An update on the new Russian formations. The sources are Ukrainian military observer Mashovets, Ukrainian think tank Centre for Defence Strategies, reports by Thord Are Iversen (former Norwegian officer who keeps track of the new Russian formations) and Azeri analyst Jahangir Arasli, who, thanks to his knowledge of the language, unearths many local Russian news articles about the new formations.

Mashovets this morning confirmed the deployment of elements of the new 25th Combined Arms Army in the Kreminna sector. The 164th Motorized Brigade would have been deployed to Zhytlivka and would be ready to enter combat around Dibrova, near the Serebrianka Forest. The 36th Motorized Regiment of the 67th Motorized Division would have been deployed in Chervonopopivka and may enter into action between Novosadove and Terny.

That’s the order of battle of the new army made by Defmon. According to what was originally announced, there should be either a second motorized division or a second motorized brigade as well, probably still being created. One of these regiments comes from Bashkortostan (which is a large pool of volunteer units afaik) and would consist of 2500 men.

Quite a lot of news have been going around about the military district to which the 25th Army belongs. Initially there was talk of the Central Military District. Then instead it had been confirmed by Russian sources that it will be associated with the Eastern Military District; an article in a Russian online local newspaper (tracked down by Iversen) basically wrote that yes, it will be formed within the latter but the army will eventually be part of the Southern Military District. Another article had been published a couple of weeks ago about the deployment to the front of the Bashkortostan Regiment in an unknown sector under the responsibility of the SMD. The acting commander of the 25th Army was the former deputy commander of the 36th Army of the EMD at the start of the conflict, then he was the chief of staff of the 14th Corps of the Arctic Fleet. At least the initial phase of the training is supposed to take place in the Vladivostok region (except for the Bashkortostan Regiment which was trained in Samara) and it was reported that 10 thousand officers and contract soldiers from the Eastern Military District’s armies were to be transferred to the 25th Army, which is supposed to have 30 thousand men. Tbh this leaves me skeptical, because it would considerably bring down the operational capabilities of the existing EMD formations that are already, all of them, very busy on the Southern front. It would make little sense to send an E/SMD formation to the north of Siversky Donets River, which has been the sole responsibility of the W/CMD for over a year. I wouldn’t know what to think about that, even because in the ads to recruit volunteers for the 25th Army it was literally written that it would be destined for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. I see two possible options: the Russians changed their minds and framed it in the CMD (for Mashovets it’s part of the latter district in fact); or at the moment the 25th Army would still be in an embryonic state as a stand-alone formation, with the Russians needing to hastily transfer to the front the war-ready elements of this army, under the command of a different formation. It’s possible that this army could be formed in two separate stages.

The “jurisdiction” of the Central Military District ranges from the Svatove sector (where units of its 2nd Army are fighting between Raihorodka and Novojehorivka) to the Siversky Donets River in the Kreminna sector, where the 41st Army is deployed, supported by elements of the 98th VDV Division (in theory the 331st Regiment should still be in the area, although elements of this unit may be in Bakhmut with the rest of the division - the artillery regiment of the 98th is also deployed in Bakhmut) and until last month by the entirety of the 76th VDV Division. Also between Svatove and Kreminna there is the 20th Army of the Western MD: its 144th MRD is active just to the north of the Serebrianka Forest while the 3rd MRD is currently mainly used as a tactical/operational reserve in the Svatove sector.

At the moment the deployed elements of the 25th Army would in fact have been attached to the 41st Army, which continues to be deployed in the Kreminna sector. It’s important to emphasize this because according to Budanov, sending the 25th Army into the area would have been instrumental in order to transfer the 41st Army to the Southern front. It’s possible that at the moment the 25th Army still doesn’t have a working general staff and is still too weak to be deployed as a stand-alone formation in a given sector and therefore needs to be framed in another army.

