I take the opportunity to try to answer to the question below in the thread by u/Velixis about Ocheretyne and to write about the developments that have occurred over the last week in both the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors.

In the Avdiivka sector, between Saturday and Sunday, there was a failure of the Ukrainian defense in the Ocheretyne area and the Russians (units of the 2nd CAA of the Central MD) managed to pull off a significant advance (over 4 kms in the direction of Ocheretyne), capturing the area of the junction between the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk and the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway lines as well as Hill 240, along with the Ukrainian trenches near this tactically important height. This came after early last week the Russians (in this case, the 132nd Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) had attacked Novokalynove from the east and the south and advanced to the gates of the village.

The Russians have taken control of the first buildings of the private sector in Ocheretyne, south of the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway line. They are also currently attempting to advance towards Novokalynove, with the aim to move the front line away from the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railway, and they also occupied the eastern part of Novokalynove, attacking from the east. The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko has written several times in the past two weeks that the Russians have been using a large number of KABs against Ocheretyne, more than anywhere else in the Avdiivka sector. The Ocheretyne area is very important because it sits on a ridgeline that acts as a watershed between the surrounding valleys (when Avdiivka was in Ukrainian hands it was also important logistically, ensuring the arrival of supplies from the Nova Poltavka area). The control of these heights is essential from the strategic-operational point of view to ensure potential advances in the directions of Pokrovsk/Selydove (south of these heights) and Toretsk (north). Tactically, the Russian gains significantly jeopardize the holding of Novobakhmutivka, towards which there have been other Russian gains, having occupied the forest belt east of this village. The latter successes are also linked to the taking of most of Berdychi (the part of the village to the east of the Durna) and the fact that the Russians bypassed, from the south to te north-west, the spring of the Durna. In contrast, the 47th Mechanized Brigade managed to push the Russians back by preventing them from descending from the spring of the Durna along its western bank. If the Russians were to take Novobakhmutivka, however, there would be serious problems with holding the area around Berdychi located in the western bank of the Durna.

The issues in this area began when the 71st Jager Brigade was moved to the southern flank and joined the 25th Airborne Brigade, the 78th Air Assault Regiment and the 53rd Mechanized Brigade in halting Russian attacks between Umanske and Netailove. It was replaced by the 115th Mechanized Brigade, which arrived from the Kupyansk sector. As soon as it arrived it began to lose positions near Novokalynove and later near Ocheretyne too. This is not the first time this brigade has created problems: it was directly responsible for troubles at the time of the battle of Severodonetsk in May 2022. We can rightfully talk about the various shortages, but it’s a fact that there are good brigades and… not very capable brigades. From what I read from Ukrainians, many internal reforms and changes inside the UAF are on the agenda. I hope one of these may be, as some propose, the introduction of divisions based on capable brigades, that include less capable ones under their control. That would also help in order to decrease the widespread phenomenon of unit melting pots that often damage communications (a battalion of a mechanized brigade, a TDF battalion, a company of the National Guard etc. in the same place).

DeepState also remarked how the brigade that used to cover the area of Ocheteryne/Novokalynove was shocked at how fast the positions were lost, which is putting the territory under the responsibility of the 47th Brigade at risk, as I wrote above. I read that in the 115th Brigade there are serious problems both with the command and with the poor training of its soldiers.

I can now also confirm what I had written last week: it’s the 68th Jager Brigade that is covering the Semenivka area, with support from elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade. In this village the Russians (114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps) advanced, during the last week, almost to the junction with the small road leading to Novoselivka Persha, i.e. to the middle of the village, also taking control of the strip of land between the two lakes created by the Durna River. The village itself is of little tactical importance, being in the lowland along the Durna valley. What matters are the Ukrainian trenches just west of the village (still in Ukrainian hands) and the heights between Semenivka and Novoselivka Persha, towards which the defense priority by the Ukrainians is going.

