am convinced of, though, despite not being a military expert and beyond the short-term trends, is that the Ukrainians cannot aspire to get to Tokmak without massively expanding the flanks of their advance. Either eastward or westward.

Let’s recall that in the Polohy sector there is the 35th Army (currently on the podium of the most fresh Russian formations) with its three motorized brigades supported by the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment of the Caspian Flotilla. The question about why the Russians have resisted the temptation to touch even one of these units, preferring to bring in reinforcements from much further afield, is a very interesting one. We could certainly guess at least two hypothesis from that: the Russians consider crucial the holding of Polohy, precisely because an Ukrainian capture of that sector would mean that the latters would gain a huge “land support” to continue the actions towards Tokmak without a really uncomfortable flank; at the same time, it could mean that the Russians are aware of a Ukrainian grouping pointing towards Polohy that we don’t know about, and consequently they don’t feel safe to weaken that sector by removing even a single unit.

The alternative would be aiming to a breakthrough in the Kamianske sector along the Dnipro and take the areas around Mykhailivka. Without one of these two scenarios, I don’t see how the “corridor to Tokmak” can get longer and longer. It certainly cannot remain just 10ish km wide as it would be exposed to the risk of counterattacks and the Russians would have an easy game with the counterbattery game too. Second part below.

In any case, the deployment of a division of the new 18th Army to Kherson that happened during the last month could be a prelude to the departure of the elements of the 49th Army still deployed there: the 205th Motorized Brigade (whose recon units suffered heavy losses in the islands in front of Kherson recently) and two battalions of the 7th Military Base; Russian reinforcements also keep arriving in Bakhmut. According to multiple sources, the 61st NIB of the Arctic Fleet has arrived in Klishchiivka from Kherson. This deployment could mean that VDV units deployed in the southern flank of Bakhmut are considerably attrited, particularly the 31st and 83rd Brigades. It’s no coincidence that the Russians lately have also sent the 51st VDV Regiment of the 106th Division to Kurdyumivka, from Soledar. The 11th VDV Brigade would be divided between the center of Bakhmut and Andriivka.

The 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet is split: the 200th Brigade has been in the Dubovo-Vasylivka salient since early May and has had heavy losses; the 80th Brigade is in Kherson. From the casualties report I found confirmation that a regiment of the 18th Division of the 11th Corps of the Western MD would be in the salient mentioned just above, where there is also the 217th VDV Regiment of the 98th Division. Moreover, the 331st VDV Regiment of the same division took losses in Bakhmut in June. It may have sent elements to support the 217th, although for all we know it should be the last VDV unit still deployed around Kreminna. The recent Ukrainian advances in Opytne (near Avdiivka) may be due a weakening of the Russian grouping in that sector, following the dispatch of elements of the 3rd Corps to Bakhmut in the last months and the recent decision to employ the 110th Brigade of the 1st Corps as an operational reserve for the Vuhledar sector. Btw, Avdiivka has been such a meat grinder for the Russians.

As far as the Ukrainians are concerned, Kopani would be covered by the 65th Mechanized Brigade, which is usually ignored by many but has been fighting in the sector for three months and has supported most of the attacks of the 47th Mech Brigade, which is reportedly still active in Robotyne, together with separate battalions such as Skala. The Ukrainian thrusts southwards (targeting “Height 166”) in recent days would be the work of the 116th Mech Brigade. The Ukrainians would have managed to cut and take under fire contol the dirt road from Novoprokopivka to Verbove which passes right on the crest of the hills between the two settlements. Although I didn’t understand at what specific point. The 118th Mech Brigade is also in the area, as are the Spartan, Kara-Dag and Chervona Kalyna Brigades of the Offensive Guard, the latter having arrived last month and still very fresh afaik. In Verbove the 82nd Air Assault Brigade is attacking, while just southwest of that settlement the 46th Airmobile Brigade is active and achieving good results; this would be the brigade that passed the dragon’s teeth near Verbove.

The Ukrainian brigades that we know are present in the sector and were just marginally employed are the 117th Mech Brigade and the 71st Jager Brigade, the latter reconstituted after the losses on the southern flank of Bakhmut during January, it had spent the last few months in the relatively quiet (compared to others…) sector around Niu York. The 71st is part of the Air Assault Forces, which are becoming increasingly important in the Tokmak sector. The 78th Air Assault Regiment would also be in the area and is carrying out actions. I don’t feel I can rule out the 80th Air Assault Brigade coming there in the future, which at the moment is still in Klishchiivka where it has undertaken several assault actions, but all in all it should still be fairly fresh imho. Then there’s the 33rd Mech Brigade (with its Leopard 2A4s) which is facing Novopokrovka, although no significant offensive actions have been recorded in the area.