The 41st Army itself is not particularly competent (it can boast the crossing disaster of the Siversky Donets in May 2022), but it’s pretty large compared to the average: two motorized brigades, a mountain brigade and a tank division are its maneuver formations. This army has been covering the Kreminna sector since October of the last year, when it was beaten in the battles between Lyman and Yampil. A deployment of the army to the Southern front (which has never seen the presence of CMD formations during this conflict) would be a very strange thing. It’s possible that the Russians are in a situation where they have no other choice though. If the dispatch to the South is confirmed, I find it possible that they will wait for the arrival of the rest of the 25th Army and then transfer the whole Kreminna sector into their hands. The 41st Army is certainly not at 100% capacities but should still be in acceptable conditions to withstand a deployment to an area far hotter than Kreminna. The 90th Tank Division during the spring received batches of T-90Ms and T-80BVs, certainly an improvement compared to the T-72A/Bs they entered the Chernihiv Oblast with, back in February 2022.

It has to be said that the 41st Army has a history of cooperation with the VDV, particularly with the 76th Division. The deputy commander of the 41st Army, Sukhovetsky, was killed in Hostomel. Actually, the 41st Army’s task was to take Chernihiv, cross the Desna River and reach Kyiv from the east. It was a resounding failure: its three brigades (35th, 55th, and 74th) were defeated in the siege of Chernihiv while the 90th Tank Division was ambushed several times on the way to Kyiv (also owing to a lack of dismounts) and was finally stopped and then pushed back in Brovary. It was the biggest debacle of the early phase of the conflict, along with the fuck-up of the 1st Tank Army between Sumy and Kharkiv. What was Sukhovetsky doing on the other side of the Dnipro? It’s possible that the 41st Army was subordinate to Serdyukov and the VDV General Staff, i.e. the protagonists of the plan to seize Kyiv. In May and June 2022 elements of the 90th Tank Division and 76th VDV Division attacked together in the Lysychansk sector, specifically to the west of Hirske in the clashes to cut the T1302 Highway. The armored vehicles of the 90th Division for instance bore the “V” mark (typical of the VDV) instead of their own “O”. Then the 76th was sent to Kherson where it remained until the Russian withdrawal; the fates of the two formations met again in November, since then the 41st Army and the 76th VDV Division fought side by side until last month in the Serebrianka Forest. The 90th Tank Division, which fields BMPTs, was instrumental in providing armored support and increased fire volumes to VDV units.

Mashovets last month spoke of the deployment of the 70th Motorized Division of the new 18th Combined Arms Army in the first rear line near Kherson. It’s a full-manned division: three motorized, one tank and one artillery regiments. It would have been transferred from Crimea according to what he said, where it was probably trained. At least one regiment appears to be largely made up of Dagestanis.

Meanwhile, it had been said that the new 18th Army will include two corps: the 22nd and the 40th. The 22nd Corps already exists (since 2016), it’s formed by the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade and the 127th Reconnaissance Brigade and is deployed near Kherson. The 40th Corps is being formed and had been said to be composed by the 47th Motorized Division and the 144th Motorized Brigade. It will definitely be part of the Southern Military District and will be led by the former commander of the 22nd Corps.

The 47th MRD would be formed in Crimea, and includes many mobilized locals. If there’s anything I have tried to figure out but have not been able to, it’s to get whether the 47th and 70th are the same division that perhaps changed numbering during the recent months or they are two different divisions. I personally lean toward the first hypothesis, but we cannot know that for sure yet. In any case, the deployment of this division allowed the 7th VDV Division to be sent to the Orikhiv sector (okay, surely the quality of the two formations is not remotely comparable).

The personnel of the 144th MRB appears to be largely made up of volunteers (and perhaps mobilized?) from the North Caucasus, such as Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. They would have carried out the first phase of training in Stavropol (where the 40th Corps is based) and are now finishing the training in Crimea. I find it likely that once they are done with the training they will join the rest of the 18th Army in the Kherson Oblast along the Dnipro, allowing other units, such as the elements of the 49th Army still in Kherson or the 80th Brigade of the Arctic Fleet, to depart towards the Southern front. Second part below.

