Food for thought on Avdiivka. Last Friday Putin visited the Southern Military District HQ in Rostov-on-Don, where he also met with Gerasimov. What’s believed is that he confirmed his will to take Avdiivka.

Since the beginning of the war, most of the DPR Army, now 1st Corps, has been concentrated around Avdiivka. The large majority of the actions against the city have been the work of it. The DPR forces had immense losses against Avdiivka. Such sector has been, arguably, always one of the areas with the best UA:RU KIAs ratio for the Ukrainians. At times the regular army provided support. For example, in March 2023, when there were major advances (especially in the north-east of the city), there were also the 20th Motorized Division (8th Army, SMD) and the 136th Motorized Brigade (58th Army, SMD) deployed, respectively, in the southern and north-eastern flanks of the city, along with, probably, some elements of the VDV. This time, however, the 1st Corps (subordinate to the 8th Army) received a very important reinforcement: most of the formations of the Central Military District. This is afaik the first time that formations unrelated to the former DPR Army (or to the Southern MD) are active in Avdiivka and the first time since the beginning of the war that Central MD’s formations are deployed so far south. This may suggest something about the Russian determination right now regarding Avdiivka.

Firstly, let’s have a recap of the actions. As for the north-eastern flank, in April 2022 the Russians seized Novobakhmutivka. In the following August they managed to take Novoselivka Druha. In February 2023 the Russians began a major offensive in the area, eventually succeeding in capturing Krasnohorivka and Vesele. On the southern flank, progress came later. The situation was unlocked in August 2022, when the Russians succeeded in taking Pisky, thanks to a frightening artillery fire (I don’t know how many places had such a density of arrivals per square meter) that basically destroyed an entire battalion of the Ukrainian 56th Motorized Brigade, with the Ukrainians still having very serious fire and counter-battery capability issues back then. In November they managed to take Opytne, the southern part of Vodyane and reached the unfinished ring road in several points. In the February/March offensive they succeeded in taking all of Vodyane and pushed onto the first tree line to the north of the village.

The summer in Avdiivka was fairly quiet, thanks to the transfer elsewhere of the units outside the 1st Corps (including sending part of the 3rd Corps to Bakhmut). Several elements of 1st Corps were also deployed along the southern front to increase force density. Units from some brigades/regiments of 1st (and 2nd) Corps are being embedded in the most battered Russian formations in order to restaff them. In any case, during this period the formations of the 1st Corps received new personnel, new equipment, and stockpiled ammos.

Occasionally there was some action. The Ukrainians in September managed to undo what the Russians had gained to the north of Opytne during the winter and reached the gates of the settlement. The Russians, as was their standard from the spring onwards, attacked mainly on the eastern flank of Avdiivka, from the H20 Highway. Since October 1 there was an intensification of the actions (along with massive artillery/FABs arrivals), but the real offensive started on October 10. As I understand it, the Ukrainians didn’t expect such an offensive, the intensity of which was discovered the same morning thanks to the usual morning drone reconnaissance which proved crucial to repel the attacks.

Let’s have a list the elements of strength and risk in Avdiivka. The southern flank is the safest right now, in my view. Here the Russian advance has been minor and it seems to have been stopped altogether over the past week (except for some very small advances towards the dachas of Pervomaiske, just above the Novoavdeevskiy Stavok Lake). The Russians advanced, on average, a few hundred meters and only at a limited point (i.e. to the south-west of Sjeverne) they were able to take positions along the last “latitudinal” tree line before Sjeverne. The Russians would also have recovered the Optyne quarry they had lost in September.