Further south, the Ukrainians are able, at the moment, to keep the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division of the Central MD and the 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps out of Umanske - in recent days videos released by the “Sparta” Recon Battalion of the 1st Corps have shown activity against the Ukrainians in the northern part of the forest belt located to the east of the southern part of Umanske, which DeepState has been giving in Russian hands for a week. Also a few days ago a Russian attack was repelled in the fields north-east of Netailove, suggesting a possible advance in the area - the Russians want to occupy the forest belts just to the east of the road between Umanske and Netailove.

Let’s now review the events in the Bakhmut sector. In mid-March, the need for a rotation emerged because the 42nd Mechanized Brigade and 17th Tank Brigade, which were fighting between Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske, were exhausted. The choice fell on the 67th Mechanized Brigade, which at the end of 2023 received a major replenishment in terms of mobilized personnel and equipment. This brigade had shown itself as being capable and determined in the past, so great things were expected, even though the task was very difficult: protecting the entryways to Chasiv Yar, from the north (i.e. from Bohdanivka, along the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway), from the center (i.e. the vast system of trenches east of the broadleaf forest, against Russian attacks from the area of the Khromove cemetery) and from the south (i.e. the “Stupky-Golubovski 2” nature reserve area, against Russian attacks from the northern part of Ivanivske).

First, the Russian successes in Ivanivske were important in complicating the situation in the direction of Chasiv Yar. Here the major responsibilities lay with the command of the 5th Assault Brigade and the inability of TDF units to hold the positions - not for lack of courage, but lack of means and of quality (or existence itself!) of physical defense infrastructure.

Around March 21/22, the positions east of the broadleaf forest (under the responsibility of the 67th Brigade), were lost to powerful attacks by the 98th VDV Division. The loss of these positions was rapid and unexpected; at that point the command ordered a counterattack - which failed, with losses. As far as Ruslan Mykula (one of the founders of DeepState) wrote, the over-formalization of command procedures made the situation much worse, there are serious responsibilities of the battalion commanders, and from the testimony of a soldier from another brigade, it seems that the command of the 67th Brigade has no idea how to conduct modern warfare.

Some sources accuse the brigade of discriminating between its volunteers (who are linked to Pravy Sektor and the DUK) and the mobilized, using the latters for expandable roles in order to protect the “core” of the brigade, which was damaged in a major way at the time of the battle of Bakhmut. From testimonies of soldiers of this brigade I read that they have always done their duty and everything possible, and the positions were held as long as possible, but the Russian attacks had too much intensity. In addition, a serious lack of EW systems (which is a widespread shortage pretty much everywhere else too) is reported. Last part below.

However, the Russians advanced rapidly into the broadleaf forest and on April 4, with a mechanized attack, they managed to occupy some houses at the beginning of the Kanal District, i.e. the part of Chasiv Yar east of the Donets-Donbas Canal. A few days later, the Russians registered an advance in the nature reserve “Stupky-Golubovski 2”, along a section that the 67th Brigade had just transferred to a battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade. At that point, during the first week of April, the 41st Mechanized Brigade arrived from the Kupyansk sector to try to stabilize the situation. This is also due to the fact that the 67th Mechanized Brigade is being almost dismantled, with transfer of its commanders and some of its soldiers. As far as I have read, those who were members of the brigade since 2022 (meaning they were volunteers and they were there because they had ties to the PS/DUK) are being transferred to other military units as infantrymen. I have read about drivers, signalmen, etc. from the 67th Brigade being sent as stormtroopers to the 41st Mechanized Brigade, for example (so they’d remain in the same area). The FB page of the Ground Forces wrote about this matter that in case of failures the Russians will not grant a second chance to the Ukrainians; an assault battalion of the 67th Brigade has become a separate assault unit and various decisions are being made to improve combat efficiency, pointing out that under martial law the management bodies are not required to give explanations for their choices.

