This morning the Ukrainian military observer Mashovets published the most recent estimate (by Ukrainian military intelligence) of the Russian grouping deployed in Ukraine. I will also include the latest estimates for a comparison as well the one from April.
| Time period | Personnel | MBTs | AFVs | Artillery guns ≥ 100mm | MLRS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Late April 2023 | 396'000 | 1'764 | 4'289 | 2'994 | 870 |
| Early September 2023 | 420'000 | 2'260 | 5'260 | 3'050 | 920 |
| Early October 2023 | 429'000 | 2'347 | 5'653 | 3'186 | 974 |
| Late October 2023 | 441'700 | 2'324 | 5'661 | 3'148 | 982 |
I find likely that among the artillery guns, 120mm mortars are included in the estimate. To this we must add 46 operational-tactical missile launchers. This grouping is organized into 60 separate brigades (of each type), 137 regiments, 106 separate battalions and 46 detachments (BARS, Storm Z, Akhmat). In the waters of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, the Mediterranean and the Caspian Sea, the Russian Navy would have 116 ships and 4 submarines, of which 22 and 3, respectively, are capable of carrying out missile attacks. The air grouping (of the Air Force and of the Naval Aviation) concentrated for operations in Ukraine would have 322 combat, special and military transport aircrafts and 289 helicopters, including 123 attack helicopters (I assume largely Mil Mi-24 and Mi-28s, due to losses of Ka-52s).
I had commented on the estimate of early October here. As we see, manpower continues to grow (in large part due to the influx of new contract soldiers from poorer regions), but in October it looks like there has been an halt to the upward trend in equipment, I imagine largely due to losses around Avdiivka. This is a reversal of the trend which has to be noted, as it occurred despite the arrival (during the first half of the month) in the Kupyansk sector of the newly formed 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, WMD), which has 94 tanks according to Ukrainian military intelligence (as far as I have been able to find, they should be T-72B3M Obr. 2022 and T-72B Obr. 1985), 32 unspecified IFVs and 12 D-30 122mm howitzers. New formations of the 18th and 25th Armies are also continuing to be deployed along the front: the newly formed 144th Motorized Brigade (40th Corps, 18th Army, SMD) was reportedly recently deployed along the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast.
In the estimate of September, the intelligence had added that among the tanks deployed, T-55s and T-62s made up between 15 and 20% of the total. These two tanks have different uses: the former are generally T-55As, without any additional protection except for anti-drone cages and they seem to be assigned to regiments of the Territorial Forces (those of the 1***th series) as fire support vehicles; the T-62M(V)s are in somewhat better conditions (e.g. they have reactive armor) in order to be used as “normal” tanks, and are assigned to “regular” units: we have evidence that a portion of the nearly 100 tanks the 5th Tank Brigade (36th Army, EMD) fields are T-62Ms, as are those of the 138th Motorized Brigade (6th Army, WMD), and they also appear to have been issued to the new formations, such as to units of the 70th Motorized Division (18th Army, SMD) deployed in Kherson Oblast during August. Also, despite the fact that on paper there should still be many BMP-1s in storage, from Russian losses we see a growing number of MT-LBs being used for offensive purposes (often modified with more powerful weapons), and the Russian Telegram channel “Military Informant” reported a few weeks ago that many BTR-70s are being pulled out of storage and assigned to new units undergoing training.
P.S.: Rosgvardia is not considered in the estimates as it’s deployed in the rear. The latter is forming new units too, such as the 116th Special Purpose Brigade, which will be the first unit of the branch to receive a tank company (apparently, T-80BVs seized from the Wagner Group). There are also rumors that Rosgvardia may establish new units led by former Wagner commanders that could enclose former members of this PMC willing to sign a contract and return to combat - in a framework that seeks to give these units some autonomy and retain some the PMC’s former structure. Kadyrov had stated that 170 former Wagnerites signed contracts with Akhmat units (which are embedded in the Ground Forces, they are not to be confused with the Kadyrovites of the National Guard), although channels linked to the Wagner Group reportedly denied this. There’s bad blood between Wagner Group and Kadyrov - Grey Zone in the past has accused the Kadyrovites of cowardice and of staying safely in the rear, unlike the Akhmat units created during 2022, which are formed by volunteers from all over Russia (although mostly from the wider Northern Caucasus), are financed by the Chechen Government, are trained in the “special forces” training center in Gudermes (near Grozny) and are led usually by Chechen officers.
True, although deliveries of refurbished and improved T-62M(V)s are relatively recent and still ongoing. Many were captured during the Kherson campaign as you wrote, usually without even reactive armor - probably those from the storage that started and fired without need for repairs were sent to DPR units deployed to Kherson as fire support vehicles. Possibly during this year units of the 1st Corps received T-62MVs, considering that, from memory, most of those lost in 2023 were lost around Marinka. In any case, during the recent attacks on the northern flank of Avdiivka, a BTR-50 was lost too. Also in May, a train with T-64As was seen moving, in Russia.
The tanks used as fire support vehicles are often well hidden and not easy to spot, which could increase their survivability.
Another vehicle that the Russians have in abundance but haven’t seen much presence in Ukraine is the BRDM-2.
Yeah! Well… its armor is really poor. It will probably be the last resort. And by the way, the current season will not favor the use of BTRs and wheeled vehicles in general, for off-road purposes.
That’s not necessarily an evidence that Russian losses were lower than Ukrainian ones, as the Russian ability to replenish losses is greater than Ukraine’s, and the formations involved in the Avdiivka offensive were never deployed in the sectors affected by the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
I think it depends on the formation deployed during that day too - there are hints that the 15th Motorized Brigade (2nd Army, CMD), which fields BTR-82A(T)s, was being employed at that stage.