What is certain is that initially the time frame for setting up the new formations was thought to be longer, but it seems that the Russians are cutting the time frame as much as possible.

CDS states it’s likely Russia will have another wave of mobilization in the fall, with a call to arms of 170/175 thousand reservists. By the end of the year, the Russian government also hopes for 130 thousand new contract personnel. This number may actually seem exaggerated, like Medvedev’s statement earlier this month in which he said that 280 thousand contracts would have been signed in 2023 so far. What’s sure is that mobilization efforts in 2023 had slowed down substantially and the new recruits of this year (although I doubt Medvedev’s numbers) are mainly contract soldiers: the wages, bonuses, promised support measures to the families, etc. are enough to attract enough a sizeable amount of desperate people from the poorest regions of the country. Immigrants from Central Asian countries who obtain Russian passports would also being pushed into signing. Young guys from the military service, who cannot be sent to Ukraine, can however sign a contract already after the first month of service. There have been cases of officers pressuring conscripts to sign. It’s rare compared to the total, but I occasionally come across obituaries of fallen Russian soldiers who were born in 2003 or 2004.

There are no updates on the intention to divide the Western Military District between the Moscow and Leningrad MDs.

The Rosgvardia is also reportedly creating new units. Between Donetsk Oblast and Crimea, the 116th Special Purpose Brigade is being formed. It’s supposed to field a tank company; it will be motorized with MRAPs. The Ministry of the Interior, of which the Rosgvardia is part along with the police forces, would have staffing difficulties: in July alone, 5000 policemen took early retirement. This is contrary to Putin’s intentions to increase personnel in these branches as well.

Russian federal subjects would have been allowed to create (and fund) their own military units outside the Ministry of the Defense, for internal use. Belgorod Oblast is reportedly creating eight battalions to garrison the area near the Ukrainian border. The oblasts are being pushed by the federal government and evaluated based on the speed and the amount of new units they assist in creating.

Irregular formations continue to exist, although under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The “Cossack Volunteer Assault Corps”, consisting of four brigades (three of which already exist and have been active in Ukraine since last year) and 20 thousand men, has been formed. Volunteers in this Corps have to sign contracts with the MoD; the Corps encloses several BARS detachments and the PMC Redut. The PMC Sokol-1, owned by the magnate Deripaska (who owns Rusal) and close to the 7th VDV Division, is reportedly converting into an air assault regiment. My theory that some of the members of the dissolving PMCs might be destined for the VDV would thus find confirmation. Recall that the latter is forming two new regiments to be assigned to the 98th and 106th Divisions; it’s also forming a new division (the 104th, which should be formed by the 31st VDV Brigade, a regiment of the Territorial Forces and another one formed by elements of the 83rd Brigade) and an artillery brigade. New VDV brigades might be created in the future. Then there is the 44th Airborne Division, which, however, owes its name to the fact that it’s trained in Ryazan by the VDV but I’m not sure whether it’s going to be an integral part of the paratroopers; it consists of a regiment from the Mobilization Reserve and one from the Territorial Forces. The “Hispaniola” Battalion, active in Bakhmut, close to PMC Wagner and formed by football hooligans with far-right sympathies, is set to become a special forces unit (it already boasts an UAV company). In Kherson a militarized detachment made up of local collaborationists is deployed.

On September 1 in Russian military academies 15 thousand people began training to become officers. Among them are 1500 veterans selected to become officers. The courses have been shortened by at least 2 months for the young aspiring officers. Meritorious veteran sergeants and warrant officers will be able to become lieutenants with a 2-month rushed course. That’s a sign, along with the fact that the age up to which a retired officer can be recalled to service was raised to 70, that Russia needs a flood of officers for the new formations and to replenish losses. Recruitment in the prisons and penal colonies for Storm Z units is going on as usual; there is, of course, the question regarding for how long they will still find available prisoners. Sending them on a mandatory basis might be a bad idea in my opinion. That’s all for today.