Quick update on the stuff that wasn’t clarified (as we had not details yet) in my yesterday’s post about the tactical developments in Ukraine.
DeepState in tonight’s update seems to have confirmed that the former restaurant “Tsarska Ohota” in Avdiivka has passed into Russian hands. It’s strange that the Russians have not posted a video from there or hoisted their flag there, as they usually do in these instances: it’s possible that there is close fighting in the area. Russian sources report the presence of the former PMC (now “assault and reconnaissance brigade”) “Veterans” there. The area of the holiday cottages in Skotovata is a grey area, while the Russians have reportedly fully occupied the dachas in the vineyard area, south of the industrial zone, as well as the small quarry west of it. This certainly complicates the situation for the Ukrainians in the south of the city - the former restaurant was a very important stronghold. This doesn’t mean that the Russians will now have it easy. Fortunately, it seems (I repeat, it seems) that the Russian presence in the private sector along Soborna Street were mostly a few recon-in-force teams that got there due to the fact that they were not detected and there should be no stable Russian presence in that area. It’s possible that the Ukrainian lines now start around the first houses in the private sector. After all, the Russians captured the industrial zone (Promka) almost two months ago and have so far been unable to advance along the private sector of Yasynovskyi Lane. The Ukrainians should also have some trenches before Lisna Street, heading north-east from the former restaurant.
This, however, gives the Russians more tactical space to move against the city’s urban core and also could complicate matters for the future holding of the area known as “Cheburashka” (i.e. the junction between T-05-05 Road and the unfinished Donetsk ring road) and the nearby former anti-aircraft missile regiment base known as “Zenith”, two other important Ukrainian strongholds north of Spartak. In addition, DeepState reported that the Russians advanced about 700 meters halfway between the Avdiivka Sand Quarry (i.e. the big lake north-east of the city) and the H20 Road along the Kamianka creek - there are some dachas in the area. Russian sources were giving this area as being already under their control for a while already. Anyway, fortunately, that area is the valley of the creek and is at a low altitude, while to the south-east of the Sand Quarry there is a terrikon in Ukrainian hands that allows them to dominate the course of the Kamianka creek.
There are also updates from the Kupyansk sector, where DeepState had reported, the day before yesterday, that there had been a breakthrough of Ukrainian positions (held by the 103rd TDF Brigade), in the area between Tabaivka and Krokhmalne. The Russians managed to break through the Kupyansk-Svatove railway, which the Ukrainians were defending and which is located on high ground, relative to the area to the east and west. Today stormtroopers of the “new” 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA) posted a photo from inside the settlement of Krokhmalne. Tonight DeepState clarified the situation. The Russian breakthrough was significant: they advanced for a length of 2 to 3 kms in a 6 kms long sector, occupying Road P07 in the area, with a gain of around 13 square kilometers. The biggest problem here is the elevation: having passed the heights that run where the railroad passes, the Russians have descended along the ridges of the Pischana creek’s valley and are now approaching the creek (which passes inside Tabaivka), enjoying an elevation advantage. Here too, the situation is not dramatic. The Pischana is a tributary of the Oskil and has its source just before Tabaivka. The valley it forms is closed to the north (where there are heights from which it originates) and to the west there are other hills, all of them in Ukrainian hands. The situation is manageable if the Ukrainians play their cards right. The bulk of the 25th Airborne Brigade is deployed several kilometers south of this area, so I guess in case of need the paratroopers could bail out the others in this area as well, just like they are doing around Terny in the Kreminna sector right now.
They updated their map, showing the former restaurant going to grey area to red (Russian control). In their daily summary + analytical notes they should publish later they may write about it, and maybe, as they often do, in a few days they will make a longer post about this event telling the details on what exactly happened.
Fortunately, the situation is not so dramatic - the actual urban fighting has yet to begin, the Ukrainians have four roads from as many directions from which getting supplied. The main access road to the city (the one going though Lastochkyne) is safe from direct Russian fire and wide enough to allow the passage of vehicles without problems. Let’s recall the dirt road south of Khromove in Bakhmut that was the only remaining option in order to supply the Ukrainian garrison in the city and evacuate the wounded, and how many vehicles the Ukrainians lost there. The Ukrainians also have the underground shelters under the Coke Plant to store supplies and stabilize the wounded.
The situation in Bakhmut became so desperate when Berkhivka and Yahidne were lost in the second half of February, and the logistical complications arising from this, along with the beginning of the urban phase of the battle, considerably worsened the ratio of Ukrainian losses to Russian ones, such that a Ukrainian retreat from there would have been deeply necessary as early as late February. Avdiivka is, fortunately, not in this situation at the moment.
Shoigu spoke of “active defense” but in fact the Russians are on the offensive or at least on the attack along the vast majority of the front.
At the moment we are not close to the fall of these cities (and anyway Kupyansk is on the western bank of the Oskil, so at most we would be talking about the Kupyansk-East neighbourhood). For the very fact that Avdiivka is in a salient, the loss of the city would not have devastating effects, at least as long as the Ukrainians entrench the area in the rear. The Russians reported about fortifications building in the strategic depths (30 kms west of Avdiivka), which in fact would prevent tactical-operational defeats from turning into strategic problems. As for the Kupyansk sector, up there the Ukrainians have the Oskil River as a natural barrier. If the Russians managed do take the eastern bank, they could concentrate their efforts on an offensive against Kharkiv from Belgorod or incresing the intensity of their actions in the Lyman direction.
Wagner’s capabilities, despite having been equipped with armor and artillery and still receiving significant amounts of ammunition, peaked between December and January. After that, the VDV’s help in advancing on the flanks was important, and let’s take into account that from February they were prevented from recruiting convicts, and over the months the MoD’s salaries became increasingly competitive with Wagner’s, which affected their ability to find contract soldiers (although Wagner always had important demands in this context as a result of its popularity). Wagner’s revolt was due to the fact that Shoigu wanted to put the nail in the coffin to their autonomy by forcing them to come under MoD control (also as a result of their perceived successfulness), with the substantial end of Prigozhin’s authority.