The Azov Brigade (Offensive Guard, not the 3rd Assault Brigade) that was active in this sector was reportedly transferred in August to the Serebrianka Forest, where it gained some positional successes. It has been a particular decision - it could be explained by the attrition of the brigades for the Protection of Public Order of the National Guard that held the forest for a long time - as the Kreminna sector was weakened tremendously by the Russians with the transfer of the 76th VDV Division that was previously fully deployed there.

Then there is the question of the transfer of the Russian 41st Army, which is the main force in the Kreminna sector. At the moment I cannot find any confirmation either from Russian or Ukrainian sources after Budanov’s words, so we will have to wait. There are also rumors that the new 67th Motorized Division of the new 25th Army may have been deployed to support the 144th MRD of the 20th Army in Kreminna, but that is also unconfirmed. That would be very strange because after the battles around Lysychansk and the attempted assaults towards Siversk, the formations of the Central Military District were sent north of the Siversky Donets in September 2022 and never returned below it, except for elements of the 80th Tank Regiment providing armored support in the southern flank of Bakhmut during this summer. Personally I am a little doubtful, we shall see. The departure of the 41st Army would massively weaken the Kreminna sector and allow the Ukrainians to take a breath in the area and perhaps move some brigades elsewhere. It’s also to be seen in which sector of the South the 41st could be deployed. It must be said that this formation has a history of cooperation with the 76th VDV Division during this conflict.

As for the new 25th Army, we are still months away from its full readiness. The acting commander is Seritsky, former deputy commander of the 36th Army. In fact we know that the formation is very close to the Eastern Military District (although I read that it should be part of the SMD) and therefore it would be very strange to think it’s going to be deployed to Kreminna, considering in the recruiting announcements as well it was written that it’s destined for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. When I have updates I will post them here.

Interesting addendum: Mashovets wrote that in the Tokmak sector the Russians are no longer allowed to fire “blindly,” but an order has been issued that artillery fires have to be limited and precise, and have always to take action after reconnaissance by drones. The units would have been ordered to transfer their equipment and carry out rotations only during the night to avoid being caught by the Ukrainians. By the way, the Russians are setting up five new heavy artillery brigades (one per each military district) that will be equipped with 203mm self-propelled howitzers pulled out of storage.

We can’t have accurate data, except when a leak comes out (for instance, a few weeks ago, it happened with the 247th VDV Regiment), the authenticity of which, however, can’t be confirmed and therefore we have to be careful. Usually if a unit has high losses it’s reported by Ukrainian observers, and in addition it can be also noticed by an unusually high number of obituaries in a short period of soldiers from a given unit.

Well certainly a medic from the 47th Brigade had said that the brigade’s losses had reached “4 figures”. Now, also considering the quality of their gear, we can at least hope that the KIA:WIA ratio is particularly favorable and in any case a good chunk of the wounded return to action.

However, if we consider that the new Ukrainian brigades are not particularly large (2/3 thousand men), we know that a really considerable percentage of the 47th Brigade’s personnel has been at least wounded and thus the brigade is far from being at 100% of its capabilities. We will see if the dozens of new incoming Bradleys will replenish all the losses of this brigade and which other brigades might receive them.

Sometimes the battalions of Ukrainian brigades engaged at the front gets restaffed with new recruits, others particularly attrited are withdrawn and rebuilt in the rear. The 47th Brigade is supposed to be composed of volunteers and not of mobilized men like the vast majority of new Ukrainian brigades and a good part of the veteran ones anyway. It remains to be seen whether there will be enough new volunteers after the circus that Markus pulled off in July that brought bad PR to a brigade that had got a lot of hype before, or whether it will receive new mobilized personnel; mind you, the flow of volunteers in Ukraine is still more substantial than people may assume and often involves young guys in their 20s, but volunteers-based brigades have become numerous and are competing with each other to recruit the most combative spirits.

I have no data/indications to make precise estimates of the status of the other brigades I mentioned. Certainly we have to keep in mind for instance that it had been said that during the failed attack of a Company tactical group of the 118th Mechanized Brigade between Robotyne and Verbove in late July, almost the entire unit was either killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Skala Battalion had a 75% casualty rate. By the way… my hot take is that the Ukrainians had more human casualties in the Velyka Novosilka sector than in the Orikhiv/Tokmak sector.

Has there been any significant effort by the Ukrainians to push towards Polohy?

Nope. For the rest, you are completely right. Even though, of course, we are just talking about what we know from open sources, we can’t know the stuff that’s going on behind the scenes (if the Ukrainians have stepped up their OpSec game) and doesn’t get recorded/reported.