Digressing, one thing I’ve heard is that Syrsky is really “mercilessly” converting a lot of people from rear roles and from branches like the Air Force into infantrymen, I think we’re talking about tens of thousands of people at this point. I’ve heard that in certain training centers the instructors are overwhelmingly working with re-training of personnel who used to be in the rear rather than with “new” mobilized soldiers. The separate rifle battalions of the 4xx-th series created during 2023 that are not part of the four infantry brigades are being organically assigned to the other brigades, to improve their endowment of infantrymen and the possibilities for inter-brigade rotation. For example: the 405th Battalion in the 32nd Mech Brigade, the 412th Battalion in the 59th Motorized Brigade, the 422nd Battalion in the 42nd Mech Brigade, etc.

The Russians in recent days have completed the occupation of the broadleaf forest and have arrived near the area of the holiday cottages between the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway and the Kanal District, which they are trying to occupy. Russian sources claim to have taken control of the first high rises in the Kanal District, but there is no evidence of this. Ukrainian observer Miroshnikov wrote the Russians have advanced along Zelena Street and clashes are underway.

From the FB profile of a soldiers of the 41st Brigade (Kir Sazonov), I read that the situation is difficult - everything is “raining” on Chasiv Yar: shells, KABs. However, he denies that urban fighting is taking place and at the moment the enemy is outside the high rises, despite the fact that a couple of times the Russians had entered the district.

The Russians are always attacking: both during the day, with mechanized and higher intensity attacks, and at night, with small groups infiltrating as close as possible to Ukrainian positions. This soldier speaks respectfully of the enemy: Russian paratroopers, who are described as young and prepared, and only the determination of the defenders is stopping the attacks, along with the precision of Ukrainian artillery, which has to do so much with little. According to this soldier, where there are experienced and motivated Ukrainian soldiers, great things can be achieved; where there are slacker and lazy (or, I would add, inexperienced) people, problems arise and often they and their fellow soldiers pay for their mistakes with their lives.

The Russians in the last week have consolidated control over the forest belt south-east of the Kanal District and are now trying to advance on the flanks. To the north, they are within a few hundred meters of Kalinina; the current status of the cattle breeding buildings between Bohdanivka and Kalinina is unclear. To the south, they are advancing along the nature reserve “Stupky-Golubovski 2”, coming within a few hundred meters of the canal. Ivanivske is not yet completely under Russian control, there is still a Ukrainian presence in the western end of the village. There is another issue, however. In that point (as just south of Kalinina too), the canal… doesn’t exist, meaning that it runs in two overground pipes as well as partially underground. It’s absolutely the area to watch most carefully, especially since it’s forested in both sides and it should be avoided at all costs that Russian assault groups manage to establish positions west of the canal (aided by the cover the forest provides), to then threaten the Novy District (the neighborhood of Chasiv Yar just west of the canal).

Moreover, should the Russians reach the canal on both the flanks, even if they don’t cross it, the holding of Kanal District would be extremely threatened, as it would be surrounded on three sides and with the canal to the west. And it will not be easy for the Ukrainians to choose to retreat, given the importance of the control of the district’s high rises.

I continue to monitor the situation and will keep you updated if there is any further important news.

Hmmm. Now we know why Zelensky wasn’t aggressively pushing for a rapid and thoroughly written mobilization bill. This was the solution.

Even Syrsky himself said this!

I remember having read from Ukrainian sources (I think they were quoting Syrsky) that there are about 300 thousand Ukrainian soldiers actually fighting on the front lines - most of the personnel in the UAF and other branches are employed in support roles or in the rear. But obviously only a part of them can be turned into an infantryman.

What they should understand, however (I’m sure Syrsky understands this, I am referring to Ukrainian politicians), is that this is a one-time solution to have the next few months covered while waiting for the mobilization (of the people currently outside the Defense Forces) to resume functioning more efficiently, certainly not a permanent solution to the problems in this regard.