At the moment I am not too concerned about this direction. The Ukrainians have entrenched every tree line and mined the fields; approaching the city of Avdiidkva there are several Ukrainian strongholds massively reinforced after 2015 that the Russians never captured: the former Air Defense base north-west of Spartak (beyond the unfinished ring road), the former “Tsarska Ohota” restaurant just before the Avdiivka-Jasynuvata railway, and the Donetsk Filtration Station just east of the H20 Highway (if anyone needs the coordinates - just tell me). Which is the reason why, for now, the Russians have never attempted to directly assault that area (from the Mineralne area) in force. In the southern flank it could be assumed that the 9th “Marine” Brigade of the 1st Corps is nearly exhaustion (the 1st Motorized Brigade of the same corps holds the areas of this flank closest to Avdiivka) and probably the Russians are waiting for the arrival of additional elements of the 41st Army (CMD).

The north-eastern flank is definitely the one which deserves a greater concern. The Russians reportedly succeeded in getting close to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway. From what I understand, the actions on the first day, October 10, would have resulted in a several hundred meters of gain by the 114th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps + a few supporting units. In the following days elements of the 2nd Army (CMD) entered the field. We had known for some time the 21st Motorized Brigade was in the area; the 15th Motorized Brigade is also confirmed to be in that area (the Storm Z detachment of this brigade was certainly involved, as was that of the 21st - moreover, the 15th fields BTR-82s); the 30th Motorized Brigade which was thought to have gone to the Volnovakha area (from Svatove, like the rest of the army) could also be in the north-east flank of Avdiivka. They would also have been reinforced by Spetsnaz detachments (from the 24th Spetsnaz GRU Brigade from Novosibirsk, usually attached to the 41st Army - probably those of the 3rd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade which used to follow the 2nd Army will also arrive or have already arrived), while now the 114th Brigade is more active in the Terrikon area.

As far as I got it, within days from the start of the offensive the Russians would have already come very close to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway. At that point there would have been a counterattack by elements of the 47th Mechanized Brigade (from the north-west) that drove the Russians away from that corner between the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk and the Ocheretyne-Horlivka railways. The Russians also were never able to pass the latter railroad and progress towards Novokalynove was extremely limited. They would, however, have been able to approach to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway in a section starting further south (from the dirt road leading to Krasnohorivka) down to the Terrikon, which the Ukrainians reportedly lost. This is certainly a negative development, because the Ukrainian lines on the fields between the railroad and Krasnohorivka during the last months had a favorable altitude advantage compared to the Russian ones. At present there’s no indication to claim that the Russians are setting up positions immediately close to the railroad, which is a formidable Ukrainian defense line.

Russian artillery is less effective in Avdiivka compared to other places. The Russians can see what the Ukrainians are doing on the surface with drones, but they cannot see what’s happening underground. Below the ground the Ukrainians rest, store ammos, stabilize the wounded, etc. I had wrote about this a few months ago here, based on an interview with a member of the “Pyatnashka” Battalion. This battalion, along with “Somalia” and “Sparta” are considered the elite of the former DPR Army. They are largely made up of volunteers from Russia proper. Despite the fact that the sector has always been very dangerous, these units manage to attract a number of volunteers who want to be deployed precisely in Avdiivka as they are sincerely convinced about the reports of “Nazi artillery shelling Russian children in Donetsk”. Avdiivka’s greatest importance is political. For the Russians, it represents a Ukrainian stronghold extremely close to the city of Donetsk and whose occupation is crucial for the “security” of the capital of the former DPR and for bringing forward the project of the “liberation” of Donbas. Strategically speaking, for the Russians, Avdiivka wouldn’t guarantee new operational depths that could make the capture of the city worth it, except, again, from a political point of view, and reflexively, considering the backlash to Ukrainian morale that the loss of the city would cause.

Andrew Perpetua had written about a potential shortage of shells on the Ukrainian side. I’m not aware of this, but if Perpetua wrote it, he had reasons to do so. What I’ve heard is that the Russians have noticed that around Bakhmut the Ukrainian artillery fire has decreased from the intensity of the past weeks and today, if we are to trust them, it’s for the vast majority DPICMs. Which could be, if true, an indication that they had to allocate higher volumes of standard shells to Avdiivka. The issue of mortar ammo is true, there’s always too little of it. Last part of my comment below.

The Avdiivka Coke Plant is built on the model of Azovstal. That means huge bunkers, with lots of reinforced concrete, built to withstand a nuclear war during the Cold War. There are also tunnels that start from under the coke plant. Since 2015 these tunnels have been expanded, and today to my knowledge they cover a good part of the city, with Ukrainian infantrymen being able to avoid going through the surface of the city. But… there’s a corollary to this. Avdiivka, from a military point of view, IS its coke plant. Without the plant, the city wouldn’t hold in my opinion. And moreover, the access road to Avdiivka passes just behind the plant. By taking the Terrikon, the Russians have come very close to the north-eastern boundary of coke plant. At the moment there are no reported Russian positions on this tailings heap. The tactical importance of this artificial hill in itself is not that high: other than a few observation/sniping points, heavy equipment can’t be deployed on the heap and the surface can be hit e.g. with cluster munitions. Still, the railroad dividing the coke plant from the Terrikon must be defended harshly and the Russians must be kept out of it. The Russians are using a large number of FABs against Avdiivka, particularly the coke plant, which, however, is built to resist heavy bombings.

The Russians are taking very high material and human losses, much more than the Ukrainians are. If I had to make an estimate, let’s say a 1:5 KIAs ratio wouldn’t even seem optimistic at all, at this stage. However, we have to have a discussion about the consequences of these losses. What are the acceptable losses, for the Russians? We don’t know. What are the losses that, even if successful, could make the operation a Pyrrhic victory with negative long-term consequences for them? We don’t know. We don’t know how many losses the Russians are willing to take to capture Avdiivka, but these could be really high. This is justified by the fact that there are not that many kilometers on which they have to advance to dangerously tighten the pincer and the Russians might accept a very high number of losses as long as it brings positional gains that they aim to consolidate. Once they’ve made gains, they could push again. It could be as early as next week, it could be in January/February 2024. But every 100 meters the Russians manage to take, the risks arise.

With the current situation the Ukrainians can afford just one “mistake” imho. That is the loss of Stepove/Berdychi or Sjeverne/Tonenke (on Tonenke I have doubts, being too close to Orlivka). The loss of the coke plant is not allowed. None of these situations is imaginable at the moment, but it’s what the Russians clearly aspire to (especially the first option). And such a mistake would greatly complicate things in the city nevertheless.

I see many comparisons with Bakhmut being made. I don’t agree that much with them. Bakhmut was a different battle in many respects. The flanks were massively bigger, and there were times when the Russians were able to achieve a legit breakthrough that got the Ukrainians into trouble, causing very high casualties (Soledar, first and foremost), well before the dirt road south of Khromove remained the only way to get in and out of the city. None of this happened in Avdiivka so far. There were slight Russian advances, but no unplanned breakthroughs, and Ukrainian losses were limited. Avdiivka’s network of tunnels and bunkers is unique. Moreover, urban warfare raged in Bakhmut during the last months. In regards to Avdiivka, I find likely that there will never be a real major urban battle. Also because the Ukrainian strongholds along the outskirts of the city are too strong. What I believe is that the Russians will try to advance further on the flanks. At that point: either they will continue getting pushed back, or they will advance up to a point that will force a Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka before there are chances for a pocket.

If we want to make a comparison, the Russians could aim for a maxi version of Zolote in June 2022, when the Ukrainian positions around (especially to the south) of this town were very strong and the Russians chose, and succeeded, to break through the flanks around Hirske further north, forcing the withdrawal of 2000 Ukrainian troops to avoid encirclement. But, again, this challenge (breaking through the flanks), for the Russians is, and will be… very, very, very difficult as well as costly. My mood remains the same. The situation at the moment is under control, but one must always keep an eye on the critical issues that are quite a few and always there.